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1. Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE
In the early 1970s the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system was
abandoned in favour of flexible exchange rates. Since then, the exchange
value of the major currencies in the industrialized world is in principle
determined by market forces. However, in the present system of
managed floating the exchange rate is not the outcome of supply and
demand by private exchange market participants only. The monetary
authorities of many countries have frequently been trying to influence the
relative value of their currencies by exchange market interventions.
It is often argued that the proper functioning of the global economy
requires stable exchange rates. Yet, crucial exchange rates like the
Deutsche Mark-US dollar exchange rate and the Japanese Yen-US dollar
exchange rate experience recurrent cycles of appreciation and
depreciation. In the 1970s and early 1980s the Group of 3 (G-3)
countries Germany, Japan and the United States regularly resorted to
individual ad hoc policy measures to stabilize exchange rates. The rather
spectacular rise in the external value of the US dollar over the period
1983-85 led to a joining of forces. The Plaza Agreement of September
22, 1985 and the Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987 entailed major
changes in the coordination of exchange rate policies among the Group of
7 (G-7) countries. I Moreover, the establishment of these agreements
marked a change in the frequency and volume of official exchange
market operations conducted by the G-7 countries.
The aim of this book is to investigate the motives and constraints
facing central banks when they decide to engage in foreign exchange
intervention. The book is organized into eight chapters. The remainder of
this first chapter gives a concise description of the foreign exchange
market. Furthermore, it gives the definition of central bank intervention
that will be used throughout the book. In addition, it discusses the exact
implications of an operation in foreign currency by a central bank.
Finally, it introduces the channels of influence of central bank
intervention. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive survey of theories on
the scope for foreign exchange market intervention. The central question
is whether and how non-sterilized and sterilized interventions are able to
1
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influence the course of the exchange rate. Chapter 3 surveys empirical
studies which have been undertaken to assess which objectives the central
banks of the main industrialized countries pursued with their
interventions in the foreign exchange market. Moreover, this chapter
reviews empirical studies which address the question of whether, in
practice, (sterilized) intervention has been capable of exerting a
significant influence on the exchange rate.
Chapters 4-6 abandon the traditional structural exchange rate models.
The random-walk model or the GARCH model are used to investigate
empirically the short-term objectives and effectiveness of daily
interventions carried out by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System over the period 1985-90. Estimation results reported in Chapters
4 and 5 indicate that both the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System conduct their foreign exchange operations consistently. However,
the empirical evidence provided in Chapter 6 does not suggest that
intervention conducted by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve was
successful at systematically reversing unwanted movements in the DM/$
rate. The latter empirical result raises the question: why do central banks
continue to intervene? Chapter 7 is an initial attempt to provide a positive
theory of central bank intervention. It merges the insights derived from
Chapters 4-6 together with the insights derived from the recent game-
theoretic approach to monetary and fiscal policy.
To influence exchange rate movements interventions basically have to
alter the balance of supply and demand for foreign exchange. However,
average central bank transactions in foreign exchange are very small
compared to the daily turnover on the world foreign exchange market.
Furthermore, the central banks of most large industrialized countries
commonly neutralize the money-market effect of their intervention
operations. Therefore, these interventions, in essence, involve nothing
but a shift in the currency composition of private investment portfolios.
Consequently, it is unlikely that regular interventions have a significant
effect on exchange rates. In Chapter 7 it is argued that the introduction
of strategic behaviour by central banks can alter the scope for
intervention rather dramatically.
It is a fact of observation that private exchange market participants are
eager to detect any information related to official operations in foreign
currency. Central bankers, in turn, know that their actions are monitored
very carefully. Therefore, it seems to make sense to abandon the
assumption - which is implicit to the majority of studies on exchange
rate policy - that the central bank is regarded by private exchange
market participants as 'just another exchange market participant'.
Chapter 7 investigates the motives and constraints facing central banks
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when there is strategic interaction between the central bank on the one
hand and private exchange market participants on the other hand. It
analyses an exchange rate policy game between a central bank and
rational speculators under symmetric information. The central bank tries
to counteract shocks to the exchange rate by means of sterilized
intervention working through the expectations channel. Private
speculators resist being fooled. They anticipate the interventions. Chapter
7 studies the characteristics of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of
the resulting exchange rate policy game. Propositions derived from the
model are confronted with cross-country data. Moreover, attention is
paid to the exchange rate policy game with unequal status of the players
and to the game with asymmetric information of the central bank.
Chapter 8 provides a summary and concluding remarks.
1.2 THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
At present, the currencies of countries in the Western world are freely
exchangeable. This exchangeability or convertibility broadens the
spectrum of available goods and financial assets. enormously. For
instance, residents of the United States are allowed to exchange US
dollars for Japanese yen to buy cars manufactured in Japan.
Furthermore, Japanese pension funds can exchange the contributions they
receive in Japanese yen for US dollars to buy US government bonds.
In general, both international trade in goods and services and
international capital flows lead to demand for and supply of foreign
currencies." Obviously, the growth of world trade depends on the
international business cycle, i.e. the growth of world income. During the
period 1970-93 the annual growth rate of the volume of world trade
averaged 5.0 per cent. World trade growth in 1994 and 1995 is estimated
at 7.2 and 5.9 per cent, respectively (IMF 1994). The global foreign
exchange market would look rather tranquil if international trade in
goods and services were the only source of demand for and supply of
foreign currencies." In those circumstances, countries' trade deficits and
surpluses correct themselves through limited exchange rate adjustments.
Take the United States as an example. As of 1983 the US dollar value of
goods and services imported into the United States significantly exceeds
the US dollar value of goods and services exported by the United States.
In itself, the persistent trade deficit should lead to a drop in the external
value of the US dollar. For, given the US trade deficit, non-residents
selling goods and services to residents of the United States receive more
US dollars than US residents receive foreign currencies in exchange for
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the goods and services they export. On the assumption that agents only
want to hold the currency of the country in which they reside, an excess
supply of US dollars will arise on the global foreign exchange market. In
the case of freely floating exchange rates - which implies that central
banks will not eliminate the excess supply of US dollars - the external
value of the US dollar will fall. This raises the US dollar price of goods
imported into the United States. At the same time, for non-residents the
price of goods and services imported from the US becomes lower in
terms of their own currency. Under normal circumstances, i.e. when the
Marshall-Lerner condition holds, these price changes should be sufficient
to restore equilibrium on the US trade balance eventually.
From the close of World War I until relatively recently, most
countries' holdings of foreign assets have been limited both in quantity
and scope. Over the last twenty years, however, financial markets have
been liberalized significantly. In particular, international capital controls
have gradually been abolished. Presumably, this is one of the driving
forces behind the recent enormous growth of financial market turnovers
in general and the surge in short -term international capital flows in
particular. The enhanced international capital mobility regularly causes
countries' current accounts of the balance of payments to be swamped by
the capital accounts." Consequently, in the recent past, the global foreign
exchange market has only very seldom been a quiet place. Rather, the
market looks hectic and out of control. The course of the DM/$ rate over
the post-Bretton Woods period is depicted in Figure 1.1.
In general, institutional investors' holdings of foreign securities as a
percentage of their total securities holdings rises year after year.
Moreover, these international portfolios are managed very actively. In
April 1992 the daily average of global spot market turnover net of
double-counting arising from both local and cross-border interbank
operations was estimated to be $400 billion. This implies a 15 per cent
rise from the corresponding estimate of $350 billion for April 1989
(Bank for International Settlements 1993). To put these figures in
perspective, in July 1993 the stock of foreign exchange reserves
(excluding gold, IMF definition) of the G-I0 countries was equal to
$427.4 billion.' Due to the enormous magnitudes, even small changes in
international capital flows can have profound effects on the world
economy. Sharp gyrations in the Deutsche Mark/US dollar rate and the
Japanese yen/US dollar rate in recent years can mainly be attributed to
large portfolio shifts. The crises in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) in the autumn of 1992 and in the summer of 1993
were caused by massive speculation.
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Figure 1.1 The exchange rate of one us dollar expressed in Deutsche
Marks
Annual Meetings in September 1992, the Group of 10 agreed to under-
take a study. The aim of this study was to get a better understanding of
recent developments in international fmancial markets and their
implications for the working of the international monetary system. Not
surprisingly, the report states that
close coordination and cooperation among countries on economic policies,
particularly monetary and fiscal policies, continue to be an essential condition for
exchange rates to be relatively stable. (Group of Ten 1993, p. 33)
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In addition, it states that
commitments to limit exchange rate movements lack credibility when market
participants believe that prevailing exchange rates have become inconsistent with
macroeconomic fundamentals. In such circumstances, efforts to defend exchange
rates through official intervention risk draining the resources of the monetary
authorities. However, when existing exchange rates are not clearly out of line with
fundamentals, intervention to allow market participants time for reassessment,
together with appropriate statements to reaffirm commitments by policy authorities,
may be sufficient to defuse market pressures. This prospect is more likely when the
authorities also demonstrate that they are prepared to adjust interest rates. In turn,
the effectiveness of interest rate adjustments depends on how strongly market
participants believe that the authorities will be willing and politically able to
maintain interest rates at the adjusted level for a prolonged period, if necessary, to
defend against exchange rate pressure. (Group of Ten 1993, p. 34)
The G-IO report partly draws on information gathered directly from
private exchange market participants through a series of interviews
conducted in each of the G-IO countries. On the whole, respondents
thought that
in the presence of major imbalances, intervention is ineffective unless accompanied
by measures in other policy areas. (Group of Ten 1993, p. 34)
Still, it is common practice among central banks to neutralize the money-
market effect of interventions. This is because monetary authorities
usually do not want exchange rate policy to interfere with domestic
monetary policy. The next section gives a definition of intervention and
introduces the concept of sterilization.
1.3 CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION
1.3.1 The definition of central bank intervention
Throughout the book a foreign exchange market intervention is defmed
as a sale or a purchase of foreign currency by the domestic monetary
authorities which is explicitly aimed at changing the exchange rate of the
domestic currency vis-a-vis one or more foreign currencies. For exposi-
tional purposes it will be assumed that in each country interventions are
carried out by one official institution called the central bank."
1.3.2 The effects of central bank intervention
The exact implications of an operation in foreign currency by the
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domestic central bank depend on who is the counterpart in the
transaction. Here, a distinction will be made between the domestic non-
bank private sector and the domestic commercial banking sector. 7
Throughout the analysis it will be assumed that in order to minimize
forgone interest earnings every agent or institution in the domestic and
foreign economy tries to minimize its holdings of non-interest-bearing
checkable deposits irrespective of the currency of denomination.
Furthermore, it is assumed that commercial banks are fully loaned up
and that there is no such thing as a credit crunch.t"
To analyse the effects of an official purchase of foreign currency
consider first a simplified balance sheet of the domestic central bank. 10
A stylized balance sheet of the domestic central bank reflects that the
monetary base of the domestic country (MB), which consists of total
domestic currency in circulation and the reserves of the private banking
system, is equal to the sum of net foreign assets (NFA) and domestic
assets (DA) in the hands of the domestic central bank.
Assets Liabilities




Net position in IMF
Monetary Base (MB)
Total currency in circulation
Reserves of commercial banks
Domestic Assets (DA)
Government securities
Loans to commercial banks
Figure 1.2 Stylized balance sheet of the domestic central bank
Clearly, the primary responsibility of each central bank in the field of
monetary policy is the provision of base money to the domestic
economy, i.e. the domestic banking system. Expansionary monetary
policy involves the offering of additional credit facilities by the central
bank to the domestic banking system. These additional credit facilities,
whichever way defined and arranged, add to the gross reserves of the
domestic private banking system and to the gross domestic assets of the
domestic central bank (Figure 1.3).11
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by the domestic central bank, suppose that non-residents are expecting
the value of the domestic currency to rise. In the absence of any capital
controls non-residents are free to acquire investments denominated in
domestic currency. For instance, they may transfer their cash and bond
holdings directly to domestic commercial banks. The top row in Figure
1.4 illustrates that banks obtain assets denominated in foreign currency.
At the same time, their liabilities increase. However, the latter are
denominated in domestic currency. In general, commercial banks are
obliged (by the central bank) to limit their foreign exchange exposure.
Therefore, they will enter the foreign exchange market as a net supplier
of foreign currency, thereby putting the value of the domestic currency
under upward pressure. The central bank may try to counteract the
imminent appreciation of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the foreign
currency by buying an amount of foreign currency. The purchase of
foreign currency from the domestic commercial banks leads to the
changes in the balance sheets shown in the bottom row of Figure 1.4.
The central bank obtains the foreign currency. In return, the reserve
position of the commercial banks is improved.
In sum, the intervention operation ceteris paribus leads to a smaller
excess supply of foreign currency and hence to a smaller appreciation of
the domestic currency. However, this does not go without a price. The
domestic central bank has to tolerate a loosening of the domestic money
market. By assumption, this will result in an increase in the domestic
money supply. For that reason, it is sometimes argued that intervention
carried out in this way amounts to using the foreign exchange market to
conduct monetary policy in lieu of the domestic money market. Indeed,
on comparing Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 it is clear that both an
expansionary monetary policy and a purchase of foreign currency lead to
a loosening of the domestic money market. In terms of the stylized
balance sheet of the domestic central bank in Figure 1.2, monetary policy
typically involves a change in the domestic monetary base brought about
by the central bank through an open market purchase or sale of domestic
government securities or by granting more or less credit to the commer-
cial banks (tlMB = ilDA). The same change in the domestic monetary
base can be effected by transactions in foreign currency (tlMB = f).NFA).
Above it was assumed that the expectation of an appreciation of the
domestic currency leads foreign investors to transfer their money to
domestic commercial banks. However, money from abroad may also
flow to domestic non-banks (Figure 1.5).12 The domestic non-banks are
likely to pass on the foreign currency to the commercial banks who are
by far the most prominent dealers on the foreign exchange market. In
















Consequently, the money stock in the domestic country increases
directly. At the same time, the foreign exchange exposure of commercial
banks is increased beyond what they regard as optimal. Presumably, the
same sequence of events will occur as described above. The central bank
is able to contain the rise in the value of the domestic currency.
However, it has to accept a loosening of the domestic money market.
Thus, in addition to the direct increase of the money stock which results
from the inflow of money from abroad the domestic money stock in-
creases indirectly due to the intervention undertaken by the central bank.
1.3.3 Intervention and sterilization
What stands out from the previous section is that the effects of purchases
and sales of foreign currency by the domestic central bank are not
limited to the reduction of changes in the exchange rate. An official
purchase of foreign currency conducted to curb an appreciation of the
domestic currency eventually leads to an increase in the domestic money
stock. In Chapter 2 it will become apparent that the induced increase in
the money supply in itself is very conducive to limiting the rise in the
value of the domestic currency. However, since the middle of the 1970s
central banks in the main industrialized countries implement monetary
policy by targeting the growth rate of the money supply (Friedman 1975,
Eijffinger 1986). The monetary authorities of these countries do not want
exchange rate policy to interfere with monetary policy. Rather, they
attempt to adhere to a preannounced target for the growth rate of some
monetary aggregates. Gardner (1983) takes into account the notion that
unsterilized interventions aimed at limiting exchange rate fluctuations in
most instances frustrate attempts to realize preannounced targets for the
money supply. Gardner assumes that central banks decide on an
acceptable trade-off between the attainment of a target level of the money
stock (M,T) and a target level of the exchange rate (st). The resulting
loss function for a typical central bank (CB) can be written as follows:
CD T 2 TL, = (M, - M,) + C (S, - S, ) (1.1)
where L,CB, S, and M, are the loss of the domestic central bank, the
exchange rate expressed as the domestic currency price of one unit of
foreign exchange, and the money stock in the domestic economy; c is a
non-negative parameter whose size depicts the relative weight attached to
the two targets. This algebraic representation of the loss function misses
the essential point. This is because monetary targeting can not be done in
a half-hearted fashion. The central bank has to earn itself a reputation by
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realizing the preannounced target for a considerable number of years
before the benefits of this policy can be reaped in the form of a lower
expected rate of inflation and lower wage demands by the trade unions.
Consequently, when the central banks adhere to certain monetary targets,
the relevant value of c in the loss function is zero.
A central bank which wants to hit the target growth rates for monetary
aggregates can deal with the international influences on monetary policy
in two ways. First, it can choose to refrain totally from intervening in the
foreign exchange market. In theory, one can think of a situation in which
international capital flows leave domestic monetary policy unaffected.
This is the case if, in addition to the no-intervention policy of the central
bank, commercial banks in the domestic economy do not buy or sell
foreign currency themselves but only act as currency brokers, i.e. when
the net foreign assets of the domestic banking system remain constant
over time. The money stock in the domestic economy is unaffected by
international capital flows. Thus, monetary policy can be implemented to
realize a reasonable degree of price stability. Under these circumstances,
however, the exchange rate has to bear the full burden of adjustment.
Any expected appreciation of the domestic currency which leads private
exchange market participants to buy domestic currency leads to an actual
appreciation of the domestic currency. Clearly, this can not be brought in
line with the assumption made in the previous section that the central
bank wants to take action against such expectations-driven appreciations
of the domestic currency.
The second way to shield domestic monetary policymaking from
international influences is to sterilize the money-market effects of official
foreign exchange operations systematically. Clearly, the question of
whether or not sterilized foreign exchange operations are effective is
extremely important. Basically, it amounts to asking to what extent the
central bank can have independent exchange rate and monetary targets.
The answer has important implications for national authorities' conduct
of their monetary policies and for IMP surveillance of its members'
exchange rate policies.
Suppose, again, that there is an inflow of foreign currency into the
domestic economy (top row of Figure 1.6). As a result, domestic
commercial banks are entering the foreign exchange market as a net
supplier of foreign currency. The central bank wants to counteract the
imminent appreciation of the domestic currency. As before, it buys an
amount of foreign currency (middle row of Figure 1.6). Now, however,
at the same time it sells government bonds from its open market portfolio
to the domestic commercial banks leaving the domestic monetary base,
ceteris paribus, unchanged in spite of the initial purchase of foreign
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currency (bottom row of Figure 1.6).13
Clearly, the effect of an exchange market intervention on the monetary
base is completely neutralized when LlDA = - t1NFA in the stylized
balance sheet of the domestic central bank. Sterilized intervention does,
however, lower the initial excess supply of foreign currency in the
foreign exchange market. Furthermore, sterilized interventions alter the
currency composition of the entire, i.e. domestic and foreign, private
sector's portfolio of investments. To see this, remember that the chain of
transactions was initiated by non-residents selling financial assets, say
bonds, denominated in their own currency because of a fall in the
expected external value of their currency. These non-residents acquired
bonds denominated in domestic currency.
In theory, the very change in the currency composition of investors'
portfolios can make sterilized official purchases and sales of foreign
currency have an effect on the exchange rate. This is the case if investors
do not view otherwise identical bonds denominated in different currencies
as perfect subsitutes." For instance, suppose that investors are risk
averse and that they demand a risk premium on bonds denominated in
domestic currency (RP,):
(1.2)
where i is the domestic interest rate, t the foreign interest rate, and s the
logarithm of the spot exchange rate. Subscript t denotes time and EtC·) is
the expectations operator conditional on the information available at time
t. Consider the effect of a disturbance of the portfolio balance caused by
a sterilized purchase of bonds denominated in foreign currency carried
out by the domestic central bank. The initial official purchase of foreign
bonds causes an excess demand for these bonds. As a result, the price of
these bonds rises and the foreign interest rate falls. The official sale of
domestic bonds carried out to leave the monetary base in the domestic
country unchanged induces an excess supply of domestic bonds. The
price of these bonds falls and the domestic interest rate rises. However,
these are mere mechanical reactions to changes in the supply conditions
on the markets for both types of bonds. The sterilized purchase of
foreign bonds carried out by the domestic central bank forces private
investors ceteris paribus to hold more (relatively risky) domestic bonds
in their portfolios. Consequently, the risk premium on domestic bonds
demanded by private investors increases. This has important
repercussions for the current exchange rate. In addition to the mechanical
price changes of domestic and foreign bonds mentioned above, the
expected rate of return on domestic bonds (I) has to rise relative to that
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on foreign bonds (i' + (EI SI+I - Sf» to enhance the attractiveness of
domestic bonds. Thus, with the (longer-term) expected exchange rate
(Ept+ I) assumed constant, the value of domestic currency has to decline
initially (rise in SI) in order to orchestrate an expected appreciation of the
domestic currency. This will be termed the portfolio balance channel of
(sterilized) intervention.
Loopesko (1984) distinguishes two other channels through which
sterilized interventions can affect the exchange rate. The market-
efficiency channel implies that the central bank can 'focus the attention of
the public on neglected information that is germane to exchange rate
determination' (Loopesko 1984, p. 258). Obviously, it will turn out to be
very hard for the central bankers to establish the market inefficiencies
with certainty. The superior-information channel corresponds with what
will be called here the expectations channel. By providing the market
with new information or a signal about the future course of the exchange
rate or of monetary policy, the exchange rate can be expected to change
immediately after the intervention. Notably, supporters of the asset-
market view of exchange rates see this as the main channel through
which interventions can affect the exchange rate. This channel is
explored further in Section 2.3.2.
Figure 1.7 summarizes the three main channels of influence of central
bank intervention.
NOTES
1. The Group of 7 consists of the following countries: the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Canada, France and Italy.
2. Strictly speaking, this is not necessarily the case. Agents may hold funds in the
Eurodollar market and use these to invest abroad or buy foreign goods.
3. This seemingly imaginary situation was in fact approximated quite closely in the 1950s
and 1960s when severe limitations to international capital mobility were in force.
4. This is one of the reasons why a systematic positive relation between trade balance
surpluses and the external value of a currency can be observed only very rarely in
practice.
S. The Group of 10 consists of the Group of 7 countries plus Belgium, the Netherlands and
Sweden. Later on, Switzerland became the eleventh member of the Group of 10.
6. In several countries, e.g. Japan and the United States, both the central bank and the
ministry of ftnance have a foreign exchange account that can be used for transactions in
the foreign exchange market.
7. Obviously, in theoretical models without a fractional reserve private banking system this
distinction is not relevant. In that case, the initial official operation in foreign exchange
can only be carried out with 'the private sector' as the counterpart in the transaction.
8. A commercial bank is fully loaned up when it maximizes the amount of loans to third
parties given the existing reserve requirements. If this is the case for all commercial
banks in the economy then the mechanical money supply function applies (Ms = m ME,
where ~ is the nominal money supply, m is the money multiplier which is assumed
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constant and MB is the monetary base). Accordingly, an increase in base money (tlMB)
leads to an increase in the money supply (~ by m tlMB.
9. The domestic country is said to experience a credit crunch when the non-bank private
sector refrains from borrowing money from the banking sector in spite of a loose credit
stance. This occurs when the non-bank private sector is restructuring its own balance
sheet and hence tries to reduce its indebtedness to the banking sector (see, e.g. Kliesen
and Tatom 1992).
10. As clearly put forward by Weber (1986), Belongia (1992) and Humpage (1994),
intervention conducted by the domestic central bank almost necessarily involves the
actions of the foreign central bank. For expositional ease and without loss of generality
the present discussion concentrates on the effects of intervention on the domestic
economy.
11. It may not be easy to trace such an operation in the actual balance sheet of a central
bank. This is because the balance sheet reflects the institutional idiosyncrasies of the
relation between the central bank and the private banking system in each individual
country.
12. In cases when the domestic currency is expected to appreciate, internationally operating
investors may acquire bonds denominated in domestic currency from domestic non-
banks. Domestic enterprises can take up foreign currency loans abroad, exchange the
proceeds for domestic currency and use this for the repayment of credit in domestic
currency or for investment purposes. In addition, multinational enterprises are likely to
shift their cash holdings to the domestic country.
13. Of course, the neutralization of the money-market effect of the initial purchase of
foreign currency does not necessarily need to be effected by open market operations.
What is essential for the separation of monetary policy from exchange rate policy is that
employees at the central bank involved in the day-to-day management of the liquidity
position of commercial banks view interventions as just another factor affecting this
liquidity position which may be corrected if appropriate.
14. Pilbeam (1991, p. 38) lists three conditions for otherwise identical bonds denominated in
different currencies to be imperfect substitutes. First, domestic and foreign bonds are
perceived to have different degrees of riskiness due to uncertainty over expected real
rates of return. Secondly, economic agents are risk averse. That is, investors only take
on increased risk if there is a sufficient increase in expected returns to compensate.
Finally, there must be a difference between the risk-minimizing portfolio and the actual
portfolio forced at market-clearing prices into investors' portfolios.
2. Theories on the Scope for Foreign
Exchange Intervention
2.1 INTRODUCTION!
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive survey of theories
on the scope for foreign exchange market intervention. The central
question is whether and how non-sterilized and sterilized interventions
are able to influence the course of the exchange rate. To answer this
question some well-established models of exchange rate determination are
examined whereby focus is on the channels of influence of unsterilized
and sterilized intervention in these models.
A distinction is made between flow models of the exchange rate on the
one hand and asset-market models of the exchange rate on the other
hand. These categories of models are treated in Sections 2.2 and 2.3,
respectively. The left-hand column of Table 2.1 lists some representative
flow and asset-market models of the exchange rate. For each of them a
concise characterization is presented. This is followed by a review of
articles which are primarily concerned with the mechanics of foreign
Table 2.1 Exchange rate models and 'intervention studies'
Exchange rate model Non-sterilized intervention Sterilized intervention
Purchasing Power Parity
Mundell-Fleming model Black (1985) Black (1985)
Flex-price Monetary model
Sticky-price Monetary model Djajic & Bazzoni (1992) Natividad & Stone (1990)
Portfolio Balance model Moreno & Yin (1992) Blundell-Wignall & Masson (1985)
Stock-flow Portfolio model Branson (1983), Hallwood & MacDonald (1986),
Pilbeam (1991) Pi/beam (1991)
17
18 Foreign Exchange Intervention
exchange intervention in the framework of the particular exchange rate
model. The latter articles are listed in the two right-hand columns of
Table 2.l.
Discontent with the performance of traditional structural exchange rate
models in explaining the actual behaviour of exchange rates has led many
economists to adopt new research strategies in exploring the field of
exchange rate economics. Section 2.4 discusses some recent alternative
approaches to the study of foreign exchange intervention which follow
directly from these new research strategies. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 THE FLOW APPROACH TO EXCHANGE RATE
DETERMINATION
2.2.1 Purchasing power parity
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is one of the earliest and simplest models
of exchange rate determination. Still, it is a widely held view that PPP
and hence the relative price of national outputs provides the international
financial system with a long-term anchor for exchange rate movements.
The absolute version of PPP relates the exchange rate of the foreign
currency in terms of domestic currency to overall price levels in the
domestic and foreign country. It is an extension of the well-known Law
of One Price to general price levels.
At the going market exchange rate, the prices of identical goods at
home and abroad expressed in one common currency may differ
significantly. This will induce international trade-flows with goods being
shipped from the cheaper country to the more expensive one. For
example, suppose that foreign prices converted into domestic currency
are lower than domestic prices. In that case the domestic country will
experience a trade deficit. The domestic currency value of imports
exceeds that of exports. Domestic residents demand foreign currency to
pay for the imported goods. Foreign residents at the same time want to
convert into foreign currency the revenues from selling their goods to
domestic residents. Consequently, on the foreign exchange market an
excess demand for foreign currency develops. The domestic currency
depreciates until identical goods cost the same at home and abroad after
converting prices to a common currency.
Accordingly, goods arbitrage eventually equalizes the market exchange
rate to the PPP rate given by equation (2.1). Relative PPP is simply the
concept of absolute PPP expressed in growth rates. Equation (2.2) asserts
that the value of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency rises at
a rate equal to the difference between domestic and foreign inflation.
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Purchasing Power Parity
S, = P, / P,* (2.1)
s, = P, - P,* (2.2)
M(*) V(*) = p(*) y(*)t t t t (2.3)
S, = (M - M *), + (V - v*), - (Y - yo), (2.4)
where S, P, M, V and Yare the exchange rate (measured as domestic
currency units per unit of foreign currency), the price level, the quantity
of money supplied, the income velocity of money and real income,
respectively. Subscript t denotes time. Foreign variables are denoted with
an asterisk ('). A dot over a variable denotes a percentage change.
A different expression for the percentage change in the domestic
currency value of foreign exchange can be obtained by combining the
PPP relationship in equation (2.2) with the Quantity Theory of Money
for both the home and the foreign country (equation (2.3)). With the
income velocity of money and the level of real income unchanged, an
increase in the domestic money supply will lead to higher domestic
prices. Hence, the depreciation of the domestic currency (rise in S,)
implied by equation (2.4). It follows that an unsterilized intervention will
in the long run, ceteris paribus, influence the level of the exchange rate.
By contrast, a pure intervention which, by definition, lacks a money-
market effect leaves the exchange rate unaffected.
In general, the validity of PPP is rejected in empirical tests (for a
survey, see Giovannetti 1992).2 A plausible explanation for the rejection
of PPP is that in practice short-term capital flows swamp the trade
balance of the balance of payments. It follows that exchange rates are
primarily set in financial markets rather than in goods markets. Indeed,
one observes that currency prices fluctuate day by day or even minute by
minute whereas price levels are sticky and adjust slowly. With exchange
rates moving more quickly than goods prices, deviations from PPP will
arise. Therefore, exchange rates can persistently deviate from their PPP-
implied values.
Particularly since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed
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but adjustable exchange rates a lot of effort has been devoted to
investigating the determinants of short-term fluctuations in the exchange
value of foreign currencies. Initially, most of these investigations were
carried out along the lines of the Mundell=Fleming model.
2.2.2 The MundeU-Fleming model
2.2.2.1 The standard Mundell-Fleming model and intervention
Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) are seminal articles exploring the
effects of monetary and fiscal policy under fixed and flexible exchange
rates. They were written at a time when the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange rate system was still operative. The theoretical framework
underlying the analysis in the two studies has become known as the
Mundell-Fleming model. Although it is not the primary aim of this
model to explain exchange rate movements, it represents an authoritative
formulation of the flow approach to exchange rate determination. An
essential characteristic of the Mundell-Fleming model is that, after a
shock has occurred, endogenous variables change so as to re-equilibrate
supply and demand for foreign currency flowing through the balance of
payments.
Mundell and Fleming consider a small economy which takes the world
market price for traded goods and the world interest rate as given. In
essence, the Mundell-Fleming model is a Keynesian model. Domestic
output is demand determined and its price level is constant. Furthermore,
wages are assumed to remain constant in domestic currency. There are
four assets: domestic and foreign bonds, each having an identical maturi-
ty, and domestic and foreign currency. The bonds are assumed to be
perfect substitutes. The currencies are assumed to be non-substitutable.
Hence, they are only held in the country of issue.
According to equation (2.5), goods-market equilibrium obtains when
the demand for the domestic country's output is equal to the supply.
Here, the demand for the domestic good, D, is written as the sum of
private sector real absorption, A, the trade balance, T, and government
spending, G. Thus Y, domestic output, is determined by aggregate
demand. Money-market equilibrium is defined in equation (2.6). The
demand for money depends positively on domestic income and negatively
on the domestic interest rate. Equation (2.7) reflects that, when the
monetary authorities allow the exchange rate to float freely, the current
account, T, and the capital account, C, sum up to zero. Implicit in the
model is the assumption of static expectations. This implies inter alia that
the expected exchange rate depreciation is equal to zero." Consequently,
a return differential between domestic and foreign bonds and hence net
international capital flows can only arise through a difference between
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The Mundell-Fleming model"
Y = D = AU,y) + T(S,Y) + G
MIP = L = L(i,}') (2.6)
B = T(S,Y) + C(i) = 0 c.=oo
I (2.7)
where D, A, T, G, Land C are the demand for domestic goods, private
sector real absorption, the trade balance, government spending, real
money demand and the capital account, respectively. The partial deriva-
tive of a variable X with respect to a variable Z is denoted as Xz.
the domestic rate of interest and the given world interest rate.
The familiar IS-LM analysis is usually conducted in i-Y spaced
figures. However, S- Y spaced figures allow more scope to visualize the
change in the exchange rate brought about by exogenous shocks. The IS
schedule in Figure 2.1 connects combinations of domestic output and the
exchange rate for which the goods market is in equilibrium. It is upward
sloping. The marginal propensity to spend is assumed to be less than
unity. Hence, an increase in domestic output leads to an excess supply of
goods. A depreciation of the domestic currency is required to maintain
equilibrium in the goods market. The LM schedule in Figure 2.1 maps
out combinations of domestic output and the exchange rate for which the
money market is in equilibrium. The LM schedule is vertical in S-Y
space. For a given domestic interest rate there is only one income level
compatible with money-market equilibrium. 5 Finally, the BP schedule
traces out points for which the balance of payments is in equilibrium. It
is upward sloping in S-Y space. However, it is less steep than the IS
schedule to make sure that the system is stable. An increase in income
causes the trade balance to deteriorate. This induces a depreciation of the
domestic currency.
Imagine the domestic economy is initially at the equilibrium point A.
We want to investigate the effect of an unsterilized purchase of foreign
currency by the domestic central bank. However, domestic residents are
assumed to hold only domestic money and domestic and foreign bonds.
Without loss of generality we can proceed by investigating the effects of
an unsterilized purchase of foreign bonds from the domestic non-bank
private sector conducted by the domestic central bank. In Section 1.3.2 it
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Figure 2.1 The effect of an unsterilized purchase of foreign bonds by
the domestic central bank in the Mundell-Fleming model
was established that, as a direct consequence of this operation, the
domestic money supply increases. On the assumption of static
expectations and perfect international capital mobility the domestic
interest rate is de facto fixed at the foreign level. Yet, the intervention
operation can be thought of as causing an incipient decline in the
domestic interest rate. This in tum leads to a capital outflow and a lower
value of the domestic currency. The depreciation of the exchange rate
improves the competitiveness of domestic industries and thus causes
domestic income to rise. The vertical LM schedule shifts to the right
while the BP schedule simultaneously shifts upward. The domestic
economy settles down at the new equilibrium in point B.
Algebraic expressions for the relevant money multipliers confirm the
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In Section 1.3.3 it was established that a sterilized or pure intervention
results in a change in the currency composition of the private sector's
nominal financial wealth but not in its volume. In the Mundell-Fleming
model bonds denominated in different currencies are perfect substitutes.
Consequently, the altered currency composition brought about by the
sterilized intervention does not have any effect on the exchange rate.
2.2.2.2 (Unisterilized intervention in Black's (1985) flow model
Not every author surrenders to the apparent ineffectiveness of sterilized
intervention in flow models of the exchange rate. Black (1985) adopts a
rather eclectic approach to model the exchange rate. Black combines
some selected building blocks of the various models of exchange rate
determination which survived in empirical testing. He argues that, in
general, empirical evidence is not supportive of short-run PPP (see also
Section 2.2.1) and perfect substitutability of assets denominated in
different currencies. 6 Black assumes imperfect substitutability and
rational expectations under imperfect information.
In essence, however, Black (1985) uses a flow model of the exchange
rate to investigate the effectiveness of unsterilized and sterilized
intervention. He starts out by deriving a short-run stock equilibrium
condition for foreign assets. Within a mean-variance framework he
derives an expression for the net stock of bonds denominated in foreign
currency J; private investors are willing to hold:
with (3 = (2.8)
2
pas, I
Accordingly, the willingness of speculators to hold foreign assets depends
positively on the expected depreciation of domestic currency (E,st+1 - St)
and the excess of the foreign over the domestic interest rate (i/ - it). It
is inversely related to the variability of the exchange rate a;, I and the
investors' degree of risk aversion p. The first difference of the stock of
foreign assets held by speculators in consecutive periods is taken to imply
the ouiflow of private capital d!, (equation (2.9)). Equation (2.10) is the
trade balance measured in foreign currency. Equation (2.11) accounts for
changes in central bank reserves. The central bank intervention reaction
function consists of two parts. Firstly, the 'leaning against the wind'
component (-~ I (s, - St_I)) reflects that the central bank buys foreign
currency (positive value of dr) when the current exchange rate is lower
than the exchange rate in the previous period. Secondly, the component
capturing intervention aimed at driving the exchange rate closer to the
target level ST (-~2 (St - S 1)) reflects that the central bank buys foreign
currency (positive value of dr) when the exchange rate is lower than
this target level. Equation (2.12) is the balance of payments identity
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Black's (1985) flow model of the exchange rate
Ah = {3 [A (E;'+I - s,) + s: - Ai,] + v, (2.9)
t, = 7 (S, + p,* - P,) + c, (2.10)
(2.11)
A r, + t, + A t, = 0 (2.12)
where J, and r, are the stock of net foreign assets held by the private
sector and the central bank, respectively; v, and C, are uncorrelated
random disturbance terms with mean zero, constant variance and zero
autocorrelation; 7, ~ I and ~2 are positive constants; lower-case letters
refer to natural logarithms of variables; A is the first-difference operator
with A x, = x, - xH; E, represents the expectations operator conditional
on information available at time t.
under floating exchange rates.
Non-sterilized purchases of foreign currency increase the domestic
monetary base and lower the domestic interest rate. In Black's model this
leads to additional private purchases of foreign bonds. Consequently, the
initial effect of central bank purchases on the balance of supply and
demand in the foreign exchange market is strengthened. However, Black
does not consider the monetary channel of intervention to be the most
interesting one.
Black's analysis of the effectiveness of sterilized intervention is rather
unusual. For him it is not the direct influence of intervention on the
exchange rate that counts. This probably has to do with the fact that
typical central bank intervention efforts are very tiny compared to the
average daily turnover on foreign exchange markets. Black is in search
of an indirect effect of sterilized intervention which has more leverage on
the exchange rate. He looks for ways in which private investors can be
made to support the central bank's actions aimed at limiting exchange
rate movements. In Black's model private speculators have a stabilizing
influence on the course of the exchange rate. They are assumed to be
rational. Furthermore, they know the equilibrium value of the exchange
rate. According to Black sterilized interventions are effective if they
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reduce uncertainty among investors (measured by a;, I)' The lower risk
induces private investors to assume a larger position in foreign currency.
Hence, speculative capital flows, which are assumed to be stabilizing, are
increased,
Based on the model described by the equations (2.9)-(2.12), which is
quite similar to the one analysed in Neumann (1984), Black derives
expressions for {3, the willingness of speculators to bear risk. It should
be noted that the author assumes the foreign interest rate to be constant.
More importantly, sterilized interventions are assumed to leave the
domestic interest rate unaffected. There are two types of sterilized
intervention; 'leaning against the wind' intervention (~I > 0) and target
intervention (~2 > 0), Both types of intervention are found to reducea; I, the level of uncertainty about the exchange rate, and hence increase
the volume of speculators' stabilizing position taking in foreign
currency." The underlying mechanism by which this is accomplished
remains rather nebulous, Of course, the central bank's transactions in
foreign exchange initially have a bearing on the flow equilibrium. The
stabilizing impact of the official operations in foreign currency may
remove part of the uncertainty among private speculators and hence
strengthen the initial effect of the official transaction, However, the
central bank is only a minor participant on the market for foreign
exchange. A huge amount of intervention may be required to convince
private market participants. Then, sterilization involves voluminous
offsetting open market transactions. For instance, when the central bank
initially buys foreign exchange from the domestic non-bank private sector
to bring the exchange rate closer to the PPP level from below, sales of
government bonds denominated in domestic currency are required to
neutralize the money-market effect of the intervention, The price of
domestic bonds will decline and the domestic interest rate will go up,
Hence, the assumption of constant domestic and foreign interest rates,
which is at the heart of the analysis of sterilized intervention in Black
(1985), seems to be rather unrealistic, This raises doubts about the
practical relevance of the reported effectiveness of sterilized intervention,
2.3 THE ASSET-MARKET APPROACH TO
EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION
2.3.1 Introduction
The flow analysis according to Mundell-Fleming essentially views the
exchange rate as the relative price of national outputs. The enormous
growth of fmancial market turnovers in general and the surge in short-
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term international capital flows in particular cause a country's current
account of the balance of payments to be swamped by the capital
account. As a consequence, the exchange rate is more and more viewed
as an asset price which is equal to the price of one national money in
terms of another. Furthermore, according to this approach exchange rate
changes are not caused by shifts in the typical demand and supply
schedules for foreign exchange because of real transactions; changes in
the perception of the market as a whole with regard to the value of one
currency vis-a-vis one or more other currencies are the crucial factor.
2.3.2 The flexible-price monetary model
One branch of asset-market models of exchange rate determination
assumes that wealth holders are indifferent as to the proportions of
domestic and foreign currency-denominated assets in their portfolios
given that they yield the same return expressed in one currency. In other
words, in these models portfolio shares are infinitely sensitive to changes
in expected rates of return. Hence, the perfect substitutability hypothesis
implies that otherwise identical bonds denominated in different currencies
can be viewed as one homogeneous asset. It follows that under risk-
neutrality uncovered interest parity prevails (equation (2.15». This
implies that the interest rates on domestic and foreign bonds are equal
unless there is an expected depreciation of the domestic currency. The
world bond market always clears instantaneously. Furthermore, PPP is
assumed to hold continuously (equation (2.16». This implies that the real
exchange rate and, thus, the relative price of domestic and foreign goods
is constant over time due to perfect international arbitrage on the goods
market. Consequently, in the flexible-price monetary model of the
exchange rate demand and supply conditions on the markets for goods
and bonds are irrelevant; in the short run a bilateral exchange rate is
determined by the requirement of money-market equilibrium in the two
countries involved whereby it is assumed that residents of each country
only hold their own money (equations (2.13) and (2.14».
Under the assumption of flexible prices, the equations (2.13)-(2.16)
can be solved for the exchange rate. Intertemporal substitution obtains
equation (2.17).8 It states that the bilateral nominal exchange rate
depends on the current and expected future values of relative money
supplies and relative outputs in both countries. Thus, the flex-price
monetary approach to the exchange rate predicts that an unsterilized
purchase of foreign bonds from the domestic non-bank private sector
conducted by the domestic central bank leads to a rise in the domestic
currency price of foreign exchange. The purchase of foreign bonds
causes the domestic money supply to increase. Through equation (2.13),
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The flexible-price monetary model
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where ¢ (= ¢.) and A (= A *) are the elasticity and the semi-elasticity
of money demand with respect to income and the interest rate, respect-
ively. Here these are assumed identical for both countries.
the inherent excess supply of money is wiped out by an instantaneous
rise in the domestic price level. Equation (2.16) implies that the domestic
currency price of foreign exchange goes up as a consequence of the
initial unsterilized purchase of foreign bonds.
Furthermore, and perhaps more surprisingly, based on the expression
in (2.17) some authors argue that sterilized intervention can alter the
current exchange rate through what is called the expectations channel of
intervention. Sterilized intervention can provide private exchange market
participants with new information or a signal about the future course of
monetary policy. The 'signalling hypothesis' was first proposed by
Mussa (1981). Accordingly, a sterilized purchase of foreign bonds from
the domestic private sector signals an expansionary future domestic
monetary policy. As can be seen from equation (2.17), the expectation of
a looser domestic monetary policy in the future will make the domestic
currency depreciate and hence the exchange rate go up, even though the
initial intervention's money-market effect is neutralized in the short run
(see equation (2.17».
The relevance of the signalling or expectations channel of sterilized
intervention is not undisputed. Private exchange market participants will
only pay attention to the signal embodied in the sterilized intervention
when in the past a stable relationship has emerged with interventions
leading changes in monetary policy aimed at some exchange rate
objective. Whether this stable relationship exists and whether private
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exchange market participants pay attention to it is an empirical issue."
More importantly, for the signalling hypothesis to be valid central banks
have to back up interventions with subsequent changes in monetary
policy. In other words, current sterilized interventions predetermine the
path of future money growth and hence interfere with monetary policy.
The neutralization of the money-market effect of the initial intervention is
limited to the short run. This does not exactly meet with the definition of
sterilized intervention given in Section 1.3.3.
2.3.3 The sticky-price monetary model
2.3.3.1 The standard sticky-price monetary model and intervention
The assumptions underlying the flexible-price monetary model are not
compatible with the persistent rejection of PPP in empirical tests (see
Section 2.2.1). Dornbusch (1976) amends the flex-price monetary model
to take account of the stickiness of goods prices observed in practice. In
the resulting sticky-price monetary model goods prices initially do not
respond to disturbances of the goods-market equilibrium.'? The
abandonment of short-run PPP requires an equation to explain the
evolution of the price level. Dornbusch assumes that the price level
adjusts in proportion to excess demand (equation (2.22». This process
continues until long-run PPP is restored (equation (2.23».
Sticky-price Dornbusch (1976) model
m = p + cpy - Ai (2.18)
i=i* +se (2.19)
S e = () (s - s) (2.20)
d = 0 (s - p) + I'Y - oi (2.21)
p = 7r (d - y) = 7r [0 (s - p) + (I' -1) Y - (Jil (2.22)
s=p-p* (2.23)
Where a bar over a variable denotes a long-run value and 7r is a positive
constant denoting the speed of adjustment in the goods market.
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Dornbusch assumes that exchange market participants form their
expectations regressively (equation (2.20)). This implies that the
exchange rate is expected to close a fraction (J of the gap between the
long-run exchange rate and the current exchange rate. The sticky-price
model holds on to the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility and perfect
substitutability of bonds denominated in different currencies (equation
(2.19)). According to Walras' law the world market for bonds, thus
constructed, is in equilibrium when the market for domestic goods and
money are in equilibrium. The sluggishness of the prices of domestic
goods implies a crucial difference between the flexible-price monetary
model in the previous section and the current sticky-price monetary
model. Continuous stock equilibrium on the financial markets requires
the interest rate and the exchange rate rather than the domestic price
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Figure 2.2 The effect of an unsterilized purchase of foreign currency
by the domestic central bank in the Dornbusch model
Suppose the domestic economy is initially at the equilibrium point A.
The MM schedule in Figure 2.2, which is essentially a long-run relation-
ship, maps out combinations of the exchange rate and the domestic price
level for which the money market is in equilibrium. It is downward
sloping. For a given money supply a lower domestic price level causes
,
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real money balances to rise. In the long run, equilibrium in the money
market is restored by a depreciation of the domestic currency which
raises the demand for domestic goods and, thus, brings down real money
balances through the induced rise in the domestic price level. Now
consider the effect of an increase in the domestic money supply. The
MM schedule shifts to the right. Furthermore, the long-run exchange rate
and the domestic price level (s ,p) will rise in proportion to the increase
in the money supply. It follows that the new long-run equilibrium point
C lies on the 45° ray passing through the origin, drawn in Figure 2.2.
The classical exercise in the Dornbusch model analyses the effect of a
monetary expansion in the domestic country. This happens to be
compatible with an unsterilized purchase of foreign currency by the
domestic central bank. In the short run, with the domestic price level still
unchanged, the intervention operation increases real money balances.
According to equation (2.18) the immediate liquidity effect of the initial
unsterilized purchase of foreign currency is to lower the domestic interest
rate. The money-market effect of the intervention makes investors expect
a long-run depreciation of the domestic currency. The decline in the
domestic interest rate plus the expected depreciation of domestic currency
seriously detract from the relative attractiveness of domestic bonds.
Speculators want to be compensated for both factors. Consequently, the
instantaneous restoration of goods and money-market equilibrium after
the monetary shock requires the exchange rate to rise to the value
associated with 'point B. Thereby it overshoots its long-run value in point
C. The initial real depreciation (the exchange rate rises while the
domestic goods price remains constant) and the lower domestic interest
rate increase the demand for domestic goods (equation (2.21)).
According to equation (2.22) this will cause domestic prices to rise. The
economy gradually moves from point B to the new equilibrium point C.
In sum, with the price level sticky, the system can not jump to the new
long-run equilibrium in point C. Instead, the exchange rate jumps,
placing the domestic economy onto the stable path to the new long-run
equilibrium (the MM" schedule in Figure 2.2) along which the domestic
price level rises and the domestic currency appreciates. 11
The effectiveness of foreign exchange market intervention in both the
flexible-price and the sticky-price monetary model depends crucially on
its money-market effect. Once this is neutralized not a single economic
variable in the model is affected by the intervention operation. This can
be seen from the equations (2.18), (2.19), (2.20) and (2.23) above.
Suppose the economy is initially in a steady state. This implies that the
expected change in the exchange rate is zero (Se = 0). Consequently,
from equation (2.20),· the current exchange rate is equal to its long-run
equilibrium value (s = s). Due to the lack of a money-market effect,
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sterilized interventions do not alter the long-run equilibrium exchange
rate s. Hence pure interventions preserve the zero expected exchange
rate change. Consequently, they leave the current exchange rate
unchanged. Moreover, uncovered interest parity (equation (2.19» implies
that interest rates at home and abroad remain equal as well.
2.3.3.2 Unsterilized intervention in Djajic and Bazzoni (1992)
The effectiveness of monetary intervention in the sticky-price monetary
model is undisputed. Djajic and Bazzoni (1992) modify the Dornbusch
model to include a rule governing unsterilized foreign exchange market
intervention (equation (2.24». This rule describes the intervention
behaviour of the monetary authorities in response to shocks to the
exchange rate. Accordingly, the domestic money supply is brought down
below the pre-disturbance level rno after the occurrence of a depreciation
of the domestic currency which has raised the exchange rate above its
pre-disturbance level so' The extent of the monetary contraction depends
on the value of the policy-determined coefficient w. Obviously, the polar
cases w = 0 and w = 00 are compatible with freely floating exchange
rates and fixed exchange rates, respectively. Agents are assumed to be
risk neutral, to know the structure of the model and to form their
expectations rationally (equation (2.26». Accordingly, the actual rate of
depreciation s equals the expected rate of depreciation of domestic
currency (S e). Hence, the uncovered interest parity condition can be
written as in equation (2.27). With output fixed at the full employment
level y, the change in the price level is given by equation (2.28), where
v is a shift parameter which reflects commodity-market disturbances.
It follows from the discussion of monetary intervention in the previous
section that the greater the magnitude of unsterilized 'leaning against the
wind' intervention, the greater the extent to which pressures on the
domestic currency to fall (rise) in value, in response to, for example, an
increase (decrease) in the foreign interest rate, are absorbed through a
reduction in (an expansion of) the domestic money supply rather than a
depreciation (an appreciation) of the domestic currency. Put differently, a
move away from fixed exchange rates (i.e., a lower value of w) allows
for greater stability of monetary aggregates.
Djajic and Bazzoni stress that these are long-run considerations. They
analyse the dynamic properties of the system in (2.24)-(2.28) for
different values of w, the parameter capturing the degree of 'leaning
against the wind' intervention. The authors do not analyse the over- or
undershooting of short-run exchange rates. Rather, their focus is on the
evolution over time of the money stock as a function of the degree of
'leaning against the wind' intervention.
The crucial assumption in the Dornbusch model is that asset markets
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Unsterilized intervention in Djajic and Bazzoni (1992)
(2.24)
m = p + 4>y - 'Ai (2.25)
s = s ' (2.26)
i=i* +se (2.27)
p = 7r [0 (s - p) + (y -1) Y - oi + v] (2.28)
IrIn and So are the pre-disturbance level of the domestic money supply and
the exchange rate, respectively; w is a policy-determined coefficient
denoting the extent of 'leaning against the wind' intervention; v is a shift
parameter which reflects commodity-market disturbances.
and exchange rates adjust quickly relative to the goods market and the
price of domestic output. A direct consequence of this assumption is that,
in the face of shocks impinging on the domestic economy, jumps in the
exchange rate are required to achieve short-run equilibrium in the goods
and assets markets. It is not very likely that these jumps in the exchange
rate are compatible with the objectives of the monetary authorities.
Hence, intervention is called for. Djajic and Bazzoni examine the
economy's adjustment to both a goods-market and an asset-market
disturbance.
Initially, the economy is in a steady state. Consider the effect of an
increase in the demand for exports, reflected by an increase in u in
equation (2.28). Firstly, under freely floating exchange rates (w = 0) the
increased demand for exports simply leads to an instantaneous
appreciation of the domestic currency which lowers exports to their
original level. Secondly, in the case when the monetary authorities
pursue a policy of 'leaning against the wind' (0 < w < 00) they will
partly resist the rise in the value of the domestic currency. Djajic and
Bazzoni show that a jump in the money supply is required to bring the
economy on the relevant stable path towards the new steady state. Along
it, domestic prices rise according to equation (2.28). The rising price
level increases the demand for money. The concomitant rise in the
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domestic interest rate (equation (2.25)) results in renewed upward
pressure on the value of domestic currency (equations (2.27) and (2.28)).
Due to the ongoing 'leaning against the wind' policy this is partly
translated into a gradually loosening monetary stance. Thirdly, under
fixed exchange rates (w = 00) the increase in the demand for exports
will set the economy on a path of gradually rising prices. Along this path
to the new steady state the money supply must be increased in proportion
to the increase in domestic prices to preserve the fixed exchange rate.
What stands out is the rather counter-intuitive finding of larger short-
run movements in the nominal money supply under a 'leaning against the
wind' policy than under fixed exchange rates. This result seems to be
due mainly to the use of an asset-market model of exchange rate
determination to analyse the effect of a real shock. This is fallacious
while in asset-market models the exchange rate is essentially viewed as a
monetary phenomenon. Djajic and Bazzoni argue that the increased
demand for exports initially leaves the demand for money unaffected.
Then, within the Dornbusch model, indeed there is no scope for an
appreciation of the domestic currency. I would argue that flow models
like the Mundell-Fleming model rather than asset-market models offer
the appropriate framework to examine the implications of various
exchange rate regimes for the short-run effects of goods-market
disturbances. In the former models an increased demand for exports will
cause an incipient appreciation of the domestic currency. Then, under
fixed exchange rates the monetary authorities are obliged to ease the
monetary stance immediately after the goods-market shock occurs. In
fact, the easing of the money supply under fixed exchange rates is likely
to be larger than under a 'leaning against the wind' policy. This
contradicts the finding of Djajic and Bazzoni (1992).
The Dornbusch model does offer an appropriate framework to analyse
the short-run effects of financial-market disturbances like an increase in
the foreign interest rate. Thus, for the latter type of shocks the perfor-
mances of different exchange rate regimes can be compared legitimately.
The results presented by Djajic and Bazzoni for this casus are in line
with intuition. A positive shock to the foreign interest rate induces a net
outflow of capital. This leads to an (incipient) rise in the exchange rate.
Official purchases of domestic currency by the domestic central bank
lead to an instantaneous contraction of the money supply both under a
'leaning against the wind' rule for intervention and under fixed exchange
rates." Thus, Djajic and Bazzoni arrive at the plausible result that the
reduction in the money supply in response to an increase in the foreign
interest rate is larger under fixed exchange rates than under a regime of
managed floating. This confirms that a move away from fixed exchange
rates allows for greater stability of monetary aggregates.
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2.3.3.3 (Partly) sterilized intervention in Natividad and Stone (1990)
In Section 2.3.3.1 it was established that the sticky-price monetary model
does not provide any scope for the effectiveness of fully sterilized
interventions. Still, it can be of interest to investigate the implications of
a varying degree of sterilization. Natividad and Stone (1990) extend the
original Dornbusch model to include separate policy functions for
domestic credit and central bank foreign exchange reserves while
allowing for variable sterilization. The intervention reaction function in
equation (2.30) permits exogenous intervention (rEX' where a positive
value denotes a purchase of foreign currency by the domestic central
bank) and endogenous responses to an observed gap between the
contemporaneous and long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. The
domestic credit reaction function in equation (2.31) allows for exogenous
operations (cEX' where a positive value denotes monetary expansion
through an open market purchase of government bonds denominated in
domestic currency by the domestic central bank), endogenous sterilization
of a fraction Wi of changes in the central bank's foreign exchange
reserves and endogenous attempts to smooth deviations of the interest
rate from its long-run equilibrium value: Equation (2.32) states that base
money and, thus, the money supply is equal to the sum of domestic
assets (c) and net foreign assets in the hands of the central bank
(r == nfa CB). The interest parity relationship is quite similar to the
equation determining the outflow of private capital in Black (1985) (see
equation (2.8) above). The net stock of bonds denominated in foreign
currency domestic residents are willing to hold is given by
r = nfa - nfa CB = {3 [ i * - i + S e ] (2.29)
Thus, equation (2.29) accounts for the fact that a country's net foreign
assets can be in the hands of the private sector and in the hands of the
central bank (n/aCB = r). Rewriting (2.29) leads to equation (2.35).
When {3 goes to infinity, otherwise identical bonds denominated in
different currencies are perfect substitutes and equation (2.35) reduces to
the familiar uncovered interest parity relationship. Clearly, the model
encompasses, as special cases, the monetary models and the portfolio
balance model, which will be deIt with in section 2.3.4. Real income is
assumed to be demand determined in the short-run. Goods-market
pressure which eventually results in price adjustment is measured by the
gap between contemporaneous aggregate demand and long-run
equilibrium income (equation (2.37)).
Natividad and Stone analyse the effects of three exogenous shocks:
discretionary monetary policy (increase in cEX)' discretionary intervention
(increase in rEX) and a change in the foreign interest rate.
Theories on the Scope for Intervention 35
Intervention and variable sterilization in Natividad and Stone (1990)
r = rEX - ~ [(s -p +p*) - (s -p +p*)] (2.30)
(2.31)
(2.32)
m d - P = ¢y - 'Ai (2.33)
(2.34)
i = i' + Se - (1/{3) (nja - r) (2.35)
d = 0 (s - p + p *) + 'YY - oi (2.36)
Ii = 7r (d - y) (2.37)
where nfa, j and r (== nfa CB) are the total stock of net foreign assets of
the domestic economy, the stock of net foreign assets in the hands of the
domestic private sector and the stock of net foreign assets held by the
domestic central bank, respectively; c is the stock of domestic assets in
the hands of the central bank; rEX and cEX are exogenous central bank
purchases of foreign currency and domestic bonds, respectively.
They note that in the case of perfect substitutability between bonds
denominated in different currencies and in the absence of sterilization
(WI = 0), changes in monetary and exchange rate policy by the domestic
monetary authorities have identical implications (see also Section 1.3.2).
Furthermore, for the case of perfect substitutability they conclude that
fully sterilized intervention has no effect in either the short or long run.
This result was discussed at the end of Section 2.3.3.1. Natividad and
Stone are able to show that the lower the degree of endogenous
sterilization WI' the larger the initial jump in the exchange rate after a
discretionary intervention (positive value of rEX). In other words, they
find that the effect of an ad hoc policy measure by the central bank
depends on the exact shape of its own mechanical reaction pattern. This
is a rather strange result. It is due mainly to the implausible specification
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of the intervention reaction function. In particular, the role of
discretionary intervention, rEX' is unclear. The intervention reaction
function already accounts for endogenous intervention in response to
observed movements in the exchange rate. More interestingly, Natividad
and Stone fmd that for a given discretionary purchase of foreign currency
carried out by the domestic central bank a change in the degree. of
sterilization has an ambiguous effect on the degree of overshooting. This
is because a lower degree of sterilization increases both the initial jump
in the exchange rate and its new long-run equilibrium value.
2.3.3.4 Monetary targeting and unsterilized intervention
From the above expositions it appears that the scope for sterilized
intervention is quite negligible whereas the effectiveness of unsterilized
intervention is undisputed. Since the middle of the 1970s the central
banks of many large industrialized countries implement monetary policies
based on targeting the growth of the money supply. Genberg and Roth
(1979) analyse whether the use of monetary aggregates as intermediate
targets for the implementation of monetary policy is compatible with
unsterilized intervention aimed at limiting currency movements. They
argue that the variance of the exchange rate around an equilibrium level
can be reduced only at the cost of an increase in the intra-year deviation
of the money supply from the target level. Genberg and Roth divide a
year into two periods. Within the framework of a simplified Dornbusch
model of exchange rate determination they analyse the effect of a
temporary increase in the foreign interest rate in the first period. The
increase in the foreign interest rate causes a depreciation of the domestic
currency. The monetary authorities may attempt to moderate the
depreciation in period one by reducing the growth of the money supply
in that period below the rate corresponding to the announced target for
the first and second periods taken together. As a consequence of the
commitment to an annual monetary growth target, in period two when
the domestic and foreign interest rate are equal again, the domestic
economy will experience a more-than-average growth of the money
supply. Obviously, the stability of domestic income growth may be
hampered by this increased variance of the money supply. Under the
additional assumption of rational expectations a truly clear-cut picture
emerges from Genberg and Roth's analysis. With a positive shock to the
exchange rate occurring again in the first period, lowering the first
period's growth of the money supply will not succeed at all in smoothing
the value of the domestic currency. Private exchange market participants
anticipate a compensatory increase in the second period's growth of the
money supply and an accompanying depreciation of the domestic curren-
cy. The induced decrease in the demand for domestic currency exactly
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offsets (the effect of) the lower money supply in the first period. Thus,
the exchange rate stabilization policy is not effective in the period in
which the shock to the exchange rate occurs. Furthermore, the second
period's increase in the money supply necessary to meet the annual target
leads to a rise in the exchange rate. Genberg and Roth (1979, p. 538)
conclude that 'exchange rate smoothing is detrimental to exchange rate
stability and, a fortiori, to output stability'.
2.3.4 The portfolio balance model
2.3.4.1 The standard portfolio balance modeL and intervention
The asset-market models of exchange rate determination analysed
hitherto assume domestic and foreign assets to be perfect substitutes.
Portfolio balance models explicitly leave open the possibility that
investors believe assets denominated in different currencies to have
different risk characteristics. In addition, risk aversion on the part of
investors implies that they want to be compensated for the higher per-
ceived risk of holding foreign assets. Suppose foreign investors demand a
nonzero risk premium on the domestic asset (RJ!». Then a wedge is
driven between the expected rates of return on domestic and foreign
bonds. The uncovered interest parity relationship no longer holds:
(2.38)
In a world in which bonds denominated in different currencies are imper-
fect substitutes, the requirement of continuous money- and bond-market
equilibrium jointly determines the exchange rate and interest rates.
Branson, Halttunen and Masson (1977) present a basic small country
portfolio model of the exchange rate. There are three assets: domestic
and foreign bonds and domestic money. In accordance with the short-run
nature of the model, accumulation of foreign bonds through current
account surpluses is ruled out. 13 Furthermore, there is no interaction
between the fmancial markets and the goods market. Therefore, the latter
is not specified in the model. The demand for money (M), domestic
bonds (B) and foreign bonds (F, expressed in domestic currency: sF) are
assumed to depend upon wealth, the own rate of return and the cross
rates whereby the rate of return on money is set to zero. Equation (2.42)
is the wealth constraint. Equation (2.43) is the adding-up constraint. It
states that the demand elasticities for domestic money and domestic and
foreign bonds must sum up to one. Equation (2.44) reflects the
assumption of static expectations. Equation (2.45) describes the small-
country assumption. It implies that the foreign or world interest rate is
fixed. Both Band F are taken to be short-term fixed-price assets to avoid
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the complications introduced by capital gains resulting from changes in
interest rates. The three market equilibrium conditions (2.39)-(2.41)
contain two independent equations in sand i, given the wealth constraint
(2.42). Any pair of (2.39)-(2.41), with W substituted from (2.42) can
be used to determine short-run equilibrium values for the exchange rate
and the domestic interest rate. For our purposes, the equilibrium
conditions for the money market and the market for domestic bonds are
the relevant equations to be analysed.
A simple portfolio balance model for a small country
M = m (i, i : + S e) W m. < 0, mi" < °,
B = b (i, t: + S ') W b. > 0, bi' < °,







s ' = ° (2.44)
i '" = i * (2.45)
The MM schedule in Figures 2.3A and 2.3B connects combinations of
the exchange rate and the interest rate for which the money market is in
equilibrium. It is upward sloping. An increase in the domestic interest
rate lowers the demand for money. The excess supply of real balances in
the domestic economy has to be wiped out. This is achieved through a
depreciation of the domestic currency. The domestic currency value of
foreign bonds rises due to the higher exchange rate. The induced wealth-
effect is assumed to increase the demand for money. The BB schedule in
Figures 2.3A and 2.3B maps out combinations of the exchange rate and
the interest rate for which the market for domestic bonds is in
equilibrium. It is downward sloping. An increase in the domestic interest
rate makes domestic bonds more attractive. The demand for domestic
bonds can only be brought back to its equilibrium level by means of an
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apprecianon of the domestic currency which lowers wealth through a
reduction in the value of foreign assets in terms of domestic currency.
In the framework of the portfolio balance model outlined above, the
central bank of the domestic (small) country can not carry out an
unsterilized purchase of foreign currency. This is because the domestic
residents are explicitly assumed to hold only their own money. To bring
down the value of the domestic currency, the central bank can buy bonds
denominated in foreign currency in the open market. As there is no
fractional reserve private banking system in the model it is sufficient to
note that 'the private sector' is the counterpart in the open market
operation.
Consider Figure 2.3A. Suppose that the economy is initially in the
equilibrium point A. A monetary intervention involves an official
purchase of foreign bonds in exchange for domestic money. It leads to an
excess demand for foreign bonds and an excess supply of money. The
MM schedule shifts to the right. For given levels of the exchange rate
the domestic interest rate has to decline in order for the investors to
willingly hold the available stock of money. The position of the BB
schedule is unaffected by the open-market operation while the proportion
of wealth held in the form of domestic bonds is unchanged. The new








Figure 2.3A The effect of an official unsterilized purchase of foreign
bonds in the small-country portfolio balance model
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point B the interest rate is lower so as to clear the excess supply of
money (substitution effect). The value of foreign currency is higher in
order to bid up the proportion of wealth held in the form of foreign
bonds (wealth effect).
The effect of an unsterilized intervention in the framework of the
portfolio balance model is rather straightforward, as is the case in other
models of exchange rate determination. It neither depends crucially on
the small-country assumption nor on the assumption of static expectations
nor on the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds.
The picture changes when one considers the effect of a sterilized
intervention in the framework of the portfolio balance model. Assume,
again, that the simple model presented above in equations (2.39)-(2.45)
gives a good description of the domestic economy's financial sector.
Suppose that the domestic central bank wants to bring down the value of
the domestic currency without altering the domestic money supply. To do
so, it can buy foreign currency-denominated bonds from the private
sector and at the same time sell domestic currency-denominated bonds to
the private sector, leaving total private sector wealth unchanged. How
exactly are investors going to react given that their portfolio shares are









Figure 2.3B The effect of an official sterilized purchase of foreign
bonds in the small-country portfolio balance model
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Consider Figure 2.3B. Suppose the economy is initially in equilibrium
in point C. A swap of domestic bonds for foreign bonds in the portfolio
of the private sector leads to an excess supply of domestic bonds and an
excess demand for foreign bonds. The money market remains in
equilibrium with both the money supply and total private sector wealth
unchanged. Thus, the BB schedule shifts to the right while the MM
schedule is unaffected by the sterilized intervention. In the new
equilibrium, point D, the domestic interest rate is higher, clearing the
excess supply of domestic currency-denominated bonds. The value of
foreign currency is higher. This bids up the proportion of wealth held in
the form of foreign bonds. As a result the initial excess demand for
foreign currency-denominated bonds is wiped out. In sum, the sterilized
purchase of foreign bonds in exchange for domestic bonds carried out by
the domestic central bank leads to a depreciation of the domestic
currency.
Many authors find it hard to clarify the underlying mechanism by
which a sterilized or pure intervention alters the exchange rate. This is
the case particularly when the assumption of static expectations and the
small-country assumption are dropped. The excess demand (supply) for
(of) foreign (domestic) bonds causes the price of these bonds to rise (fall)
and, hence, causes the foreign (domestic) interest rate to fall (rise).
Obviously, these interest rate changes make domestic bonds relatively
more attractive than foreign ones. However, they are mere mechanical
reactions to changes in the supply conditions on the markets for both
types of bonds. According to Henderson and Sampson (1983), given
imperfect substitutability, investors require an additional inducement to
switch their foreign bonds for domestic bonds. This relates to the third
condition for imperfect substitutability as listed by Pilbeam (1991, p.
88) .14 Risk-averse economic agents may perceive otherwise identical
bonds denominated in different currencies to have different degrees of
riskiness. Yet these agents do not require a risk premium on the
relatively risky asset as long as they can hold the portfolio of available
financial assets which minimizes risk. A nonzero risk premium comes to
the fore once there is a difference between the risk-minimizing portfolio
and the actual portfolio forced at market-clearing prices into investors'
portfolios. Assume that investors hold the risk-minimizing portfolio
before the central bank engages in sterilized intervention. The sterilized
purchase of foreign bonds carried out by the domestic central bank forces
private investors to hold more (relatively risky) domestic bonds in their
portfolios than what is optimal from a risk-minimizing point of view.
Consequently, private investors demand a risk premium on domestic
bonds. This has important repercussions for the current exchange rate.
This can be seen by reasoning along the lines of the uncovered interest
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parity relation adjusted for a risk premium in equation (2.38). The
mechanical price changes of domestic and foreign bonds due to changes
in the supply conditions on the respective markets were mentioned above.
In addition to these price changes the expected rate of return on domestic
bonds (i) has to rise relative to that on foreign bonds (i* + iEs,+ 1 - Sf))
to enhance the attractiveness of domestic bonds. Thus, with the (longer-
term) expected exchange rate (E,s'+I) assumed constant, the value of
domestic currency has to decline initially (rise in Sf) in order to
orchestrate an expected appreciation of the domestic currency. 15
2.3.4.2 Unsterilized intervention in Moreno and Yin (1992)
Until now, the effectiveness of unsterilized intervention working through
the monetary channel is undisputed. Moreno and Yin (1992) come up
with some new theoretical insights. Moreno and Yin draw on the
experience of Taiwan in the 1980s. The monetary authorities in Taiwan
tried to limit fluctuations in the New Taiwan (NT) dollar/US dollar
exchange rate.
The authors develop a small open economy portfolio model with flex-
ible prices. There are three assets: domestic money (m), domestic bonds
(b) and foreign bonds (j). The real demand for each of these assets is a
function of the nominal return on domestic bonds, the expected rate of
depreciation of the domestic currency (E,sr+l - St), real wealth (w) and
real income (y). The small-country assumption implies a fixed foreign
interest rate. In the model it is normalized to zero. Central to the analysis
by Moreno and Yin are the reduced form responses of the exchange rate
and the price level to exogenous shocks viz. changes in the expected rate
of depreciation of the domestic currency (ll(E,st+l - St)) and changes in
the supply of domestic money (t.m,) and foreign bonds (t.!,).
Ps>O, Pm>O, Pt<O (2.47)
Moreno and Yin trace out the effect of a shock to exchange rate
expectations. An expected appreciation of domestic currency
(t.(E,s'+I- s) <0) increases the demand for assets denominated in
domestic currency. As a result, the domestic currency appreciates
(equation (2.46)). The authors analyse the extent to which the central
bank is able to neutralize this appreciation by conducting unsterilized
purchases of foreign bonds. The intervention operation leads to an
increase in the domestic money supply and a simultaneous reduction in
the supply of foreign assets held by domestic residents of equal magni-
tude. As a result, the initial appreciation of domestic currency is reversed
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(at least partly, depending of the extent of 'leaning against the wind'
intervention). The authors arrive at the familiar insight that the domestic
central bank can limit exchange rate changes to any desired degree.
However, this occurs at the cost of larger changes in the central bank's
holdings of net foreign assets and, hence, in the domestic money supply.
Moreno and Yin point out that the story does not necessarily end here.
The exchange rate change to which the central bank reacts was initiated
by a shock to private investors' exchange rate expectations. In the
terminology of the authors the intervention outcome is credible when
investors believe that, after the unsterilized or monetary intervention in
reaction to the expectations-induced change in the exchange rate, there
will be no further change in the exchange rate. By contrast, the outcome
of intervention is not credible when investors 'believe that the exchange
rate must ultimately adjust to some target exchange rate s', regardless of
the short-run attempts of policymakers to prevent such adjustment'
(Moreno and Yin 1992, p. 20). Of course, when the central bank refrains
from intervening, the full impact of a shock to expectations is felt
immediately and the exchange rate adjusts to the equilibrium level s' that
private exchange market participants have in mind. Now, Moreno and
Yin come up with a case in which unsterilized 'leaning against the wind'
intervention is not effective. It only leads to a distribution over time of
the impact of the one-time shock to expectations at the cost of higher
cumulative intervention. It is important to note that this result hinges on
the assumption that the expectation of an appreciation of domestic
currency persists as long as S > S '. Consequently, any intervention
which initially prevents the exchange rate from reaching s* leads to
renewed excess demand for assets denominated in domestic currency.
At first sight, the persistence in the appreciation expectation does not
seem very plausible. The unsterilized interventions lead to an increase in
the domestic money supply and this will eventually lead to a rise in
domestic inflation and hence to a depreciation of the domestic currency.
Moreno and Yin come up with an interesting explanation. The
appreciation expectation for the NT dollar was due to the competitive
advantage of Taiwan's tradeables sector over that of other countries.
Taiwan's growing exports indeed caused upward pressure on the external
value of the NT dollar. Moreno and Yin argue that in the short run,
unsterilized intervention can prevent equilibrium exchange rate adjust-
ment. This may result in a sequence of growing trade surpluses for the
domestic country. At the same time, investors may revise their estimates
of St' downward when confronted with news indicating no reduction in
the trade surplus or complaints by trading partners." It can readily be
seen from equation (2.47) that there are two channels through which an
unsterilized purchase of foreign bonds in exchange for domestic money
44 Foreign Exchange Intervention
leads to an increase in the domestic price level. Firstly, the intervention
creates an excess supply of money. 17 Secondly, the central bank's
purchase of foreign bonds creates an excess demand for foreign bonds by
private investors. This leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency
and, hence, to a higher domestic price level." However, the recurrent
updating of appreciation expectations has a deflationary effect. 19 Conse-
quently, in the present case the increase in the money supply which
results from unsterilized intervention is associated with a less than
proportional increase in inflation. The innovations in the appreciation
expectation hamper the adjustment process as described in Section 1.3.2
and prevent the working of the monetary channel of intervention.
Moreno and Yin conclude from their analysis that the persistent and
accelerating appreciation of the NT dollar in the 1980s may have been
related to government efforts to limit such appreciation, which lacked
credibility.
2.3.4.3 Sterilized intervention in Blundell- Wignall and Masson (1985)
Blundell-Wignall and Masson (1985) extend the sticky-price monetary
model to allow for imperfect substitutability between assets denominated
in different currencies. Equation (2.52) reflects that domestic investors
demand a risk premium on foreign assets which depends positively on
the privately held stock of net foreign assets (nfa - nfaCB = nfa - r).
Blundell-Wignall and Masson assume that the central bank systematically
tries to resist movements in the real exchange rate away from a publicly
known constant long-run equilibrium value. According to equation
(2.49), the central bank enters the foreign exchange market to buy
domestic currency (t <0) when the current real exchange rate is above
its long-run value SR (~I > 0). Furthermore, the central bank tries to
prevent the stock of reserves from deviating from some target level r.
According to equation (2.55), the current real exchange rate may differ
from its equilibrium level either because real interest rates differ at home
and abroad or because private net claims on foreigners are nonzero.
Obviously, sterilized purchases of foreign bonds affect the volume of
privately held net claims on foreigners and, hence, have a bearing on the
current real exchange rate through the portfolio channel described at the
end of Section 2.3.4.1. Blundell-Wignall and Masson establish that the
model is stable whatever the value of the intervention parameter ~I· It
follows that the rule for sterilized intervention in equation (2.49) allows
the monetary authorities 'to guide the exchange rate toward its long-run
equilibrium value without inducing short-run fluctuations in that rate'
(Blundell-Wignall and Masson 1985, p. 140).
From equation (2.51) it appears that private exchange market
participants either do not anticipate the intervention behaviour or, if they
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Sterilized intervention in Blundell-Wignall and Masson (1985)
SR = S - P + P * (2.48)
(2.49)
(2.50)m = p + ¢y - Ai
(2.51)
i=i* +se-(l/{J)(nja-r) (2.52)
(2.53)d = os R + 'YY - (J (i - p e)
p = 7r (d _ y) + p e
SR = SR + [(i * - p * ') - (i - F)]/() - (nja - r)/(){3
(2.54)
(2.55)
do, consider it has no effect. To correct for this feature, Blundell-
Wignall and Masson modify the model so as to let expectations correctly
take account of intervention. With fully rational expectations regarding
the exchange rate, equation (2.51) reduces to S e = s and equation (2.52)
can be rewritten as s = i - i' + (1/{3) (nja - r). The authors show
that the resulting model has the saddlepoint property. Furthermore, they
find that for a sufficiently high value of the intervention parameter ~1 '
sterilized intervention does not lead to cyclical fluctuations in the
exchange rate.
The original Dornbusch model accounts for nominal exchange rates
overshooting their long-run value in response to an increase in the
domestic money supply. With prices sticky in the short run, the real
exchange rate also overshoots. The mechanics of sterilized intervention in
the amended sticky-price monetary model of Blundell-Wignall and
Masson are not entirely clear. Shocks cause short-run misalignments of
the real exchange rate. However, they leave the long-run equilibrium
value SR unaffected. Sterilized intervention, supposedly working through
the portfolio balance channel described in Section 2.3.4.1 is said to
'speed up adjustment to past shocks' and to 'help lessen overshooting'
(Blundell-Wignall and Masson, 1985, p. 142).
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2.3.5 Stock-flow interaction in portfolio models of the exchange rate
2.3.5.1 Introduction
The portfolio model discussed in Section 2.3.4.1 is essentially a short-run
asset-market model. There is no interaction between the asset markets
and the goods market. Furthermore, in accordance with the short-run
nature of the model accumulation of foreign assets through current
account surpluses is ruled out. In the previous sections changes in the
exchange rate were governed by the requirement of stock equilibrium. In
the next sections it will become clear that the instantaneous adjustment of
the exchange rate induces changes in the current account and capital
account of the balance of payments. Thus, beyond the short run the
course of the exchange rate is determined by flows of foreign exchange
through the balance of payments.
Assume that before a shock occurs the trade balance, the capital
income account and the capital account of the domestic economy are all
individually in equilibrium. An exogenous fall in the exchange rate turns
the trade balance and, by assumption, the current account of the domestic
economy in surplus. As a consequence, the domestic private sector starts
accumulating net foreign assets. Below, it will become clear that the
exchange rate moves until the current account and the capital account are
again individually in equilibrium.
2.3.5.2 Seminal work by Dornbusch and Fischer (1980)
Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) is a seminal article on long-term
adjustment processes and the concomitant interaction between flows of
foreign exchange and the dynamics of asset stocks. Dornbusch and
Fischer assume that domestic economic agents can hold only domestic
money and foreign bonds. Prices of goods produced in the small
domestic economy are flexible. The prices of imports and the foreign
interest rate are given. Domestic production is given and constant. The
market for domestic goods is in equilibrium when domestic production
equals the sum of domestic demand and net exports. The authors
postulate an economy without a government sector, taxes or investment.
Then, the excess of disposable income (which is equal to the sum of
domestic production and net interest earnings from abroad) over spending
is equal to saving and, due to the lack of investment opportunities in the
home country, also equal to the accumulation of foreign assets. In turn,
the level of savings is a decreasing function of real wealth. The
mechanics of adjustment in this model can be highlighted by analysing
how the domestic economy adjusts to a new long-run equilibrium after an
initial current account surplus in period t caused by an exogenous change
in, for instance, tastes or technology: The deficit on the capital account
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which accompanies the current account surplus leads to an increase in
domestic real wealth through the accumulation of foreign bonds. The
demand for money is assumed to depend positively on the net position in
foreign assets. A fall in the domestic price level wipes out the excess
demand for money. The lower price level leads to a further increase in
real wealth. As real wealth is a determinant of domestic spending, the
demand for domestic goods is increased. A restoration of domestic
goods-market equilibrium requires the relative price of domestic goods to
increase. With the domestic price level falling due to the real balance
effect just described this necessitates an appreciation of the domestic
currency which lowers the price of foreign goods expressed in domestic
currency. Over time, the economy converges to a new equilibrium. On
the one hand, the lower exchange rate mitigates the initial current
account surplus. On the other hand, the (gradually diminishing)
accumulation of foreign assets raises real wealth and, by assumption,
reduces saving by domestic residents. The resulting adjustment profile of




Figure 2.4 The adjustment profile of the exchange rate after an
exogenous shift in preferences for domestic goods in the
Dornbusch=Fischer (1980) modeL
2.3.5.3 Unsterilized intervention: current and capital account dynamics
Branson (1983) extends the standard small-country portfolio model
analysed in Section 2.3.4.1 to include the interaction between cross-
border flows of foreign exchange and stocks of foreign assets. The model
is augmented to include an equation which describes price dynamics
(equation (2.63)) and an equation for the rate of accumulation of net
foreign assets (equation (2.64)). For price dynamics, Branson follows
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Dornbusch (1976) in assuming slow adjustment of the price level to
monetary shocks. In equation (2.63) mR (= M/p) and mR* are the actual
value of real balances and the equilibrium value corresponding to long-
run equilibrium output, respectively. In the long run the economy is
homogeneous in monetary variables with the price level changing
proportionately to the money stock. This implies that if M is increased,
raising mR above mR*' the price level eventually rises to restore mR =
mR•• Rewriting the balance of payments identity which states that, under
freely floating exchange rates, the capital account and the current account
must sum to zero, gives equation (2.64). The trade balance depends
positively on the real exchange rate." Branson assumes that the
domestic country has acquired a net foreign asset position by running a
current account surplus in previous periods."
In Section 2.3.4.1 it was established that an unsterilized intervention
which involves an official purchase of foreign bonds in exchange for
A small-country portfolio balance model with current account dynamics
M = m (i, i : + S e) W mi < 0, mi· > 0 (2.56)
B = b (i, i * + s e) W b > 0, b. < 0 (2.57)
I
sF = f (i, i * + s e) W I; < 0, 1;. > 0 (2.58)
W = M + B + sF (2.59)
m w b w f= (2.60)
se = 0 (2.61)
i • . * (2.62)= I
p = lj; (mR - mR*) (2.63)
. sp 'F = T (-) + i * sF (2.64)
p
mR (= M/p) and mR* are actual real balances and the equilibrium value
corresponding to long-run equilibrium output, respectively.
Theories on the Scope for Intervention 49
St, Pt
Pt:l~
Sn--- -~-- -- - --S-t
PO,Pl,SO =1 L--_....::---!....: --------1.
t1 ti time
Figure 2.5 The adjustment profile of the exchange rate and the
domestic price level after an unsterilized purchase of
foreign bonds by the domestic central bank at time r,
domestic money leads to an instantaneous reduction in the domestic
interest rate and a depreciation of the domestic currency (i.e., a jump in
the exchange rate from So = 1 to s [ in Figure 2.5). While initially
domestic prices do not respond to the shock (Po = PI = 1 in Figure 2.5)
the real exchange rate (sp'rp, with p' constant and normalized at one)
rises along with the nominal exchange rate. The trade balance improves
and a current account surplus emerges. According to equation (2.64) the
domestic economy accumulates additional foreign assets. Over time, the
current account surplus leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency
(this is reflected by a fall in s, beyond period r.). Furthermore, with a
gradually rising domestic price level the real exchange rate starts to
appreciate even stronger. The trade balance deteriorates. At the point t,
where s, = Pi the price ratio sip is the same as the original so/Po = 1.
This implies that net exports have fallen to their original value. But since
F, the net foreign assets position of domestic residents, has risen in the
interval between t[ and t.; the current account balance is positive at t, due
to the higher interest earnings on foreign assets. Thus, at t.; where s, =
Pi' the domestic economy is still accumulating foreign assets. To arrive
in a new steady state the exchange rate has to fall. The nominal exchange
rate declines and the domestic price level rises until the ratio sip reaches
the value where T (sp'rp) = ( F once again. At that point the current
account is in equilibrium and the adjustment process is completed.
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2.3.5.4 Sterilized intervention: current and capital account dynamics
By definition, a sterilized intervention has no effect on the domestic
money supply. As a result, the extended portfolio model featuring the
sticky-price equation (2.63) analysed in the previous section does not
provide an appropriate framework to investigate the effects of a pure
intervention. Instead, the framework provided by Hallwood and
MacDonald (1986, Chapter 7) will be used to track the long-term effects
of sterilized intervention when otherwise identical assets denominated in
different currencies are imperfect substitutes. Hallwood and MacDonald
extend the standard small-country portfolio model analysed in Section
2.3.4.1 to comprise a traded goods sector and a non-traded goods sector
in the domestic economy. Traded goods are exposed to international
competition. Therefore, they are priced according to the law of one price
(equation (2.63)').
(2.63)'
yo = Y + i*sF (2.65)
C = yo - 0 (w' - w) (2.66)
F = T (sp ') + i' sF = 0 (w' - w) (2.64)'
p
Equation (2.66) states that domestic spending depends positively on
disposable income which is made up of domestic income plus net interest
earnings on the stock of foreign assets (equation (2.65» and negatively
on the discrepancy between constant desired real wealth w' and actual
real wealth w. From an accounting identity it follows that the
accumulation of foreign assets over time is equal to a constant fraction 0
of the discrepancy between desired and actual real wealth. As before, the
trade balance and hence the accumulation of foreign assets is assumed to
depend positively on the real exchange rate.
In Section 2.3.4.1 it was established that a pure intervention involving
a swap of domestic currency-denominated bonds for foreign currency-
denominated bonds leads to an instantaneous rise in both the domestic
interest rate and the exchange rate. From the law of one price, the rise in
the exchange rate implies a rise in the domestic currency price of traded
goods. This has two effects. Firstly, the higher price of traded goods
induces domestic producers to shift resources to the traded goods sector.
Domestic consumers, on the other hand, will buy relatively more non-
traded goods. The world demand for traded goods is infinitely elastic.
Therefore, the resulting excess supply of traded goods in the domestic
economy will be exported thus improving the trade balance of the
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domestic economy. Secondly, the higher price of traded goods raises the
overall domestic price level and drives real wealth below the desired
level w·.22 By assumption, domestic residents lower consumption in
order to save more and restore real wealth. The improved trade balance
facilitates a deficit on the capital account. This implies that domestic
residents indeed acquire foreign assets and hence restore real wealth to
the desired level. The current account surplus puts upward pressure on
the value of domestic currency. Therefore, in the course of the adjust-
ment to the new steady state the domestic currency appreciates (i.e., s
falls) and the rate of accumulation of net foreign assets gradually
diminishes to zero. The new long-run equilibrium consequent upon the
initial swap of domestic for foreign bonds must be one in which the
nominal exchange rate has risen (see the adjustment profile in Figure
2.6). Due to the accumulation of foreign assets in the adjustment period,
interest receipts on the foreign assets must ceteris paribus be greater in
the new equilibrium. Then, equilibrium on the current account allows a




Figure 2.6 The adjustment profile of the exchange rate after a
sterilized purchase of foreign bonds at time t
2.3.5.5 A comprehensive portfolio balance model by Pilbeam (1991)
Pilbeam (1991, pp. 93-103) presents a comprehensive dynamic portfolio
balance model. Pilbeam postulates perfect foresight on the part of foreign
exchange market participants. He compares both the impact effects and
the long-run effects of open market operations and unsterilized and
sterilized interventions. Pilbeam generally reproduces the results
discussed in the two previous sections. Both monetary and pure
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intervention operations trigger an initial jump depreciation of the
exchange rate followed by a gradual appreciation. However. the author
concludes that a sterilized foreign exchange operation has a relatively
weaker effect on the nominal exchange rate than an unsterilized foreign
exchange operation.
A long-run steady-state equilibrium condition in the zero-growth model
by Pilbeam is that the current account balance is zero. During the
transition to the new long-run equilibrium after the initial intervention
operation the domestic economy accumulates net foreign assets. The
accompanying increase in net interest receipts from abroad improve the
service component of the current account. To ensure a current account
balance of zero in the long run it is necessary for the real exchange rate
to appreciate.
In Section 1.3.2 it was concluded that an expansionary monetary
policy and an unsterilized purchase of foreign currency have similar
effects. Pilbeam (1991. p. 103) shows that in his portfolio balance model
the initial jump in the exchange rate is greater following an unsterilized
intervention; an expansionary monetary policy does not lead to an initial
fall in private agents' holdings of foreign assets. but it does lead to a fall
in the domestic interest rate. In the portfolio balance model this induces
an excess demand for foreign assets. which coincides with the impact
effect of an unsterilized purchase of foreign bonds by the domestic
central bank. Clearly. this confirms that the preliminary conclusion of
Section 1.3.2 about the identical effects of monetary policy and unsterili-
zed exchange rate policy only applies when domestic and foreign bonds
are perfect substitutes.
Pilbeam is clear about the working of a sterilized intervention carried
out to support the value of the foreign currency:
The authorities ... increase the amount of domestic bonds in private portfolios via
an SFXO [a sterilized foreign exchange operation] above the minimum variance
portfolio share. thereby increasing the risks in private asset-holders' portfolios.
Accordingly. asset-holders require a risk premium in the way of a higher domestic
interest rate and expected appreciation of the domestic currency to compensate.
Hence an SFXO works by breaking up the uncovered interest rate parity condition
via manipulation of the risk premium. When there is no risk premium to
manipulate an SFXO cannot work. (Pilbeam 1991. pp. 108-9)
The author notes that a central bank may be unwilling to exploit the
possibility of using sterilized interventions. They may require substantial
changes in foreign exchange reserves to exert significant exchange rate
effects. The empirical investigations surveyed in Chapter 3 will give
some indication of the magnitude of sterilized intervention required to
have exchange rate effects.
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2.4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY
OF INTERVENTION
2.4.1 Introduction
The theoretical investigations discussed in the previous sections all
assumed that some structural model of exchange rate determination
provides a valid framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of
foreign exchange market intervention. After surveying the empirical
evidence on exchange rate models, MacDonald and Taylor (1992)
conclude that
the asset approach models have performed well for some time periods, such as the
interwar period, and, to some extent, for the first part of the recent floating
experience (that is, 1973-1978); but they have provided largely inadequate
explanations for the behavior of the major exchange rates during the latter part of
the float. (op. cit., p. 24)
Discontent with the performance of traditional structural exchange rate
models in explaining the actual behaviour of exchange rates has led many
economists to adopt new research strategies in exploring the field of
exchange rate economics.
2.4.2 De Grauwe's (1989) near-rationality model
Two basic assumptions underlie all asset-market models of the exchange
rate. Firstly, foreign exchange market participants calculate the long-run
equilibrium value of an exchange rate (S') based on, inter alia,
expectations about the future value of the 'fundamentals'. Secondly,
market participants take positions in foreign currencies to exploit the
difference between the spot rate which prevails at a certain moment and
the calculated long-run equilibrium value.
De Grauwe (1989, pp. 160-63) argues that there are no models which
provide a reliable guide for forecasting the future exchange rate. De
Grauwe emphasizes the crucial role of uncertainty among foreign
exchange market participants regarding the future course of currency
movements. Within a mean-variance framework, in which it is assumed
that currency traders trade off the expected gain from operating in the
foreign exchange market against the risk involved, he shows that it is not
necessarily profitable to use aU available fundamental economic
information. For instance, an individual exchange market participant may
observe a gap between the actual level of the exchange rate and the
perceived fundamental equilibrium value. In a highly uncertain economic
environment, the expected gain from taking a forward position aimed at
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exploiting this gap may not outweigh the risk involved.
Due to the risk involved in fundamental analysis it can be rational for
exchange market participants to implement technical analysis. De Grauwe
presents a rule for the formation of exchange rate expectations that
consists of a backward-looking and a forward-looking component, the
first term and the second term on the right-hand side of (2.67),
respectively:
E, t..Sr+1 = k (L ci t..S,J + (l-k) (S' -S)i=O
(2.67)
The parameter k which represents the weight given to each of the
expectation rules is assumed to be endogenous. Exchange market
participants choose to let the backward-looking component dominate their
expectations formation (high value of k) when the actual exchange rate is
not too far away from the equilibrium rate they have in mind (sj. This
implies that they resort to technical analysis. A higher weight is assigned
to the forward-looking component (lower value of k) only when it is
obvious that the actual exchange rate is at an unsustainable level. Foreign
exchange trading based on fundamental analysis becomes less risky
leading to a larger expected utility in a mean-variance framework.
Chartism is a specific form of technical analysis. It involves
forecasting exchange rate movements based on perceived patterns or
regularities in past currency movements (some authors call it feedback-
trading, see Menkhoff (1992) for a survey). The popular financial press
has already adopted the concomitant vocabulary of 'resistance levels',
'support lines' and 'technical corrections'. 10 an attempt to ascertain the
extent and manner by which chartism is used, Allen and Taylor (1989)
conducted a questionnaire survey among more than 200 chief foreign
exchange dealers in the London market. They found, inter alia, that
at the shortest horizons, intraday to one week, approximately 90% of respondents
use some chartist input in forming their exchange rate expectations, with 60%
judging charts to be at least as important as fundamentals. At longer forecast
horizons, of one to three months or six months to one year, the weight given to
fundamentals increases. (Allen and Taylor 1989, p. 50)
Additional evidence for non-fundamental trading strategies on the part of
private exchange market participants is provided by De Grauwe and
Decupere (1992). They cannot reject the hypothesis that psychological
barriers exist in the Japanese yen-US dollar market. For the Deutsche
Mark-US dollar market the results are mixed.
By assuming that exchange market participants revert to backward-
looking technical analysis instead of forward-looking fundamental
analysis in cases of extreme uncertainty, De Grauwe's near-rationality
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model can account for some stylized facts of (real) exchange rates which
are left unexplained by perfect foresight rational expectations models, i.e.
real exchange rates wandering away from levels implied by fundamentals
for long periods of time before being pushed back towards equilibrium
and the relative sluggishness of exchange rate movements as compared to
stock and commodity price movements.
While the current global exchange rate system offers no credible
anchor for exchange rate expectations, De Grauwe (1989) sees no role
for ad hoc (un)sterilized intervention to remedy persistent deviations of
exchange rates from their perceived equilibrium values. In his view, even
changes in fundamentals brought about by monetary or fiscal policy will
not help. Due to the extreme uncertainty as to the true model, market
participants do not know how to interpret these changes. De Grauwe
argues that only a credible exchange rate commitment by the monetary
authorities, i.e. a commitment embodying a clear and stabilizing guide
for exchange market participants' expectations, can facilitate an efficient
functioning of the foreign exchange market comparable to stock and
commodity markets. This would require systematic unsterilized
interventions rather than ad hoc (un)sterilized central bank operations in
foreign exchange with which the analysis in the previous sections was
concerned.
In sum, De Grauwe's analysis, which takes account of non-
fundamentalist behaviour or, to be more precise, chartist behaviour by
(some) foreign exchange market participants, does not reveal a distinct
channel through which foreign exchange intervention can affect the
course of currency movements.
2.4.3 The chartist channel and noise trading signalling channel of
intervention
Fukao (1985) argues that the scope for intervention changes quite
dramatically when one is willing to drop the assumption that the foreign
exchange market is efficient in the sense that market participants use
some structural model as a yardstick when taking positions on the foreign
exchange market. Fukao presents the following table which is both
simple and insightful (see Table 2.2).
Fukao (1985) does not clarify how the inefficiency of the foreign
exchange market opens up a distinct channel through which foreign
exchange intervention can affect the exchange rate. Hung (1991a,b)
contends that the presence of non-fundamentalist market participants
whose trading behaviour is more or less predictable constitutes a channel
through which sterilized intervention can be effective. Hung conducts her
analysis in the framework of a partial equilibrium flow-market approach
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Table 2.2 The state of the foreign exchange market and the effectiveness
of central bank intervention (Source: Fukao 1985, p. 26)
Substitutability of bonds denominated in
different currencies
Perfect Imperfect
Efficient market Intervention is ineffective Intervention is effective
Inefficient market Intervention is effective Intervention is effective
to exchange rate determination. If a large enough group of noise traders
use the same forecasting technique or share the same belief with respect
to the future course of the exchange rate, expectations may turn out to be
self-fulfilling. The central bank may want to counter the resulting
currency movements. Hung argues that the noise trading behaviour
displayed by market participants in itself offers an opportunity for the
central bank to do this successfully.
Hung's approach is slightly different from that of De Grauwe (1989).
The noise trading behaviour by exchange market participants is not
derived formally. Earlier work on noise trading is just put to the right
use. Like De Grauwe, Hung arrives at the important insight that
fundamentalists can at times turn into noise traders due to the extreme
uncertainty regarding the future path of the exchange rate. She
distinguishes two categories of non-fundamentalist or noise traders.
Chartists 'rely on analysis of past price patterns to predict the future
direction of exchange rate movements' (Hung 1991a, p. 12). Market
participants who base trading on their prediction of the market's reaction
to news and rumours are called non-chartist noise traders.
A necessary but of course not sufficient condition for intervention to
be effective is that the central bank can imagine itself in the position of
the two groups of noise traders distinguished. Current intervention
volumes are insufficient to counter a strong underlying trend in the
exchange rate. Therefore, the decision when and how to intervene has to
be made conditional on information about the general market sentiment
and the (strength of the) buy or sell signals adherents of technical
analysis derive from their charts. Hung (1991a, p. 20) presents an ideal
picture in which chartists 'help amplify and prolong the effect of
intervention' which may be transitory by itself. The central bank should
select a time period during which the market is sufficiently thin.
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Concealed intervention carried out through brokers may cause just
enough upward or downward pressure on the currency under
consideration which, if incorporated in the chartists' trendline analysis
induces them to reinforce the movement of the exchange rate in the
direction favoured by the central bank. This is what Hung calls the
chartist channel of intervention. When the interventions indeed remain
anonymous, the central bank has nothing to lose in terms of
reputation." On the other hand, Hung (l991b) admits that
chart analysis has a large subjective element, and there are probably as many
methods of combining and interpreting the various techniques as there are chartists
themselves. (op. cit., p. 7)
A second channel is the noise trading signalling channel. For this
channel, the opportunity to influence the course of the exchange rate does
not lie in the thinness of the market or the fact that traders only stare at
their charts. For the noise trading signalling channel to be effective,
noise traders must be 'already looking for any sign or excuse to reverse
their position' (Hung 1991b, p. 12). Highly visible interventions,
conducted via the interbank market could give just such a signal.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter was to provide a comprehensive picture of
theories on the scope for foreign exchange market intervention and to
find out whether and how intervention is able to influence the course of
the exchange rate.
In Section 1.3 it was established that the exact implications of an
operation in foreign currency by the domestic central bank depend on
who is the counterpart in the transaction, the non-bank: private sector or
the domestic commercial bank. However, in theoretical models without a
fractional reserve private banking system this distinction is not relevant.
In the latter case, the initial official operation in foreign exchange can
only be carried out with 'the private sector' as the counterpart in the
transaction.
Some well-established models of exchange rate determination were
examined whereby focus was on the channels of influence of unsterilized
and sterilized intervention in these models. In the case of perfect
substitutability between bonds denominated in different currencies, in the
end, there is no difference between domestic monetary policy on the one
hand and unsterilized intervention on the other hand. Therefore, the
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of unsterilized interventions,
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working through the monetary channel, are much the same as those that
would arise if one were to investigate the effect(iveness) of monetary
policy on the exchange rate. Overall, the effectiveness of monetary
intervention in the various models studied is undisputed. Even elementary
PPP predicts that an unsterilized intervention will in the long run, ceteris
paribus, influence the level of the exchange rate in a one-to-one
relationship with a purchase of foreign currency by the domestic central
bank leading to a rise in the value of foreign exchange in terms of the
domestic currency. In the theoretical models investigated in Sections 2.2
and 2.3, sterilized intervention can only be effective in cases where risk-
averse investors believe assets denominated in different currencies to
have different risk characteristics. In that case, a swap of domestic bonds
for foreign bonds in the portfolio of the private sector brought about by a
sterilized purchase of foreign currency by the domestic central bank can
lead to an appreciation of foreign currency. When domestic bonds are
considered to be the relatively risky asset investors require an inducement
to switch their foreign bonds for domestic bonds. Consequently, the
expected rate of return on domestic bonds has to rise relative to that on
foreign bonds to enhance the attractiveness of domestic bonds. An
expected appreciation of the domestic currency can do the job: with the
(longer-term) expected exchange rate assumed constant, the value of
domestic currency has to decline.
In portfolio balance models sterilized interventions have an impact
effect on the exchange rate. However, the initial change in the exchange
rate triggers off current account and capital account dynamics which, in
turn, do not leave the exchange rate unaffected. In fact, in Sections
2.3.5.4 and 2.3.5.5 it was established that over time the initial (nominal)
exchange rate change is reversed at least partly. Moreover, in the new
steady state the real exchange rate turns out to have undergone a real
appreciation when, on impact, the sterilized intervention accomplished a
nominal depreciation. This does not exactly seem to be what the
monetary authorities were looking for at the time they decided to
intervene. The practical relevence of the portfolio balance channel of
intervention is an empirical issue which will be addressed in Chapter 3 of
this book.
Attention was also paid to the popular insight that sterilized
intervention can alter the current exchange rate through what is called the
expectations or signalling channel of intervention by providing private
exchange market participants with new information or a signal about the
future course of monetary policy. It was argued that for the signalling
hypothesis to be valid central banks have to back up interventions with
subsequent changes in monetary policy. In other words, current sterilized
interventions predetermine the path of future money growth and hence
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interfere with monetary policy. The neutralization of the initial inter-
vention's money-market effect is limited to the short run. This no longer
meets the definition of sterilized intervention presented in Chapter 1.
From Section 2.4 it appears that the scope for intervention changes
quite dramatically when one is willing to drop the assumption that the
foreign exchange market is efficient in the sense that market participants
use some structural model as a yardstick when taking positions on the
foreign exchange market. However, the literature on how the inefficiency
of the foreign exchange market opens up distinct channels through which
intervention can affect the exchange rate is still in its infancy.
NOTES
1. This chapter is based on Almekinders (1994c).
2. Edison, Gagnon and Melick (1994) argue that the failure of most empirical studies to
find evidence for PPP in the post-Bretton Woods era can be attributed largely to the low
power of the tests employed. Using a new testing procedure they find moderate evidence
for PPP in post-Bretton Woods data.
3. Under static expectations the exchange rate which is expected to prevail in the next
period equals the current exchange rate. Hence, S' = 0 and the uncovered interest
parity condition reduces to i = i',
4. This representation of the Mundell-Fleming model is mainly due to MacDonald (1988,
pp.42-7).
5. This is due to the implicit assumption that changes in the exchange rate do not lead to
alterations in the domestic price level.
6. These are two assumptions which underlie the flexible-price monetary model which is
discussed in Section 2.3.2.
7. Intervention aimed at reducing the difference between the current exchange rate s, and
the target rate ST reduces the level of uncertainty about the exchange rate provided that
the target chosen by the monetary authorities is equal to the PPP-implied long-run
equilibrium value which rational private speculators regard as the true long-run
equilibrium exchange rate.
8. For a lucid exposition on the derivation of this solution for the exchange rate in the
monetary model with rational expectations, see Visser (1989, pp. 18-22).
9. Klein and Rosengren (1991) use newspaper reports on dollar intervention by the United
States and Germany. They found no evidence for interventions systematically preceding
changes in monetary policy. Furthermore, periods of active intervention were not
followed by monetary policy changes. Kaminsky and Lewis (1992) strongly reject the
hypothesis that interventions convey no signal. However, they also find that in some
episodes, intervention signalled changes in monetary policy in the opposite direction of
the conventional signalling story.
10. A theoretical explanation for this phenomenon can be found in Okun (1981). Okun
distinguishes customer markets from auction markets. The market for domestic goods is
a customer market. On such a market the price is the result of an ongoing relationship
between buyer and seller. Therefore price changes on customer markets are costly.
Money and bonds are traded in auction markets on which buyers and sellers are more or
less anonymous. Moreover, traders on auction markets are used to prices changing in
real time.
11. Gray and Turnovsky (1979) derive an expression for the value of 9 (9") for which the
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Dornbusch model has the saddlepoint-property. Furthermore, they show that within this
model equation (2.20) with 8 = 8- is the only ad hoc expectations hypothesis consistent
with perfect foresight.
12. Djajic and Bazzoni show that for certain parameter values the jump in the money supply
is slightly larger in the case of 'leaning against the wind' intervention than in the case of
fixed exchange rates. In my view this is a technical artefact of the model which defies
economic explanation. Furthermore, it is not clear at all whether these parameter values
imply a realistic degree of 'leaning against the wind' intervention.
13. Stock-flow interaction in portfolio models of the exchange rate is discussed in Section
2.3.5.
14. See note 14, Chapter I.
IS. In the case of perfect substitutability the latter exchange rate change does not occur.
Furthermore, the demand for bonds denominated in either currency are perfectly elastic.
Hence, after the swap of domestic for foreign bonds only an incipient rise (decline) of
the domestic (foreign) interest rate is sufficient to restore equilibrium in all three
financial markets in the model.
16. Note that a subscript 1 is attached to this expression for the target exchange rate of
private investors. This indicates that the current analysis is concerned with a sequence of
negative shocks to exchange rate expectations rather than a one-time expected
appreciation of the domestic currency. The updating of the target rate by investors in this
case implies that E, S,+I > E'+I S,+2 > E'+2 S,+3' etc.
17. Intervention-induced increase in the money supply: 6 m, > O. From equation (2.47)
with Pm > 0 it follows that 6 P, > O.
18. Official purchase of foreign bonds: Il 1, < O. From equation (2.47) with PI < 0 it
follows that 6 P, > O.
19. Revision of expectations: 6 (Ef,.1 - s,) < O. From (2.47) with p, > 0 it follows that
6p, < O.
20. Obviously, the assumption of continuous PPP would imply that slip is constant. Here,
this assumption is not imposed. Rather, p (and F) are state variables which adjust slowly
while the exchange rate s can jump in the short run.
21. In a steady state with both the capital account and the current account in equilibrium,
interest earnings on the foreign asset position allow the domestic economy to run a trade
deficit.
22. This hinges on the implicit assumption that the fall in real wealth due to the rising
overall price level in the domestic economy is larger than the rise in real wealth brought
about by the rise in the exchange rate and the concomitant rise in the domestic currency
value of foreign bonds (see equation (2.59».
23. The real exchange rate was previously defined as SR = sp'rp, Hallwood and MacDonald
(1986) define the real exchange rate as the relative price of traded to non-traded goods:
SR = pTlpN. This definition is often used in the context of two-sector models.
24. The latter condition may account for the fact that detailed intervention data are not made
publicly available by central banks.
3. Empirical Investigations into the
Objectives and Effectiveness of
Intervention: A Survey
3.1 INTRODUCTIONl
The previous chapter surveyed the theoretical literature on exchange market
intervention. An explicit assumption in most of this literature is that central
banks try to minimize deviations of the actual exchange rate from a target
level implied by 'fundamentals' (see, e.g., Neumann 1984, and Natividad
and Stone 1990) and/or that central banks try to dampen the short-term
volatility of exchange rates. This chapter surveys empirical studies which
have been carried out to assess which objectives the central banks of the
main industrial countries pursued with their interventions in the foreign
exchange market.
The central question in the previous chapter was whether and how, in
theory, non-sterilized and sterilized interventions are able to influence the
course of the exchange rate. This chapter reviews empirical studies which
address the question of whether, in practice, (sterilized) intervention has
been capable of exerting a significant influence on the exchange rate.
As before, an exchange market intervention is defined as a sale or a
purchase of foreign currencies undertaken by the central bank to change the
exchange rate of their own currency vis-a-vis one or more foreign
currencies. The distinction that is sometimes made between 'active
intervention' and 'passive intervention' does not seem very helpful as far as
empirical research is concerned. By definition, passive intervention is
distinguished from active intervention in that it is carried out outside instead
of inside the exchange market. It is of course at the discretion of a central
bank to carry out a sale of foreign exchange inside or outside the market
depending on the strength of its own currency.
By far the larger part of exchange market intervention is carried out in
the spot market. While 'analytically there is no distinction between the
effects of forward market and sterilized spot market transactions on the spot
exchange rate' (Smith and Madigan 1988, p. 189) the reason for this seems
61
62 Foreign Exchange Intervention
to be that an intervention operation derives a great deal of its effect from
the announcement of the operation itself. Highly visible spot market
operations confirm the announcement.
In general, the empirical investigation of objectives and effectiveness of
exchange market intervention is hampered by a lack of sufficiently detailed
data. It is well known that, for example, the German and Swiss central
banks swap foreign exchange with the commercial banks. Changes in
official reserves include these swaps, implying that they do not accurately
reflect intervention. Taylor (1982) puts forward the problem of concealed
intervention not showing up in the official international reserve figures. For
instance, one can think of industries under public ownership intervening in
the foreign exchange market acting as an agent for the central bank.
However, this is probably a phenomenon of the 1970s.2
This chapter is organized into three remaining sections. Section 3.2
surveys the results of sixteen empirical studies into the objectives of central
bank intervention. The discussion of the individual studies is preceded by
a concise exposition of some theoretical and technical insights. Analogously,
Section 3.3 discusses eleven empirical investigations into the effectiveness
of intervention. Section 3.4 summarizes the main conclusions.
3.2 OBJECTIVES OF INTERVENTION
In the theoretical literature two divisions of objectives can be found. First,
in the Jurgensen report (1983) the objectives are classified according to
whether the central bank pursues them on a long-term or a short-term basis.
Second, German economists like Lehment (1980) and Sommer (1983) use
the kind of objective which underlies the intervention as the division
criterion. The latter division criterion distinguishes four categories of
interventions. 'Anpassungs' -interventions (in English corresponding with
'smoothing' -interventions) grosso modo refer to interventions undertaken on
account of a 'leaning against the wind' policy. The central bank tries to
resist large short-term exchange rate movements without affecting the
underlying trend. Interventions carried out to alter the trend in the
development of the exchange rate for economic or political reasons are
called 'Erhaltungs' - interventions (' trend breaking' -interventions), whereas
'Gestaltungs' -interventions (,direction indicating' -interventions) apply to the
situation where the exchange rate is moving out of control. Finally, the
category 'other interventions' covers sales and purchases of foreign
currencies owing to the management of the volume and composition of the
foreign exchange market reserves of the central bank.
It appears that the detailed division of objectives in the Jurgensen report
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is not in accordance with the practical implementation of intervention
policy. To formulate medium-term and long-term objectives is one thing.
To carry out exchange market interventions aimed at realizing those
objectives while one is not even able to control the exchange rate
movements in the short run is something totally different.
Most empirical studies postulate a central bank intervention reaction
function rather ad hoc. Some derive it formally, however. For instance, this
is done by combining a policy loss function with a set of equations
describing the determination of the exchange rate of foreign currency in
terms of domestic currency (St). The policy loss function - which is
postulated ad hoc! - reflects the hypothesis that the central bank in the
domestic country wishes to limit deviations of the actual exchange rate from
a target level for the exchange rate (StT):
L,CB = (log S, - log S/)2 = (s, - SfT? (3.1)
with Sf = log Sf and s/ = log S,T. To capture intervention carried out on
account of a 'leaning against the wind' policy, the target level for the
exchange rate can be thought of as representing past levels of the exchange
rate. This follows immediately from the definition of smoothing exchange
rate fluctuations: whether or not the exchange rate was considered to be at
a desirable level in the previous period(s), deviations from this target level
will be countered.
The dramatic increase of the exchange market turnovers has caused
proper timing of the interventions and the use of the correct intervention
technique to become of growing importance in the exchange rate policy of
the central banks. However, it is not possible to estimate a reaction function
which reflects that the central bank only intervenes 'when such action can
be expected to dampen adverse exchange rate movements' (Dudler 1988,
p. 69) and that 'monetary policy-makers have hesitated to react as long as
there seemed to be a chance that external disturbances or erratic exchange
rate movements could reverse themselves within a reasonable time' (Dudler
1988, p. 76). The estimated reaction functions only account for the volume
and direction of intervention transactions. This reduces the explanatory
power of the estimated relations.
All investigations under review are concerned with spot market
interventions only. In the estimated reaction functions the volume of
intervention in consecutive periods (lNV,) is the dependent variable that has
to be explained by the independent variables of which the percentage change
in the exchange rate (Sf - Sf_I) and the difference between the actual level
of the exchange rate and a target level for the exchange rate (S, - S/) are
the most important ones. However, account has to be taken of the fact that
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exchange rates and intervention volumes are determined simultaneously and,
hence, that exchange rate changes may not be an exogenous explanatory
variable in the intervention reaction function. For example, when the
estimation is carried out using weekly data, the exchange rate change in one
week ('independent variable') will be simultaneously determined by the
interventions undertaken in the same week (dependent variable).
Consequently, the estimation results are subject to simultaneity bias. In an
attempt to reduce the simultaneity bias, some studies use the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) or the instrumental variables (IV) estimation technique. In
any case, the estimation results have to be interpreted carefully. It should
be stressed that the empirical tests of the objectives of intervention policy
are rather indirect in the sense that estimates of the reaction functions
assume the underlying model to be the true model. Therefore, estimation
results may not only be an indication of objectives of intervention policy,
but also of the strength of the underlying model.
The remainder of this section reviews a number of empirical
investigations into the objectives of exchange market intervention. Their
main characteristics are summarized in Table 3.1.
Artus (1976) studies the intervention policy of the Bundesbank (DBB)
over the period March 1973-July 1975. He finds evidence of a 'leaning
against the wind' policy. A rise (fall) by one percentage point in the value
of the DM in terms of the US dollar (S,) during one month on average gave
rise to the buying (selling) of 0.359 billion DM worth of foreign exchange
over the same one-month period. Furthermore, the German central bank on
average bought (sold) 463 million DM of foreign exchange 'for each US $
0.01 of discrepancy between the current value of the deutsche mark in US
cents and its target value' (Artus, 1976, p. 329). The target level for the
exchange rate is based on relative prices in the Federal Republic of
Germany (P G) and the United States (Pus). Estimation results for the
structural equations are shown below with r-values in parentheses.
T .
INY, = 0.463 ( S, - S, ) + 0.359 S,
(4.98) (6.30)
(3.2a)
S,T = 40.2 - 54.8 (PG / Pus - 1) (3.2b)
The findings of Quirk (1977) with respect to the intervention behaviour
by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) are similar to those of Artus' study of German
intervention policy. However, Quirk is not able to relate the interventions
to the deviation from a target level for the yen exchange rate. Instead, the
total volume of spot transactions on the Tokyo foreign exchange market and
the lagged endogenous variable are significant independent variables in
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explaining the intervention response. A one per cent exchange rate change
of the yen vis-a-vis the US dollar was accompanied on average by
intervention amounting to $156 million in the month the exchange rate
change occurred and $78 million thereafter. Quirk ascertained that the
interpretation of the OLS estimates was not hampered by a simultaneity bias
after comparing the results with those of 2SLS estimates.
Branson, Halttunen and Masson (1977, 1979) try to apply the asset-
market model empirically to the US dollar-DM exchange rate. To obtain
consistent results, a reaction function for intervention is estimated
simultaneously with an equation determining the level of the exchange rate.
Branson, Halttunen and Masson relate Germany's reserve position in period
t to the reserve position in period t-l and the change in the index of the
US dollar/DM exchange rate that occurred between the end of period t-l
and the end of period t. A rise (fall) of the $IDM exchange rate index by
one point caused the Bundesbank to 'lean against the wind' by purchasing
(selling) $83 million when estimated over the period 1971(8)-1976(12),
and $180 million when estimated over the period 1971(8)-1978(3).
Dornbusch (1980) assumes that central banks calculate the unanticipated
depreciation of the US dollar (5,UA), defined as the difference between the
actual depreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis their own currencies (5) and
the depreciation that investors had already anticipated upon by demanding
a risk premium on assets denominated in US dollars:
5 UA = Ii - (i $ - i *)( t t t (3.3)
The intervention behaviour of the major industrialized countries taken as
a whole (INY,) is explained rather poorly by the unanticipated depreciation
of the effective exchange rate of the US dollar, indicating perhaps that one
or more important explanatory variables have been left out of the estimated
reaction function. The main result of the estimations looks as follows:
. UA
I~ = 1.00 + 0.003 S,
(104.8) (3.22)
. UA+ 0.001 Sr-l
(1.68) (3.4)
R2 = 0.38 DW = 1.81 SEE = 0.05
r-values are in parentheses, R2 is the squared multiple correlation
coefficient, DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for first-order
autocorrelation and SEE is the standard error of the estimate. For example,
an unanticipated one percentage point depreciation of the nominal effective
exchange rate of the US dollar during a quarter led to a cumulative
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Lehment (1980) distinguishes two estimation periods. For the first period,
April 1971- December 1975, the results show a significant proportional
relationship between changes in the exchange rate of the DM in terms of
US dollars and changes in the reserve position of the Bundesbank.
However, for the period January 1976-December 1978, there are no signs
of a 'leaning against the wind' policy. Lehment supposes that this is caused
by the fact that the Bundesbank aimed its interventions at keeping the $IDM
exchange rate within a certain target zone. However, this presumption is not
tested.
Longworth (1980) is the first study to go beyond the usual verification of
the 'leaning against the wind' behaviour of the Bank of Canada (BoC).
Longworth investigates whether the BoC has a 'tendency to lean more
strongly when the exchange rate is moving in one direction than the other'
(Longworth 1980, p. 284). Clearly, his point of departure is a symmetrical
intervention behaviour of the Canadian monetary authorities. During the
1950s and early 1960s Canada was the only major industrialized country
with a floating exchange rate. For this period, Longworth finds that
depreciations were counteracted significantly stronger than appreciations.
However, for the period June 1970- December 1977 no such asymmetries
in the intervention behaviour are found. On average, the BoC bought (sold)
145 million US dollars for everyone cent appreciation (depreciation) of the
Canadian dollar vis-a-vis the US dollar in one month. Longworth notices
that Artus (1976) and Quirk (1977) found an almost equal intervention
response for the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan (BoJ), respectively. The
Canadian central bank does not appear to have tried to move the exchange
rate closer to parity ($1 Can. = $1 US) or to PPP.
Argy (1982) discusses the theoretical and practical aspects of exchange
rate management. He studies the intervention behaviour of Germany, Japan
and the United Kingdom for the period March 1973 (for the UK: March
1972)-December 1979. By analysing the differences between gross and net
interventions in a year, Argy infers the main objective of a country in that
year. 3 In 1974 and 1975 net German and Japanese intervention was close
to zero while gross intervention divided by the value of exports was around
seven. Of course, this indicates that the central banks have tried to smooth
exchange rate changes only. Gross intervention equalling net intervention,
except for a sign, points to a one-way intervention effort to oppose
persistent depreciation or to rebuild reserves after a period of large sales of
foreign exchange as was the case in the United Kingdom during the years
1974-76 and in 1977, respectively. Estimation results for an intervention
reaction function for the United Kingdom covering the period March
1972-0ctober 1977 look as follows, with t-statistics shown in parentheses:
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I~ = 112.8 + 163.1 SI + 0.62 I~_l
(1.4) (3.6) (5.3)
(3.5)
R2 = 0.53 Durbin's h statistic = 0.00113
It follows that every one percentage point change in the effective exchange
rate was accompanied on average by an intervention effort by the Bank of
England (BoE) amounting to 163 million US dollars in the month the
exchange rate change occurred and 266 million US dollars thereafter. For
the period November 1977-December 1979, the 'leaning' coefficient rises
to 252.6. The coefficient for the lagged intervention variable becomes very
small (0.08) and is no longer significantly different from zero. A regression
with the percentage change of the ex post real effective exchange rate in
place of the nominal effective rate yields moderately lower 'leaning'
coefficients for both periods. In the case of Germany and Japan, the
reaction function can explain only a quarter of intervention systematically.
The coefficients for the percentage change in the effective rates are 115 and
210, respectively.
The explanatory power of the reaction functions estimated in Konig and
Gaab (1982) over the period April 1973-July 1975 is satisfactory. The
estimation results correspond to a large extent with those of the studies
discussed above. However, estimates over later periods (1974-79,
1980-81) lose power dramatically.
Neumann (1984) takes up the challenge of trying to formulate and
estimate an intervention reaction function which explains a considerable
portion of observed Bundesbank intervention. Unlike Konig and Gaab
(1982), Neumann (1984) has data at his disposal which give a precise
coverage of the foreign exchange operations undertaken with the sole aim
of influencing the exchange rate. Furthermore, Neumann applies non-linear
Ordinary Least Squares (nl OLS) as the estimation technique. He tries to
establish whether or not the Bundesbank shifts its priority to controlling the
money stock when the uncertainty in the Deutsche Mark/US dollar market
increases. Neumann derives an intervention reaction function by combining
a policy loss function of the central bank with a flow model of the exchange
rate. He distinguishes two major explanatory variables: the expected risk
premium on DM assets and the difference between the actual exchange rate
and a target level for the exchange rate. The target level specification for
which the reaction function has the highest explanatory power can be
written as follows:
log S/ = () log F1_1 + (1-0) log S/PPP + ~ RP/ + iJ./ (3.6)
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As in Artus (1976), PPP considerations (SIPP,) are taken into account. Of
course, this comes down to stabilizing the real exchange rate. In an attempt
to fight private speculation beforehand, the Bundesbank tries to compress
the excess return on assets denominated in Deutsche Marks. This is done
by revising the target rate in accordance with increases in the expected risk
premium and movements in the lagged forward rate (FI-I). It appears that
for the more turbulent subperiod, September 1977-December 1981,
Neumann's supposition of a shift in the trade-off in favour of money control
is confirmed.
Following the approach taken by Longworth (1980), the empirical
investigations in Bischofberger (1986) are aimed at establishing whether the
central banks of the G-7 countries and Switzerland employed their
intervention policy of 'leaning against the wind' symmetrically across
periods of depreciation and appreciation of their own currencies vis-a- vis the
US dollar and across periods with a rising and a falling effective exchange
rate of their own currency. Bischofberger deflates the monthly change in a
country's foreign exchange reserves by the sum of imports and exports in
the current and eleven previous months. He does this in order to make the
estimated coefficients and, thus, the intervention efforts, comparable across
countries. Therefore, the implicit assumption is that the more open an
economy is, the more opposed a central bank will be to short-term exchange
rate fluctuations. In an attempt to detect (ir)regularities in the intervention
behaviour of the individual countries, the 90 monthly observations are
divided into four categories. A rise (faU) in the value of a currency in two
consecutive periods is called a trend appreciation (trend depreciation) of the
exchange rate vis-a-vis the US dollar. A rise (fall) in the value of a currency
after a fall (rise) in the previous period is labelled non-trend appreciation
(non-trend depreciation).
with: Al = 1 in case of trend appreciation, 0 otherwise
A2 = 1 in case of non-trend appreciation, 0 otherwise
A3 = 1 in case of trend depreciation, 0 otherwise
A4 = 1 in case of non-trend depreciation, 0 otherwise
To be able to make comparisons across time, subsamples consisting of 30
observations each are created." The three subsamples are July
1973-December 1975, January 1976-June 1978and July 1978-December
1980. The Bundesbank appears to have carried out its interventions
symmetrically. The intervention-trade ratio for a one per cent change in
the effective exchange rate of the Deutsche Mark is 0.0023 0) on average
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for all four categories of intervention. As Konig and Gaab (1982)
experienced, the explanatory power of the estimated reaction function for
the Bundesbank declines over time. The estimated reaction functions for the
Banque de France (BdF) and the Banca d'Italia have low explanatory power
and indicate that there was no systematic 'leaning against the wind'
behaviour. For the sample as a whole, the BoE is found to have assigned
systematically more weight to countering depreciations of the effective
exchange rate of the pound and depreciations of the pound vis-a-vis the US
dollar. However, the estimation results for the subsamples indicate that both
trend and non-trend appreciations of the pound were a matter of concern of
the British monetary authorities as well. The BoJ appears to have acted in
a slightly asymmetrical way. The variable capturing non-trend depreciations
of the yen vis-a-vis the US dollar has a coefficient significantly different
from zero indicating at a 'leaning with the wind' behaviour. The directives
of the Canadian Exchange Fund obliged the BoC to follow grosso modo the
same intervention pattern as the Bank of Japan. However, compared to the
BoJ the BoC carried out its sales and purchases of foreign currency more
systematicallly and on a larger scale when measured by the
intervention-trade ratio. To manage the liquidity position of the private
banking system in Switzerland the central bank makes active use of foreign
currency swap operations. This is, of course, reflected in the intervention
reaction function. Apart from that, Bischofberger only fmds the second
subsample to show a systematic pattern of foreign exchange intervention.
The Swiss National Bank appears to have tried to resist appreciations of the
Swiss franc with respect to the US dollar which lasted longer than one
month on the one hand, and to have supported depreciations which, ex post,
were found to have lasted no longer than one month, on the other hand,
both with particularly high intervention-trade ratios. The intervention
behaviour of the monetary authorities of the United States can be explained
systematically by means of a linear reaction function only for the last two
subsamples. The estimation results indicate that the transactions in foreign
exchange by the Federal Reserve System were mainly directed at curbing
the rise of the effective exchange rate of the US dollar.
Kearney and MacDonald (1986) study the intervention behaviour of the
BoE. They make a distinction between day-to-day dealings in foreign
exchange to smooth transient fluctuations on the one hand, and interventions
'on a scale sufficient to maintain the rate of exchange at a level which
differs from that which would otherwise have cleared the foreign exchange
market' (Kearney and MacDonald 1986, p. 348) on the other hand.
Quarterly data are used to test empirically whether the latter category of
interventions was guided by a systematic 'leaning against the wind' policy.
The OLS estimation result for the period April 1973-December 1982 looks
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as follows, with z-values in parentheses:
INV, = - 202.18 - 54.582 (S, - St_l) + 0.466 INV,_I
(0.46) (2.49) (3.10)
(3.8)
R2 = 0.34 DW = 1.88
It follows that on average the BoE bought (sold) 54.6 million US dollars for
every pence the value of the US dollar dropped (rose) during the month the
exchange rate change occurred and $47.6 million thereafter. An IV
estimation renders a higher but insignificant 'leaning' coefficient. A target
exchange rate term defined analogously to that in Artus (1976) is
insignificant.
Gartner (1987) challenges the ruling consensus that central banks only
employ a 'leaning against the wind' policy. He argues that large and
persistent medium-term movements in the exchange rates are of major
concern to international business. Therefore, exchange rate targeting should
show up in the intervention reaction function as well. Before presenting an
alternative specification of a reaction function for the Swiss National Bank
(SNB) which meets with the apparent shortcomings of earlier investigations,
Gartner criticizes the way in which other studies deal with the simultaneity
problem when estimating reaction functions. He claims to have found an
appropriate solution for this problem. It involves employing the IV
estimation technique using the percentage rate of change of the real
exchange rate of the US dollar vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark as an instrument
to replace the percentage rate of change of the real exchange rate of the US
dollar vis-a-vis the Swiss franc. Obviously, the real $/DM rate is a cross-
rate of the real $/Sfr rate. Therefore, movements in both rates are
correlated by definition. However, a direct consequence is that intervention
by the German and Swiss central banks will be correlated as well.
Therefore, Gartner's assertion that changes in the real $/DM rate do 'not
itself respond in any relevant fashion to Swiss intervention' (p. 447) is a
faulty one. This is the case particularly when the SNB subscribes to the
conclusion reached in the following section that coordinated interventions
conveying a news content constitute the only sort of interventions that have
a chance to affect the rate of change of an exchange rate. Therefore, the
real $/DM rate is not a proper instrument for the reaction function. The
estimation results are not reported here. An interesting aspect of the
investigations by Gartner is the flexible formulation of the reaction function.
A distinction is made between the directions of change of the real exchange
rate during a month. In addition to that the possibility is left open that the
central bank takes into account whether the real Sfr/$ rate is overvalued or
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undervalued. Thus, four cases are created.' It is found that appreciations
of the Swiss franc which occurred while it was overvalued were opposed
most strongly. Appreciations of the Swiss franc which took place when the
currency was undervalued were tolerated. Analogous 'leaning against
destabilizing wind' is detected for depreciations of the Swiss franc vis-a-vis
the US dollar.
Gaiotti, Giucca and Micossi (1989) try 'to ascertain whether the
intervention policies of 1985-87 entailed a departure from past practices'
(p. 21). Their estimations cover the period 1974(4)-1987(12) or subperiods
within this sample. They use monthly data. The estimating equation is
obtained by substituting the equation which explains movements in the
target exchange rate S,r, equation (3.2b) above, into the actual intervention
reaction function. The intervention data used by Gaiotti, Giucca and Micossi
are not very detailed. To account for changes in the reserve position of a
central bank (lNV) that do not directly result from interventions in the
foreign exchange market, the trade balance (TBJ is included as an
explanatory variable in the reaction function. This is the main difference
from the approach taken by Artus (1976). The most important IV estimation
results for the Deutsche Bundesbank and the BoJ can be written as follows,
with z-values in parentheses:
lAA'rDBB = -1413.1 + 1479 (PGERIPus-l) + 17.96 TBt + 2603.8 s, + 169.4 s,
(-4.28) (3.12) (0.44) (3.77) (3.46)
R2 = 0.30 DW = 1.83 (3.9a)
INV/OJ = -3715.4 + 3148 (PJAFjPus-l) + 150.74 TEt + 6974.8 S, + 189.3 s,
(-4.24) (3.08) (2.63) (3.78) (2.03)
R2 = 0.39 DW = 1.69 (3.9b)
The 'leaning against the wind' behaviour of the Bundesbank appears to have
been stable throughout the period. The IV estimates imply that the German
central bank, on average, bought (sold) 169 million US dollars for every
one per cent appreciation (depreciation) of the Deutsche Mark vis-a-vis the
US dollar during one month. However, estimation results for subperiods not
reported here suggest that the steady appreciation of the US dollar from
March 1980 until February 1985 was accompanied by a more than average
intervention effort by the Bundesbank. The estimated coefficient for the
variable capturing the 'leaning against the wind' intervention by the BoJ is
larger (189 million US dollars) than that of the Bundesbank. Moreover. the
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Japanese central bank intervened significantly less than average during the
period of US dollar appreciation mentioned earlier. Furthermore, Gaiotti,
Giucca and Micossi find that the BoJ from the middle of 1986 onwards
rigidly tried to hold on to the prevailing exchange rate level. The reported
IV estimates of the 'leaning' coefficients are significantly higher than the
ones obtained with OLS. This can be explained by the fact that the former
method accounts for the negative correlation between s, and INVp while the
latter does not. In view of the frequency of the data, one wonders whether
the percentage rate of change of the spot rate from one period (month) to
another (S) can capture the 'leaning against the wind' character of the
interventions adequately. A dummy variable which accounts for the coordi-
nated interventions following the Plaza Agreement enters the estimated
reaction functions of both the Bundesbank and the BoJ with a coefficient
significantly different from zero. This indicates that the concerted action in
October 1985 is one without precedent in the post-Bretton Woods era.
Honegger (1989) wants to let the data determine which explanatory
variables have to be included in the intervention reaction function for the
central banks of Canada, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. Honegger applies the vector autoregression (VAR) estimation
technique to determine for each of the five countries whether or not lagged
values of the level of intervention, the unemployment rate, the inflation
rate, the percentage change of the exchange rate and the deviation of the
exchange rate from PPP are significantly correlated with monthly
intervention volumes for the period January 1974-December 1985. For
none of the respective central banks does any other variable but lagged
intervention and the percentage change of the exchange rate of the home
currency vis-a-vis the US dollar appear to be correlated with the volume of
intervention. However, Honegger argues that lasting deviations of a
country's effective exchange rate from PPP are far more damaging for the
domestic economy than short-term exchange rate volatility. Therefore, it
should appear from the reaction functions that central banks take into
account whether or not a currency is over- or undervalued and act
differently when the exchange rate moves towards PPP as compared to
cases in which the exchange rate moves away from the equilibrium rate
implied by PPP. Honegger contends that, as actual monthly foreign and
domestic inflation rates (necessary to compute the PPP rate) are available
only with a certain lag, it is unknown whether a currency is over- or
undervalued during a particular month. He computes the ex ante PPP rate
based on the assumption that the equilibrium exchange rate follows a first
order autoregressive process. Four variables are constructed. Each
represents the percentage change of the home currency vis-a-vis the US
dollar during one month in discrete cases:
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VI appreciation during undervaluation
V2 depreciation during overvaluation
V3 depreciation during undervaluation
V4 appreciation during overvaluation
OLS estimation results for the Deutsche Bundesbank (DBB) and the Bank
of Japan (BoJ) look as follows:
INV,OB8 = _ 0.006 -0.515 VI - 0.207 V2 - 0.501 V1 - 0.872 V4 + 0.083 INV'_IOBB
(0.86) (4.36) (1.22) (1.65) (4.64) (1.10)
If = 0.26 Durbin's h = - 4.93 SER = 0.034 (3. lOa)
INV,BoJ = 0.002 - 0.064 VI - 0.515 V2 - 0.509 V) - 1.022 V. + 0.304 INV,_rBoJ
(0.26) (0.32) (2.52) (1.29) (5.17) (4.25)
R2 = 0.34 Durbin's h = - 2.65 SER = 0.037 (3. lOb)
As before, t-values are in parentheses. SER denotes the standard error of
regression. It appears that the DBB only tried to counteract appreciations of
the Deutsche Mark vis-a-vis the US dollar. It should be noted that this
finding not only applies to months in which the DM was overvalued (V4)
but also to months in which the DM was undervalued (V2), albeit with a
smaller 'leaning' coefficient. Given that the Deutsche Mark was
undervalued, a one percentage point appreciation of the DM on average led
the Bundesbank to buy US dollars to an amount equivalent to 0.515 per cent
of the Bundesbank's foreign exchange reserves. Based on the estimation
results Honegger concludes that the Bundesbank undertook its interventions
at least partly to enhance the international competitiveness of German
industries. For the BoJ 'leaning against the wind' behaviour is found only
during months in which the yen was overvalued. Most noticeable in this
respect is the systematic selling of foreign exchange in return for yen when
the yen 'threatened' to move towards the (computed) equilibrium value. The
BoC appears to have carried out its interventions symmetrically across all
four cases. The amount of intervention during months of appreciation was
three times as large as during months of depreciation. For the BoE the
results suggest that interventions were mainly guided by the pursuit of
domestic price stability. The operations in the foreign exchange market
were directed one-sidedly at opposing depreciations of the pound vis-a-vis
the US dollar. The estimation results for the SNB are similar to the ones
found by Gartner (1987).
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Eijffinger and Gruijters (1991) have daily data of intervention by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System at their disposal. This allows
them to test for an other intervention strategy: countering erratic
fluctuations and 'leaning against the wind' over shorter periods than one
month. To take account of intra-daily exchange rate movements, Eijffinger
and Gruijters include in their estimation the opening (primo), fixing, and
closing (ultimo) rates of every trading day at the Frankfurt foreign exchange
market. These variables are denoted by S/, S/ and StU, respectively. It
appears that on average one-fifth of Bundesbank and Federal Reserve
interventions on day t can be explained by the difference between day t's
opening spot rate of the US dollar in terms of DM and the five days moving
average of the opening, fixing and closing rate. For September 1985
estimation results indicate that the Bundesbank pursued a 'leaning with the
wind' policy. A closer inspection of the data revealed that all observed US
dollar sales were carried out after the establishment of the Plaza agreement
had shifted the market sentiment in favour of a depreciation of the US
dollar. The coordination of exchange market intervention by the Bundesbank
and the Federal Reserve System is investigated by adding intervention by
the Federal Reserve as an additional explanatory variable of the
Bundesbank's reaction function. The estimated coordination coefficient is
significantly different from zero in five out of eight months in which both
central banks intervened. However its value is unstable. This points at a
changing degree of coordination. To test the effect of exchange market
uncertainty on interventions the 'leaning against the wind' variable is
adjusted for the variance of the opening, fixing and closing rates of the US
dollar in terms of the DM in the past five days. The estimation results for
the reaction function of the Bundesbank's interventions (INV(DBB) in October
1987are as follows, with r-values in parentheses
I~DBB = -0.003 - l321.7 a; [s/ - ~ t S(~':/U]
(-0.10) (-5.47) 15 n=1
(3.11)
with a; = nt [s(~,:/U - /5 nt s:,:/u] 2, R2 = 0.580, DW = 1.760
Eijffinger and Gruijters find that in months with large exchange rate
fluctuations the smoothing coefficient as well as the explanatory power of
the reaction function are larger than in months with small fluctuations. This
indicates that the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System accept their
responsibility and do not pull back when uncertainty in the foreign exchange
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market grows, contrary to the empirical findings of Neumann (1984).
Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) test whether daily Bundesbank and
Federal Reserve intervention in the $/DM market was geared towards a
PPP-implied target level of the $IDM rate. In addition to that, they test
whether the German and US central banks tried to keep the $IDM rate close
to target levels to which, according to Funabashi (1988), the G-5 countries
had agreed at successive summit meetings during the period 1985-89. For
the post-Louvre period, February 1987-December 1990, the Federal
Reserve is not found to have 'leaned against the wind'. Rather, action was
taken when the dollar wandered away from its target rate. IV estimation
results for this period, which comprises 900 observations, can be written:
I~FED = -14.71 + 34.71 Ss, - 7.73 t:J.s,_1 + 5.20 (s, - s/P") + 0.52 INV'_IFED
(-2.69) (0.29) (-0.66) (4.77) (13.00)
If = 0.35 (3.12)
Accordingly, a one per cent rise in the value of the DM in terms of US
dollars above the PPP rate, on average, led the Federal Reserve to buy US
$5.2 million. The estimation result for a reaction function with the
alternative target specification is almost identical. The intervention effort for
a one per cent deviation from the target rates given in Funabashi (1988) is
US$ 4.59 million. For the Bundesbank, the overall explanatory power of
the estimated intervention reaction functions is lower. Intervention data are
available from September 1985 to December 1988. Again, no systematic
'leaning against the wind' behaviour is found. The PPP target performs
better than the Funabashi target. However, the intervention coefficient
implies that for the post-Louvre period, February 1987-December 1988,
a one per cent appreciation of the DM above the PPP rate, on average, led
the Bundesbank to buy only US $1.8 million.
3.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTION
This section discusses the results of empirical research carried out to
ascertain the effectiveness of foreign exchange market intervention
undertaken since 1973.
A purchase (sale) of foreign exchange by a central bank leads, ceteris
paribus, to an increase (decrease) in the reserve position of the private
banking system as a whole. The induced loosening (tightening) of the
domestic money market results in an increase (decrease) in the money
stock. In the structural exchange rate models discussed in the previous
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chapter a depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency is the
immediate consequence. Nearly all empirical investigations disregard this
monetary channel because it can be argued that this channel applies to
monetary policy rather than exchange rate policy. Of course, this argument
may be arbitrary.
To prevent the money stock from increasing (decreasing) the monetary
authorities can sterilize the effect of the exchange market intervention by
selling (buying) short-term domestic assets to (from) the banking system
leaving the monetary base of the country unchanged. In the previous
chapters two main channels of influence of sterilized interventions were
distinguished. When investors do not view otherwise identical government
bonds denominated in different currencies as perfect substitutes, a
disturbance of the portfolio balance caused by a steril ized purchase of bonds
denominated in the relatively 'risky' currency leads to a rise in the value of
the 'risky' currency.
Attention has been paid to the effectiveness of interventions via the
portfolio balance channel because this channel, if operative, constitutes a
tool of exchange rate policy which is independent from monetary policy.
However, the enormous growth in financial market turnovers during the last
decades seems to have diminished the potential for central banks to cause
a significant imbalance in investors' portfolios. For this reason current
research focuses more on the expectations channel.
Sterilized intervention could influence exchange rates by providing new
information about future monetary policy to an otherwise efficient (semi-
strong form) market. Moreover, it could simply alter private exchange
market participants' expectations in an informationally inefficient market.
As was argued in the previous chapter, the portfolio balance channel can
only be effective if the risk premium on assets denominated in domestic
currency, (RpD) in equation (2.38), does not equal zero. Problems arise
however when one wants to calculate the risk premium. Various attempts
have been made using different kinds of expectations formations (see, on the
problem of estimating econometrically the portfolio balance model, Tryon
1983 and Weber 1986). Another complication lies in the fact that the effect
of central bank interventions is absorbed immediately in the movements of
the exchange rate. To get a clear view of the actual effectiveness one should
be able to compare these movements with the fluctuations in the exchange
rate that would have occurred in the absence of intervention. Furthermore,
it can be argued that the estimations are rather partial as most of the time
intervention will be accompanied by other measures of monetary policy, for
instance interest rate policy. 6
The remainder of this section reviews a number of empirical
investigations into the effectiveness of exchange market intervention. Their
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main characteristics are summarized in Table 3.2.
Branson, Halttunen and Masson (1977, 1979) estimate a reduced-form
portfolio balance model. Movements in the spot rate of the Deutsche Mark
in terms of US dollars (S,) are related to movements in US and German
stocks of money (MIIUS, Ml/,) and stocks of net foreign assets (FPIUS, FP/1.
Sterilized foreign exchange market interventions have an impact on the
volume of a country's net foreign assets, but leave the money stock
unchanged. Thus, if accurate data on privately held net foreign assets are
available, it is possible to detect the effect of sterilized interventions without
having the problem of finding a proxy for exchange rate expectations.
Consistent estimates look as follows, with t-values in parentheses:
S, = -4.852 - 0.062 MllG + 0.092 MlluS + 0.676 FPIG - 0.398 FPIUS
(-0.1) (-1.7) (2.8) (1.7) (-1.9)
"R2 = 0.937 DW = 1.349 RHO = 0.868 (14.0) (3.13)
RHO denotes the estimated first-order autocorrelation coefficient. All
coefficients have the correct sign. A point estimate in Branson et al. (1977)
suggests that a sterilized purchase by the Bundesbank of US $1 billion on
average caused the DM to depreciate by 0.185 cent. However, comparing
Branson et al. (1977) and Branson et al. (1979) raises doubts about the
robustness of this effect.
To find some evidence on the extent to which sterilized intervention was
practiced by the Bundesbank during 1975-81, Obstfeld (1983) estimates a
domestic credit reaction function. The estimated coefficients indicate that
only a small fraction of any change in reserves was allowed to affect the
monetary base. In contrast to Branson et al. (1977, 1979), Obstfeld focuses
on a structural portfolio balance model of German asset markets. The
estimation results indicate that home and foreign demand for DM-
denominated bonds only adjusted slowly to their long-run levels. To assess
the effects of sterilized as compared to non-sterilized intervention on the
exchange rate, the empirical model is simulated under the assumption that
agents have perfect foresight concerning future exchange rate movements.
Many events which impinge on the exchange rate are in fact unanticipated.
Consequently, the historical exchange rate path is not a proper reference for
the simulation results. Therefore, the results of a simulation giving the
exchange rate's perfect-foresight path in the absence of intervention serve
as a benchmark. The results of the simulation experiments imply that a
foreign exchange sale by the Bundesbank that decreases the German
monetary base by DM 13.25 billion (in 1979: 10 per cent) causes an
immediate 3.0 per cent appreciation of the DM vis-a-vis the US dollar
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relative to its benchmark value. By contrast, the simulated effect on the
exchange rate of an unanticipated but transitory sale of DM 13.25 billion
which is accompanied by an open market purchase of DM-denominated
bonds of equal proportion by the German central bank is a mere 0.04 per
cent. However, the apparent ineffectiveness in simulation experiments with
monthly data does 'leave open the possibility that sterilised foreign exchange
market intervention has significant but short-lived exchange rate effects that
disappear within a month' (Obstfeld 1983, p. 185).
Loopesko (1984) constructs a series for realized one-day foreign
exchange market profits, r., taking into account the usual two-day lag in
delivery on spot foreign exchange contracts:
(3.14)
St is the logarithm of the spot rate of a G-7 currency in terms of US dollars,
itUS and i/ are overnight US dollar and G-7 currency Eurodeposit rates,
respectively. Realized profits calculated this way reflect both the expected
risk premium and any spot rate forecast error. The joint hypothesis of
perfect substitutability of assets denominated in different currencies and of
the 'efficient' working of the foreign exchange market is rejected because
previously observable variables (e.g., cumulated interventions, lagged
values of realized profits and the exchange rate) are found to be significant
determinants of realized profits. The results of a second (F-)test lead
Loopesko to conclude that 'the predictable component of realized profits
can be identified with a risk premium, and hence that sterilized intervention
can affect the exchange rate through a portfolio balance channel' (Loopesko
1984, p. 267). However, interventions are only one out of many factors that
determine demand and supply conditions on the foreign exchange market
and therefore changes in the risk premium. Loopesko's investigation of the
'extra effectiveness' of coordinated interventions is hindered by a lack of
data as well as difficulties in interpreting the data. She finds some evidence
of a more than proportionate effect of coordinated US and narrowly defined
German intervention.
Rogoff (1984) expects the risk premium on assets denominated in
Canadian dollars to be positively correlated with the relative supply of
Canadian dollar- (At) versus US dollar- (At) denominated outside assets,
including the monetary base of Canada and the United States, respectively:
(3.15)
Rogoff postulates rational expectations. This enables him to replace the
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where 81+1 is a forecast error which is uncorrelated with any information
dated period t or earlier. The very disappointing estimation results are
accompanied by the 'plausible interpretation that there is a time-varying
exchange risk premium but one that cannot be affected by sterilized
intervention' (Rogoff 1984, p. 141).
Danker et a1. (1985) study the degree of substitutability of bonds
denominated in Deutsche Marks, Japanese yen, and Canadian dollars with
those in US dollars. Danker et a1. argue that direct estimation of the asset-
demand equations forming the portfolio balance model 'may not yield
accurate estimates of the degree of substitutability when the true degree of
substitutability is quite high' (Danker et a1. 1985, p. 1). Therefore, inverted
bond-demand equations are estimated with non-linear two-stage least squares
(ill 2SLS). The dependent variable in these equations is the risk premium.
Both under the assumption of static as well as rational exchange rate
expectations, perfect substitutability implies that the risk premium should
be uncorrelated with explanatory variables suggested by the portfolio
balance model (short-term interest rate differentials, real income, real
wealth and stocks of bonds). For Germany the estimation results based on
monthly data clearly point to the rejection of perfect substitutability.
However, the results are inconsistent with the portfolio balance model. The
same applies to the results for Canada obtained with quarterly instead of
monthly data. For Japan, when assuming rational expectations, the
hypothesis that all the coefficients in the inverted-bond equation are equal
to zero is not rejected using monthly data. Having established this, Danker
et al. report estimation results for the original bond-demand equations. They
only consider whether (the sign of) the estimated parameters of these
equations are consistent with the portfolio balance model. Probably, the
disappointing results of earlier empirical investigations prevented them from
formal hypothesis testing. The consequence is that 'the degree of success
obtained is largely a matter of judgment' (Danker et a1. 1985, p. 12).
Kearney and MacDonald (1986) replicate the study by Obstfeld (1983).
Central to their investigations is a portfolio balance model for the United
Kingdom estimated with quarterly data from the second quarter of 1973
through to the fourth quarter of 1982. Kearney and MacDonald examine the
potency of sterilized and non-sterilized interventions carried out by the Bank
of England based on the results of various policy simulations with the
model. Their results contrast with Obstfeld' s findings for Germany. A non-
sterilized sale of US dollars worth £10 billion (in 1976: 10 per cent of the
UK monetary base) is found to cause a 7.9 per cent appreciation of the
pound vis-a-vis the US dollar. Furthermore, a sterilized sale of equal
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magnitude raises the value of sterling by 3.2 per cent. Kearney and
MacDonald contend that the effectiveness of a sterilized intervention not
only depends upon the degree of substitutability between domestic and
foreign assets but also on the degree of capital mobility whereby the
instantaneous achievement of portfolio balance is regarded as a necessary
and sufficient condition for perfect capital mobility. Kearney and
MacDonald impute the effectiveness of sterilized intervention appearing
from the simulation results for the UK to the restrictions on capital mobility
in the 1970s.
Dominguez and Frankel's initial (1990) study attempts to disentangle the
influence of the portfolio and the expectations channel. The estimation
results concerning the portfolio effect of intervention are contained in
Dominguez and Frankel (l993b). The estimation results for the expectations
channel figure prominently in Dominguez and Frankel (l993a). Regarding
the portfolio effect, again, the main idea is that sterilized interventions are
effective if they are able to change the risk premium. Dominguez and
Frankel (l993b) estimate a portfolio balance equation that is consistent with
mean- variance optimization:
(3.17)
where St:l is the log of the one-period ahead survey expectation for the
$/DM spot rate. Contrary to Rogoff (1984), Dominguez and Frankel do not
invoke the methodology of rational expectations. Instead, expected future
exchange rates are represented by data from surveys of expectations among
private exchange market participants. 7 v, is a measure of the variance of the
change in the exchange rate, x, is the ratio of the total quantity of DM assets
to the sum of the total quantities of DM and US dollar assests, both
measured in dollars, and I-t, is an error term. Dominguez and Frankel report
OLS and IV estimates of the risk premium equation. Federal Reserve and
Bundesbank intervention cumulated from the beginning of the sample period
expressed as a percentage of wealth (i.e., the sum of DM and dollar assets)
is a statistically significant determinant of the risk premium on DM-
denominated assets. This leads Dominguez and Frankel to conclude that
over the period considered, sterilized interventions were effective.
In their (l993a) study Dominguez and Frankel provide evidence for the
effectiveness of intervention in three ways. The first two are clearly
hindered by the familiar problem of reversed causality or simultaneity. The
third is based on some unrealistic underlying assumptions. The first way of
showing that intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank
during the period 1985-90 was effective involves distinguishing eleven
'intervention episodes'. These are non-overlapping periods of three to eight
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months during which both central banks tried to influence the DM/$ rate.
It is found that
generally, in the month following the end of an intervention episode, the mark-dollar
exchange rate moved in a manner consistent with the intervention operations. When
intervention operations were in support of the dollar, the dollar appreciated against the
mark in the month following the end of the operations. Likewise, when central banks
sold dollars, the dollar depreciated against the mark in the month following the end
of the intervention episode. (Dominguez and Frankel 1993a, p. 95)
It should be clear, however, that the comparison of movements in the
Deutsche Mark/US dollar exchange rate in the months before and after
eleven periods of intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank
is a far cry from direct evidence of interventions causing exchange rate
movements. 'News' hits the forex .market almost continuously.
Consequently, a lot may have happened in these periods of intervention
which each lasted three to eight months (including inter alia changes in
monetary and fiscal policies in the countries concerned). The results of
Dominguez and Frankel can be interpreted with equal force as evidence that
the central banks withdrew from the foreign exchange market once
unfavourable exchange market pressure had subsided irrespective of the
precise cause. At best, these results shows that the old wisdom that what
goes up must come down also applies to exchange rates. The second way
of showing that intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank
during the period 1985-90 was effective is not less controversial. After
'showing' that extended periods of intervention moved the Deutsche
Mark/US dollar exchange rate in the desired direction, Dominguez and
Frankel move on smoothly to argue that intervention is best conducted
sparingly - which in itself is a contradiction. More importantly, however,
the interpretation of the crucial Tables 7.1-7.6 which are said to contain
evidence in favour of the effectiveness of intervention is fallacious. The
crucial coefficients on which the provoking conclusions are based are
always 'incorrectly signed'. The estimated equation looks as follows:
where s, is defined as the dollar price of one Deutsche Mark. Consequently,
a rise in the exchange rate is equivalent to a depreciation of the US dollar.
NEWS" REPINI'r and SECINT, are (+ 1,0, -1) dummy variables. NEWS,
is set equal to + 1 if there were official announcements other than those
about intervention that are favourable to the US dollar, -1 in the case of
official announcements against the dollar, and 0 if there were no such
announcements. Analogously, REPINI'r is set equal to + 1 if there were
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reports of central bank intervention in support of the dollar. SECI~ is set
equal to + 1 if there were no reports of intervention when a central bank: in
fact intervened in support of the dollar. Based on the definition of the
explanatory variables, the coefficient I'l is expected to be negative with
official announcements in support of the dollar leading to a stronger dollar
and, hence, a lower dollar price of one Deutsche Mark. Analogously, the
coefficient 1'2 is also expected to be negative. Purchases of US dollars
(REPI~ = + 1) should lead to a fall in the US dollar price of one
Deutsche Mark. Interventions which were not reported in the press are not
expected to have had an effect (1'3 = 0). The NEWSt dummy turns out to
be statistically different from zero and to have the expected negative sign
irrespective of the precise specification of the estimated effectiveness
equation. However, the coefficient 1'2 is systematically wrongly signed
(')'2 > 0). Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) admit this several times (e.g.,
'the variable that captures reports of central bank intervention is significant
but incorrectly signed' (p. 116)). Obviously, this invalidates any conclusions
concerning the effectiveness of intervention to be drawn from the estimation
results. In fact, equation (3.18) seems to be a degenerated intervention
reaction function which indicates that positive changes in the exchange rate
(~t > 0) trigger official purchases of US dollars (1'2 > 0, REPINTt =
+ 1). Yet, Dominguez and Frankel estimate several more detailed
specifications of equation (3.18) to detect differences in the effect of initial
versus subsequent intervention and coordinated versus non-coordinated
intervention. They conclude that both initial interventions and coordinated
interventions had large effects.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) provide a third piece of evidence in
favour of the effectiveness of interventions carried out by the Federal
Reserve and the Bundesbank during the period 1985-90. It is closely linked
to the results in their (1993b) study. The authors try to quantify the effect
of intervention on the spot rate. They make use of the 'knowledge that the
portfolio share allocated to mark assets, Xt' is a function of the risk premium
which is in tum a function of expected depreciation I1st:l, which is in turn
a function of news [about intervention), (Dominguez and Frankel 1993a, p.
132). The expected exchange rate change is a crucial component of the risk
premium. Therefore, Dominguez and Frankel try to establish the impact of
publicly known intervention and interventions carried out anonymously on
market participants' expectations. They estimate the following equation:
+ C¥3 NEWSt + C¥4 REPINTt + C¥5 SECI~ + ft (3.19)
88 Foreign Exchange Intervention
where S(~j.k is the log of the k-days ahead expectation for the $/DM spot rate
which is collected) days ago. The dependent variable in equation (3.19) is
the percentage revision in the survey prediction of the k-days ahead
dollar-mark spot rate from time t-) to time t. It is assumed that investors
expect the trend in exchange rate movements over the previous) days to
carryon during the following k days. Furthermore investors are expected
to redress their expectations when it becomes known that central banks
change their exchange rate policy. The dummy variable NEWS captures this
effect. The dummy variables REPINT and SECINT were defined above.
Estimation results for the period October 1982-0ctober 1984 are not very
interesting. As is well known the monetary authorities in the United States
hardly intervened during that period. For the period October 1984-Decem-
ber 1987 it appears from the estimation results that newspaper reports of
exchange rate policy announcements (NEWS) and central bank intervention
(REPINJ) in support of the dollar tended to lower expectations of the future
$/DM exchange rate. Secret interventions are found to have no effect on
expectations. Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) attempt to quantify the
ultimate effect of interventions on the spot rate by carrying out some tenta-
tive calculations. On the assumption that interest rates in Germany and the
United States are unaffected by an intervention operation, a publicly known
non-sterilized Bundesbank purchase of $100 million against the mark leads
to a 1.581 per cent appreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis the mark.
Dominguez (1990) investigates whether ex post one-day, thirty-day and
ninety-day excess returns in the US dollar-Deutsche Mark and US
dollar-Japanese yen market are related to unilateral and coordinated
intervention by the Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank
of Japan." Five distinct episodes are estimated: January 1985-March 1985,
September 1985-December 1985, September 1986-January 1987,
February 1987-June 1987 and October 1987-December 1987. Dominguez
claims to focus on the possible signalling effect of official intervention, i.e.
the capacity of intervention to influence exchange rates by providing
information about the future conduct of monetary policy. She states that this
effect does not rely on the existence of a risk premium. Yet, her method for
estimating the signalling effect does. The estimation results for the five
periods of coordinated G-3 intervention indicate that the expectations
channel was the main channel through which intervention affected the
excess returns. For each subperiod the results are in line with what could
be expected on the basis of Dominguez' description of the policy
announcements made by the G-3 monetary authorities and the press
accounts which reflect how these announcements were interpreted by private
exchange market participants. For example, the Plaza Agreement was
understood by the market to be specifically initiated by the United States.
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This was judged to reflect a definitive break from the previous policy and
the market was very alert to US intervention. By contrast, no particular
attention was paid to Bundesbank intervention immediately after the Plaza
Agreement. The German central bank had already intervened on a large
scale in the first quarter of 1985 and its intentions apparently had not
changed since then. The estimation result for the equation relating the ex
post one-month US dollar-DM excess return, taking into account the usual
two-day lag in delivery on spot contracts, r,_2. /+21' to the interventions
conducted three days before the survey of exchange rate expectations for the
period September 1985-December 1985 is reported here, with t-values in
parentheses:
r,-2.1+21 = - 40.44 - 0.12 INV,_3FED - 0.16 INVt-3DBB - 0.51 INV,_3c
(-5.18) (-2.55) (-1.81) (-2.16)
(3.20)
The excess return relates to Eurocurrency deposits with a time to maturity
of one month, i.e. twenty-one trading days. Analogous to Eijffinger and
Gruijters (1992) Dominguez defines coordinated intervention (IW)
observations as the sum of Federal Reserve and Bundesbank intervention
observations on days that both banks intervened in the same direction. A
coordinated sale of one million US dollars on average increased the
annualized US dollar-Deutsche Mark return differential by 51 basis points.
The results change from subperiod to subperiod. In some instances,
statistically significant but wrongly signed coefficients are obtained,
reflecting the fact that the interventions were not accompanied by credible
policy announcements. For the three-year period under consideration
coordinated intervention is found to have had a significantly different and
longer-term influence on market expectations than unilateral intervention.
This indicates that it was not the size of intervention that counted, which is
compatible with the portfolio balance channel, but the source of intervention
pointing to the relevance of the expectations channel.
In the analysis of Humpage (1988) it is not the volume of intervention
that counts. The mere fact that the Federal Reserve Bank entered the market
is of crucial importance. To emphasize the search for the 'news' -effect of
interventions, Humpage constructs dummy variables to distinguish between
initial and subsequent interventions. The former type refers to interventions
carried out following a period of at least five days without intervention. The
latter type is the complement of the former. For the period August
1984- August 1987 Humpage distinguishes three subperiods in which the
attitude of the Federal Reserve System towards intervention showed
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fundamental differences. Initial purchases of DM and yen directly following
the Plaza meeting (represented by the dummy variables DJ and D3,
respectively) significantly contributed to a depreciation of the US dollar
against the DM and the yen respectively. Subsequent intervention
(represented by the dummy variables D2 and D4, respectively) did not
produce a significant effect. Estimation results for the 75 trading days
between August 23, 1985 and December 9, 1985 can be written as follows,
with t-values in parentheses:








Initial intervention carried out following the establishment of the Louvre
Agreement did not have an effect on the opening rates of the US dollar vis-
a-vis the DM (StDM/$) and the yen (S/I$) in New York due to conflicting
statements on the direction of US policy. Humpage concludes that interven-
tion can have an effect on exchange rate movements taking into account that
'the size and duration of any announcement effect seems to depend on the
extent to which the intervention creates expectations of changes in monetary
and fiscal policies' (Humpage 1988, p. 15).
Eijffmger and Gruijters (1992) assume the market for foreign exchange
to be highly efficient. In that case, effective interventions will influence
exchange rate movements immediately - that is, within the same day -
by altering the expectations of market participants. Therefore, to test for the
effectiveness of intervention Eijffmger and Gruijters relate the closing rate
of the US dollar in DM at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market on day t
(Stu) to spot market intervention by the Bundesbank (I~DBB) and the
Federal Reserve (INYrFE~ during day t. Other explanatory variables are day
t's opening DM/dollar rate (S/'), the lagged closing rate (St_1 ~ and changes
in the interest differential between one-month Euro-DM deposits and one-
month Eurodollar deposits in London during day t (/1(iDM - i$)J Interven-
tions appear to have had a significant influence on the US dollar-DM
exchange rate during only one out of eight estimated periods of about six
months. The estimation results for the period February 1985-June 1985 are
as follows, with t-values in parentheses:
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StU = -0.0063 + 0.9037 S/ + 0.0988 St_IU - 2.0196 l1(iDM_i$)( +
(-0.089) (8.650) (0.948) (-0.678)
+ 0.0196 INV,DBB - 0.0606 INV,FED _
(2.741) (-1.188) R2 = 0.9589 DW = 2.0786
(3.22)
The estimation results suggest that a sale of US dollars worth DM 1 billion
carried out by the Bundesbank on average caused the US dollar to
depreciate vis-a-vis the DM by 2 Pfennig during the day on which the
intervention took place. The announcement of unexpected US trade balance
figures proved to have outweighed the effect of interventions in other
periods. Eijffinger and Gruijters conclude that a selective intervention
strategy and a careful timing of the interventions can enhance their
effectiveness. Coordinated interventions and initial interventions, defined as
in Humpage (1988), are found to have had a larger announcement effect.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS
Publicly available intervention data sufficiently detailed and frequent to
carry out reasonable investigations is still lacking. In spite of that, several
interesting features of the objectives central banks pursued with their
interventions have been uncovered. Longworth (1980) is the first study to
go beyond the usual verification of 'leaning against the wind' behaviour.
The Bank of Canada is found to have reacted symmetrically across months
with a rising and a declining value of the Canadian dollar in terms of the
US dollar. Later studies, e.g. Bischofberger (1986), Gartner (1987) and
Honegger (1989), have continued the search for asymmetries in the
intervention behaviour and extended it to cover more countries. A very
informative specification of an intervention reaction function leaves open the
possibility that central banks act differently in case their currency is
overvalued as compared to the case in which it is undervalued with respect
to PPP. Honegger (1989) fmds that the Bank of Japan only 'leaned against
the wind' when the yen was overvalued. The Bundesbank appears to have
been concerned with countering appreciations of the DM vis-a-vis the US
dollar only, while the Bank of England only opposed depreciations of
sterling. The search for asymmetries in the more recent studies replaces
attempts to include deviations from a target level as an explanatory variable
in the reaction function in the more dated studies such as Artus (1976),
Quirk (1977) and Konig and Gaab (1982). Asymmetries in 'leaning against
the wind' behaviour point to specific objects central banks want to attain,
e.g., low inflation and improved competitiveness of domestic industries.
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This contrasts with the assumption underlying most target level
specifications that central banks want to bring the exchange rates in line
with PPP.
In general, no systematic effect of sterilized intervention via the portfolio
balance channel is found, implying that interventions do not constitute an
independent tool of monetary policy. Data limitations and theoretical and
econometric problems have made it impossible to estimate the portfolio
balance model and measure the effects of sterilized intervention
satisfactorily. Furthermore, the scale of intervention relative to the
magnitude of flows in the foreign exchange market and relative to the
magnitude of stocks of private foreign assets is insignificant. Therefore, on
the basis of casual empiricism the potential for central banks to cause a
significant imbalance in investors' portfolios seems negligible.
Only official exchange market operations which create expectations of
changes in monetary policy or which embody another sufficient 'news'-
content appear to have a chance of affecting the exchange rate significantly.
Several attempts, such as Humpage (1988), Eijffmger and Gruijters (1992)
and Dominguez (1990), have been made to detect the components of which
the announcement effect is made up. In this context the extra-effectiveness
of intervention carried out after a certain period of no intervention and
coordinated intervention is investigated. The results are rather mixed
indicating perhaps that whether or not market participants pay attention to
the interventions also depends on' the availability of other 'news'.
Furthermore, statements of politicians and monetary authorities which
accompany the intervention can lend support to or detract from its
effectiveness.
NOTES
1. This chapter is based on A1mekindersand Eijffinger (1991).
2. Taylor (1982) investigates the profitability of foreign exchange market intervention.
Therefore, this study does not flt within the framework of our study.
3. Argy (1982, p. 68) defines gross intervention as the summed absolute values of the monthly
volumes of intervention, divided by exports in that year. Net intervention is the same except
that the sum of the months takes account of signs.
4. This may cause the number of observations to become too small to be able to present
meaningful estimates. These numbers are not reported by Bischofberger.
5. Unlike Bischofberger (1986), Gartner reports on the number of observations applying to
each case.
6. Obstfeld (1988) discusses the importance of central bank intervention relative to monetary
and fiscal policy for the determination of exchange rates during the period 1985-88.
7. This method is open to question because survey data do not have to correspond with market
expectations. Market participants may be interested in masking their actual expectations. For
a survey of the pros and cons of using survey data, see Takagi (1991).
8. It should be noted that Dominguez constructs a dummy variable which is set to unity for the
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days on which the Bank of Japan was in the market, according to her information, and zero
otherwise for the three-year sample period. Despite these questionable data she draws some
tentative conclusions on coordinated interventions by the three central banks.
4. Objectives of Daily Bundesbank
and Federal Reserve Intervention in
the DM/$ Market - Part I
4.1 INTRODUCTIONl
This chapter reports on the results of an empirical investigation into the
objectives of daily foreign exchange market intervention by the Deutsche
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the US dollar-Deutsche
Mark market. This study makes three contributions to understanding and
testing the objectives of central bank interventions. Firstly, the
investigations reported in this chapter deliberately focus on the short-term
objectives of intervention in the dollar - DM exchange market. Secondly,
particular attention will be paid to the respective central banks' behaviour
towards ex ante exchange market volatility. This is done by making use
of the insights provided by the recent GARCH literature in financial
economics. Thirdly, Tobit analysis is implemented to obtain consistent
estimates of the intervention reaction functions in spite of the fact that the
central banks did not inr==ene on the majority of the trading days in the
sample.
The previous chapter surveyed earlier empirical studies of central bank
intervention reaction functions. These studies are based on monthly or
quarterly intervention data. Consequently, they focus on the longer-term
objectives of foreign exchange intervention. As a result, they usually
ignore or deduct from the short-term strategy of 'countering disorderly
market conditions' which results in the smoothing of exchange rate
volatility from day to day and even during the day.
The investigations reported in this chapter deliberately focus on the
short-term objectives of intervention in the dollar-DM exchange market.
Daily intervention data of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are
used. The disadvantage of such an approach is the vanishing relation
between intervention and the 'fundamentals' which are measured on a
monthly or quarterly base. Nevertheless, this approach has a decisive
advantage, because it captures better the frequency and pattern of
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exchange market intervention with respect to 'countering disorderly
market conditions' and 'leaning against the wind' over shorter periods.
Thereby, it should be noted that the intervention behaviour of central
banks is not only reflected in the direction and volume, but also in the
timing and technique of intervention. The timing refers to the question
whether the exchange market is 'thin' and uncertain or not, while the
technique relates to the way in which a central bank implements its
intervention, i.e. by domestic and possibly foreign commercial banks or
by currency brokers with different announcement effects.
Despite the importance of both timing and technique for intervention
behaviour, these elements can not be taken into account by our study and
will surely detract from the explanatory power of the intervention
reaction functions. 2
In the empirical investigations reported in this chapter, particular
attention will be paid to the respective central banks' behaviour towards
anticipated exchange market volatility. Applications of the GARCH
model reveal that volatility is predictable in most financial markets (for a
survey, see Bollerslev et al. 1992). Shocks to daily exchange rate returns
in period t show a considerable persistence onto the conditional volatility
in consecutive periods. The conditional variance of daily returns in the
US dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange market will be used as a proxy for
the ex ante exchange rate risk. It is expected that the central banks try to
compress the perceived risk by means of direct foreign exchange market
operations.
The study concentrates on intervention of both central banks in the
spot dollarlDM exchange market. Daily observations for the official
interventions are used. Focus is on 'active' intervention which takes
place inside the dollarlDM exchange market. It is well known that
foreign exchange market participants are eager to detect any information
related to official foreign exchange intervention. Central bankers, in turn,
know that their actions are monitored very carefully. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to assume that all interventions undertaken inside the
dollar/DM exchange market are intended to influence the price formation
on the market. 'Passive' intervention which takes place outside the
market is left out of consideration.
The data available to this study run from February 1985 through to
October 1990. Four periods of at least three months with prolonged
intervention in one direction have been selected as relevant subsamples:
September 1987-January 1988, June 1988-September 1988, December
1988-June 1989 and August 1989-0ctober 1989. These periods are all
after the Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987. Therefore, the same
exchange rate policy regime applies to each, making them comparable in
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at least one respect.
This chapter is organized into five remaining sections, followed by two
appendices. Section 4.2 examines the stated objectives of exchange
market intervention by central banks in the G-7 countries in general and
by the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve in particular. Section 4.3
presents an update of the empirical results in Eijffinger and Gruijters
(1991) for periods of at least three months. The volume of Bundesbank
and Federal Reserve intervention is regressed on a constant and the
difference between the current exchange rate of the US dollar in terms of
Deutsche Marks in the Frankfurt foreign exchange market and a moving
average of the exchange rate in previous days. Section 4.4 discusses the
relevance of using the information contained in the evolution of the
conditional variance of daily returns in the US dollar-Deutsche Mark
exchange market as an additional regressor in the short-term reaction
function for daily interventions. Furthermore, OLS estimation results for
the amended Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention reaction
functions are presented. Section 4.5 centres on the actual inappropriate-
ness of the simple OLS estimation technique used in Section 4.4. Tobit
analysis is implemented to deal with the problem of a large proportion of
zero-observations for the dependent variable in the reaction functions.
This obtains consistent estimates of the intervention reaction functions. It
is found that an increase in the conditional variance in daily exchange
rate returns derived from a GARCH model estimated in the paper, led
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve to increase the volume of
intervention, for both dollar sales and purchases on account of their
'leaning against the wind policy. Section 4.6 contains a summary and
concluding remarks. Appendix A4.1 introduces the GARCH model for
daily exchange rate returns and shows that the stochastic process which
generates the DM/$ return changed markedly after the establishment of
the Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987. Appendix A4.2 provides
some technical details on Tobit analysis.
4.2 ST AT ED OBJECTIVES OF INTERVENTION
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in
the early 1970s, the exchange value of the major currencies in the
industrialized world is in principle determined by market forces.
However, in the present system of managed floating the exchange rate is
not the outcome of supply and demand. by private market participants
only. The monetary authorities of many countries have frequently tried to
influence the relative value of their currency by means of exchange
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market interventions. In the short term all central banks have a common
objective of 'countering disorderly exchange market conditions'. It is part
of their commitment to promote exchange stability in accordance with
Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund as amended effective November 11, 1992 (IMF 1993). As stated by
the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention (Jurgensen 1983)
and repeated by Dudler (1988), 'disorderly market conditions' are
indicated by a substantial widening of bid-asked spreads, large intraday
exchange rate movements, 'thin' or highly uncertain trading,
destabilizing impacts of essentially non-economic shocks and self-
sustaining exchange rate movements which may gain a momentum of
their own. The medium-term objectives relate to resisting large short-
term exchange rate movements or 'erratic fluctuations' which exceed a
certain size, buying time by the central banks to reassess their policies,
and 'leaning against the wind' which has been pursued by some over
short periods and by others over longer periods. The long-term objectives
vary from resisting exchange rate movements, which are believed to be
unjustified with respect to the fundamentals (inflation, money growth,
balance of payments accounts, etc.), and attempts to give some leeway to
monetary policy by lessening the impact of foreign shocks on domestic
monetary conditions, to resisting depreciation because of its inflationary
effects and resisting appreciation in order to maintain competitiveness.
Other objectives are, for example, attempts to acquire foreign currencies
without generating (renewed) downward pressure on the domestic
currency.
According to the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention
(Jurgensen 1983) the Bundesbank
has sought from the onset of floating to counter disorderly market conditions,
dampen 'erratic' short-term exchange rate fluctuations and smooth out excessive
swings in the DM/US dollar rate over longer periods (p. 13)
whereas Smith and Madigan (1988) state that
for the period since March 1973 as a whole it is probably correct to say that the
United States had no exchange rate objective. (Smith and Madigan 1988, p. 188)
Obviously, for the large US economy currency movements are relatively
unimportant in their ultimate repercussions on domestic growth and
inflation. Therefore, as its maximum tolerable exchange rate changes are
smaller, the Bundesbank will feel the need to intervene earlier than the
Fed for given movements of the US dollarlDM rate. On the other hand,
the weight assigned to exchange rate stabilization might be larger for the
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Federal Reserve after the Louvre Accord. While coordinated interven-
tions are expected to have a larger chance of affecting the development
of the exchange rate through their larger announcement effect, the
Bundesbank will urge the Fed to do its bit, or the other way around.
4.3 AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE REACTION
FUNCTION OF THE BUNDESBANK AND THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
4.3.1 The data
An empirical study of the reaction function for daily interventions by the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the spot US
dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange market must take account of the
development of the dollar-DM exchange rate between successive days
(interday), as well as in the course of these days (intraday).:' In this
study the intraday development is approximated by three observations per
day in the Frankfurt market:
1. the opening rate at 8.30 hours (Frankfurt time), SFR/·30;
2. the fixing rate at 13.00 hours (Frankfurt time), SFR/3OO;
3. the closing rate at 16:30 hours (Frankfurt time), SFR/6.30.
Because the opening and closing rates are only available from February
1985, the sample period chosen is from February 1985 until October
1990.4 Furthermore, the results reported in this chapter are based on
data for daily interventions in the US dollar-DM exchange market. Two
time series are used.' First, US dollar interventions of the Deutsche
Bundesbank expressed in Deutsche Marks against the DM/dollar
intervention rate of that day (INV,DBB). Second, DM interventions of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the Federal
Reserve System, so far as these operations affect the net foreign position
of the Bundesbank (INVtE~. Federal Reserve interventions affect the net
foreign position of the Bundesbank e.g. when the Federal Reserve
finances its DM sales by calling on the swap agreement with the
Bundesbank or from its DM balances at the Bundesbank, or when the
Federal Reserve invests its DM purchases at the Bundesbank.
The sample period (February 1985-0ctober 1990) consists of 1,439
trading days. On the majority of these days no interventions were carried
out by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System. Months which
comprise less than four interventions are left out of consideration. Four
periods of at least three months with prolonged interventions in one
direction by either of the central banks have been selected as relevant
Objectives of Bundesbank and Federal Reserve Intervention - Pan I 99
subsamples. The reason for this will be explained in the next section.
The first period runs from September 1987 (for the Fed: October
1987) to January 1988. It seems that during this period, the G-3
countries were no longer willing to direct monetary policy at stabilizing
exchange rates as was agreed upon at the Louvre meeting. Furthermore,
the October 1987 stock market crash is likely to have caught exchange
market participants off balance, calling for dollar-supporting intervention.
In the first half of 1988, the US dollar recovered gradually from its
steep decline in the aftermath of the stock market crash. The dollar's
upward movement against the mark strengthened vigorously during the
second period considered in this paper, June 1988 through September
1988. It appeared to be possible for the US economy to experience a
relatively strong growth without frustrating external adjustment. The
announcement of US trade deficits which were much smaller than
expected led exchange market participants to anticipate a further
appreciation of the dollar. 6 Coordinated central bank interventions in
August 1988 carried out to counteract this rise were supported by the
Bundesbank's move, on August 25, to raise its discount rate by Ih
percentage point leading to a narrowing of the interest differential in
favour of the dollar.
The third period runs from December 1988 to March 1989 for the
Bundesbank. For the Federal Reserve System it begins in January 1989
and ends in June 1989. Political strains in Germany and Japan on the one
hand, and a widening short-term interest differential favouring the US
dollar over the Deutsche Mark on the other hand put the value of the
dollar under upward pressure. Thereby, the market temporarily
overlooked the structural weakness of the US dollar caused by the
persistent US 'twin deficit'. The buoyancy of the dollar and thus the
perceived need for (US) intervention finally subsided in late June 1989.
Indications of a deceleration of economic growth and a lessening of
inflationary pressure led to market expectations of an easier US monetary
policy stance and lower short-term interest rates.
The fourth period chosen is August 1989-0ctober 1989. During this
period, again, the dollar came under upward pressure. The currency was
strengthened by lower than expected US trade deficits for June and July
released on August 17 and September 15, respectively, and favourable
employment and retail sales data lowering the probability, as perceived
by market participants, of an easing of US monetary policy. By means of
official sales of dollars, in part undertaken after a G-7 meeting on
September 23, the Bundesbank and the Fed tried to convince market
participants that the G-7 monetary authorities were firmly committed to
resisting the dollar's rise and maintaining exchange rate stability.
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4.3.2 Estimation results for the intervention reaction function
Quirk (1977) uses monthly data. He distinguishes two types of
intervention behaviour. First, intervention on account of a 'leaning
against the wind' policy. The reaction function for this 'case is given by
(4.1)
Second, intervention consistent with gliding panties calculated as a
moving average of previous levels of the exchange rate:
INV, = b (S, - L aj S,), with L aj = 1
i i
(4.2)
where INV, is the volume of intervention expressed in the home currency
and S, is the spot exchange rate (home currency price of one unit of
foreign currency). The same two specifications can be distirIguished
when daily data are used. In fact, the latter specification is central to the
investigations in Eijffrnger and Gruijters (1991). This section presents an
update of their study.
The interventions by the Bundesbank (INVfBB) and the Federal Reserve
System (INVtE~ in the US dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange market are
explairIed by a constant and the difference between the opening rate of
the dollar in DM in the Frankfurt market (SFR,830) and the seven-days
moving average of the opening rate, fixing rate (SFR,13.00) and closing
rate (SFR/630) of the dollar." The seven-days moving average of the
DM/$ rate in Frankfurt is calculated as follows:
SFRMA = ~ t (SFR830 + SFR \3.00 + SFR 1630), 21 n=1 t-n
The intervention reaction function can be written:
/NV,DBBIFED = (S'D'R 8.30 _ SF'R MA), ~+~ ~'., t +~ (4.3)
where 1-'1 is the residual of the reaction function. The exchange market
interventions by the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve are both expressed
in billions of Deutsche Marks. The interventions are positive if the
central bank buys US dollars in return for Deutsche Marks. The Deut-
sche Mark/US dollar exchange rate is defined as the spot value of one
US dollar expressed in Deutsche Marks at the Frankfurt exchange. The
constant in the reaction function (4.3) (ao) reflects, when significant, a
bias of the irItervening central bank with respect to the DM/$ rate based
on the development of the 'fundamentals', such as the (long-term) capital
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account, the current account, the inflation rate and the growth rate of the
money stock in Germany and the United States. A positive constant
represents an autonomous bias of the central bank concerned towards a
dollar appreciation vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark in the medium (and long)
run." The smoothing or 'leaning against the wind' coefficient (al)
reflects the reaction of the central bank by exchange market intervention
on a deviation of the current exchange rate - i.e. the opening rate on
day t in the Frankfurt market - from the average level of the exchange
rate during the previous days. As a proxy for the average level of the
exchange rate, a moving average of the opening, fixing and closing rates
during the previous seven trading days in the Frankfurt market is chosen.
During periods of an increasing (decreasing) value of the US dollar in
terms of the DM, the difference between the opening rate of the day and
the moving average (the bracketed term in equation (4.3)) tends to be
positive (negative). Consequently, a positive (negative) value of the
coefficient al would imply that the central bank tends to buy (sell) US
dollars when the exchange rate of one US dollar in terms of Deutsche
Marks is rising (declining). While the Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve are supposed to pursue a policy of 'leaning against the wind',
the smoothing coefficient is expected to have a negative sign. This means
that the central banks try to dampen the volatility of the DM/dollar rate
in the short run by exchange market intervention. 9
The results from estimating equation (4.3) by ordinary least squares
(OLS) are reported in Table 4.1. The constant (ao) is significant in all
eight regressions. For the first subsample it has a positive sign consistent
with the fact that both central banks only bought US dollars during that
period. The opposite case applies to the other three subsamples. The
smoothing or 'leaning against the wind' coefficient (al) has the expected
negative sign except for the fourth subsample. In the case of the
Bundesbank, this 'leaning with the wind' is statistically significant.
Neither a closer inspection of the data nor a broad characterization of the
major economic issues during the particular period reveal an explanation
for this apparent 'leaning with the wind' by both the Bundesbank and the
Fed. The announcement of a smaller than expected US trade deficit in
August and September 1989 pushed the (value of the) dollar above DM2,
inducing dollar sales by the central banks.
The values of the Durbin-Watson test statistic given in Table 4.1
clearly indicate that first-order autocorrelation in the residuals of equation
(4.3) is a problem. Although the lower bound of the critical value for
each regression varies with the number of observations in the subsample,
it can easily be checked that only for the fourth subsample in the case of
the Federal Reserve is the null hypothesis of uncorrelated errors not
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Table 4.1 OLS estimation results for the reaction function in (4.3)
INVDBB'FED = ao + a. (SFRt
83Q
- SFR,MA)t
Period Qo Q1 R2 DW Obs.
Deutsche Bundesbank
1987(9)-1988( 1) 0.035 -2.957 0.241 1.41 105
(3.18) (-5.83)
1988(6)-1988(9) -0.138 -4.490 0.086 1.59 86
(-4.87) (-3.00)
1988(12)-1989(3) '-0.029 -2.695 0.152 1.59 84
(-2.64) (-3.98)
1989(8)-1989( 10) -0.027 0.939 0.068 1.33 66
(-2.77) (2.40)
Federal Reserve System
1987(10)-1988(1) 0.036 -2.044 0.117 1.35 83
(2.54) (-3.45)
1988(6)-1988(9) -0.080 -4.444 0.137 1.23 86
(-3.63) (-3.80)
1989(1)-1989(6) -0.102 ~4.344 0.150 1.67 124
(-5.25) (-4.76)
1989(8)-1989( 10) -0.075 0.226 -0.013 1.86 66
(-4.71) (0.38)
Notes:
t-statistics are in parentheses.
/? 2 is the squared multiple correlation coefficient adjusted for degrees of freedom.
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for first-order autocorrelation.
Obs. gives the number of observations for each period.
rejected. In the following sections a different specification of the reaction
function and a more appropriate estimation technique will be used to
describe the intervention behaviour more satisfactorily.
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4.4 THE REACTION TOWARDS ANTICIPATED
EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY
In the previous section the reaction of the central banks to a divergence
of the actual from the desired exchange rate was estimated. The desired
level of the exchange rate was proxied by the seven-days moving average
of the exchange rate. Therefore, the central banks' reaction patterns were
assumed to be guided by realized values of the exchange rate.
The evolution over time of the variance or standard deviation of
exchange rate changes and other statistical properties derived from the
behaviour of exchange rates have recently become an intensively studied
subject. Several recent studies have applied Engle's (1982) autoregressive
conditionally heteroskedastic (ARCH) model and Bollerslev's (1986)
extension to a generalized ARCH (GARCH) model to describe time-
varying variances in exchange rates. The purport of the extensive
GARCH literature is that volatility in daily returns is predictable in most
financial markets. In several applications it has been shown that there is a
long-term persistence in the effects of shocks in period t onto the
conditional variance of exchange rates in period t+s for large s. On the
assumption that central banks are aware of this regularity, the forward-
looking nature of foreign exchange market operations can be tested by
including a conditional variance term in the reaction function ..
The investigations in this chapter are concerned with exchange rate
risk associated with interday movements of the exchange rate only. JO
The conditional variance of daily returns in the US dollar-Deutsche
Mark exchange market will be used as a proxy for the anticipated
exchange rate volatility. An increase in the conditional variance is not
only likely to cause 'disorderly market conditions' on the foreign
exchange market, but also it may have an adverse effect on the volume
of international trade. Until recently, the effect of exchange rate volatility
on the volume of international trade remained an unresolved issue.
Theory is indeterminate on this issue." Furthermore, Bini Smaghi
(1991) explains why it is so difficult to find any empirical relationship.
Using sufficiently disaggregated data on trade flows, he finds that, for
the period 1976-84, the standard deviation of weekly rates of change of
the intra-EMS effective exchange rate during a quarter had a significantly
negative effect on the volume of exports of the countries considered
(Germany, France and Italy) in the same quarter.
In the previous section four periods were selected of at least three
months with prolonged interventions in one direction by one of the
central banks. The reason for this is as follows. The variance of a time
series is positive by defmition. It seems reasonable to expect a central
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bank, ceteris paribus, either to buy or sell more US dollars in the case of
an increase in the conditional variance of the return series depending on
the initial direction of intervention. Therefore, the expected sign of the
coefficient for the conditional variance term in the intervention reaction
function is positive (negative) when the period is characterized by
purchases (sales) of US dollars by the central banks.
The periods selected all occur after the establishment of the Louvre
Agreement of February 22, 1987. Estimation results presented in
Appendix A4.1 point to a marked change in the stochastic process
generating the DM-US dollar return series as of that date. Furthermore,
these estimation results suggest that the process remained relatively stable
at least until October 1989. Therefore, the sample period used to estimate
the GARCH model runs from February 23, 1987 through to October 31,
1989 totalling 677 observations. The model can be written:
100 A log SFR/6.30 = bo + E,
E, I 0'_1 - N (0, h,) (4.4)
h, = 11" + a E~_I + {3 n.,
with 11", a, {3 > 0, a + {3 < 1. SFR/6.30 is the closing rate of one US
dollar in terms of DM at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market. The
first line of the GARCH model in equation (4.4) represents the mean
equation of the model. The dependent variable is the percentage change
of the closing rate of the US dollar. Et is the residual of the mean
equation. The second line of the model states that this residual has a
conditional normal distribution with mean zero and variance h; 0'_1
indicates the information available to exchange market participants as of
time t-1. The third line of the model defines the variance equation (ht).
The maximum likelihood estimation results for the GARCH model in
equation (4.4) are shown in Table 4.2. The constant in the mean equation
(bo) does not differ significantly from zero. Obviously, the DM/dollar
rate did not increase uniformly across the sample. The high standard
deviation of the daily returns in the dollar-DM market renders an
insignificant constant in the mean equation. The other coefficients of the
GARCH model in (4.4) are highly significant. The value of the
likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic in the last column of Table 4.2
indicates that the null hypothesis Ho: a = {3 = ° can be soundly
rejected. This implies that the random-walk model with a GARCH error
term fits the data better than the random-walk model with a Gaussian
error term. Although the residuals still exhibit some excess kurtosis, it
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Table 4.2 Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the
GAReH model in equation (4.4)







10.29 20.63 0.04 4.29 35.68
Notes: r-statistics are in parentheses.
111:3 and m, give the sample skewness and kurtosis for the residuals, respectively.
Q(12) and Q2(12) refer to the Ljung-Box portmanteau test for up to 12th order
serial correlation in the levels and the squares of the residuals, respectively. The
critical value for a 5 %-level test is 21.0.
LR(2) gives the value of the test statistic for the likelihood ratio test under the null
hypothesis that the variance is conditional homoskedastic Ho : ex = {3 = o. As the
alternative hypothesis is HI : ex ~ 0, {3 ~ 0, the LR-statistic does not have a x2-
distribution with two degrees of freedom. The tabulated critical value for a 5 %-
level test is 5.135 (Kodde and Palm 1986).
can be argued that the conditional normal specification in (4.4) captures
the stylized facts of the DM/dollar exchange rate fairly well. The
estimation results depicted in Table 4.2 are used to generate a time series
for the conditional variance of the daily DM/dollar return. The
unconditional or average variance of the return series for the sample
considered in Table 4.2, rr = 7r I (1 - a - (3 ) = 0.396, is used as a
starting value." The path of the conditional variance (hI) for the period
from September 1987 to July 1988 is depicted in Figure 4.1. An upturn
in the conditional variance during the first period of prolonged (dollar-
supporting) intervention stands out. A major strengthening of the US
dollar vis-a-vis the DM marks the beginning of the second subsample.
The course of the DM/dollar rate, its seven-days moving average and the
conditional variance of daily DMI$ returns for the period December 1988
to October 1989 is shown in Figure 4.2. During the third subsample the
value of the US dollar vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark increased rather
. sharply. The conditional variance of daily returns experienced major
gyrations from May 1989 onwards.
OLS estimation results for the intervention reaction function for the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System which includes the
conditional variance of the daily return in the US dollar-Deutsche Mark
market as an additional explanatory variable are reported in Table 4.3.
When comparing these results with those in Table 4.1, it is obvious that
the conditional variance draws explanatory power away from the constant
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Figure 4.1 The course of the Levelof the DM/$ rate and the
conditional variance of daily DM/$ returns:
September 1987-July 1988.
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Figure 4.2 The course of the level of the DM/$ rate and the
conditional variance of daily DM/$ returns:
December 1988-0ctober 1989.
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Table 4.3 OLS estimation results for the reaction function which includes
the conditional variance of the daily return in the DM/$
market as an additional explanatory variable
INVDBBlFED= Co + c1 (SFRt
8
.
3O - SFRtMA) + c2 htt
OLS Co c1 c2 i?2 DW Obs.
Deutsche Bundesbank
87(9)-88(1) -0.034 -3.156 0.134 0.284 1.56 105
(-1.21) (-6.34) (2.68)
88(6)-88(9) 0.105 -5.514 -0.588 0..151 1.75 86
(1.13) (-3.69) (-2.72)
88(12)-89(3) 0.047 -2.646 -0.213 0.165 1.63 84
(0.92) (-3.94) (-1.50)
89(8)-89(10) 0.130 0.723 -0.285 0.298 1.57 66
(3.75) (2.26) (-4.71)
Federal Reserve System
87(10)-88(1) -0.076 -2.573 0.192 0.192 1.56 83
(-1.87) (-4.32) (2.91)
88(6)-88(9) 0.226 -5.733 -0.740 0.313 1.38 86
(3.35) (-5.32) (-4.75)
89(1)-89(6) -0.012 -4.423 -0.207 0.172 l.77 124
(-0.26) (-4.91) (-2.08)
89(8)-89(10) 0.080 0.084 -0.280 0.068 2.12 66
(l.29) (0.15) (-2.57)
Notes: See Table 4.l.
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(co). The smoothing or 'leaning against the wind' coefficient (c.) remains
of equal magnitude. Furthermore, the overall explanatory power of the
reaction function, as measured by the squared multiple correlation
coefficient adjusted for degrees of freedom, is higher and the problem of
first-order autocorrelation in the residuals seems to have become less
severe. Most importantly, the conditional variance coefficient has a value
which is significantly different from zero with the expected sign in all
cases. It is positive in the first subsample when both central banks only
bought US dollars and negative in the three remaining subsamples during
which the central banks sold US dollars.
A straightforward interpretation of the estimated coefficients in the
Bundesbank reaction function for the sample period September
1987-January 1988 could be the following. A one pfennig decline of the
actual level of the exchange rate of the US dollar below the desired level
led the Bundesbank to buy DM 31.56 million worth of US dollars on
average. Furthermore, an increase in the conditional variance by 10
points, say from 0.30 to 0.40, caused by a larger than average
percentage change in the DM/$ exchange rate during the previous day,
ceteris paribus induced the Bundesbank to buy an additional DM 13.4
million worth of US dollars. However, the simple OLS estimation
technique in fact does not yield consistent estimates for the coefficients in
the reaction functions when using a data set in which large proportions of
the observations for the dependent variable are at a limiting value, in this
case zero. In economic terms, this implies that a correction is required
for the possibility that the one pfennig decline in the actual level of the
exchange rate of the US dollar below the desired level or the increase in
the conditional variance by 10 points actually were insufficient to lift the
volume of intervention above zero. Tobit analysis is the appropriate
method to deal with this problem. It is implemented in the next section.
4.5 THE INTERVENTION REACTION FUNCTION
ESTIMATED AS A TOBIT MODEL
The OLS estimation technique implemented in Sections 4.3 and 4.4
assumes that the residuals of the reaction functions (P-J are independent
of the explanatory variables. However, this assumption does not hold
when large proportions of the observations for the dependent variable in
the reaction function are zero, as is the case in the four subsamples
selected above. A possible explanation for the zero interventions is that
the central bank does not carry out foreign exchange market operations
intended to alter the development of the exchange rate until the perceived
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necessity to enter the market exceeds a certain level. Neither this
necessity nor 'negative' interventions, which correspond to various levels
of necessity below the threshold level, can be observed." A reaction
function for necessary intervention can be written
INVt * = do + d, (SFRt830 - SFR:U) + d2 h, + fJ-t* (4.5)
where INV/ is the necessary amount of intervention of the Bundesbank or
the Federal Reserve and the residual fJ-: is assumed to be an identically
and independently distributed random variable with mean zero and
variance cr. The coefficients in Table 4.3 are biased estimators of the
coefficient do, d, and d2 in equation (4.5). Therefore, fJ-t is not identically
distributed with mean zero and variance cr. The relationship between
observed and necessary intervention applying to both buying and selling
of foreign exchange is
INV/ if INV/ > 0 (4.6)
o if I~' =:; 0
In Tobit analysis, named after Tobin (1958) who pioneered this type of
analysis, the parameters in (4.5) are estimated consistently applying
maximum likelihood procedures. Appendix A4.2 provides some technical
details on Tobit analysis. Table 4.4 reports the Tobit regression results
for equation (4.5). In a qualitative sense these do not differ very much
from the OLS results reported in Table 4.3. The puzzling 'leaning with
the wind' coefficient in the fourth subsample for the Bundesbank is no
longer significant.
The Tobit regression coefficients overstate the actual effect of unit
changes in the explanatory variables on the volume of intervention. A
correction is required for the possibility that, for instance, an increase in
the divergence of the actual spot rate from the seven-days moving
average of the exchange rate does not lead to nonzero interventions.
Therefore, the coefficients in Table 4.4 have to be multiplied by the
expected probability that the volume of intervention is larger (in the first
subsample for both central banks) or smaller (in the other subsamples)
than zero. This probability can be derived from the Tobit regression
.equation with the independent variables set equal to their mean values.
The value for each regression is given in Table 4.4. These probabilities
grosso modo correspond with the (order of the) actual proportions of
intervention days in each subsample. At first sight, the expected
probability in the second subsample for the Bundesbank, 0.6421, seems
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Table 4.4 Tobit regression result for the reaction function in (4.5)
INV,* = do + d, (SFR,83O - SFRtMA) + d; h,
Period do a, d2 LogL Prob. LR(2) Obs
Deutsche Bundesbank
87(9)-88(1) -0.448 -9.998 0.384 -216.02 0.1425 41.65 105
(-3.79) (-5.31) (2.16)
88(6)-88(9) 0.327 -7.074 -0.911 -429.50 0.641 15.50 86
(2.45) (-3.40) (-3.06)
88(12)-89(3) 0.252 -9.140 -0.291 -223.08 0.2530 28.89 84
(2.03) (-4.34) (-0.87)
89(8)-89( 10) 0.522 0.824 -0.704 -122.72 0.0754 15.00 66
(3.78) (0.86) (-3.47)
Federal Reserve System
87(10)-88(1) -0.877 -10.245 0.869 -148.07 0.0821 22.54 83
(-3.41) (-3.74) (2.62)
88(6)-88(9) 1.037 -14.971 -1.786 -214.88 0.1925 29.50 86
(4.25) (-4.35) (-3.78)
89(1)-89(6) 0.403 -9.510 -0.493 -381.74 0.2703 23.00 124
(3.23) (-4.34) (-2.15)




Prob. gives the expected probability of an intervention volume larger (in the first
subsample for both central bank) or smaller (in the other subsamples) than zero.
LR(2) gives the value of the test statistic for the likelihood ratio test that the
explanatory variables, other than the constant, have no impact on the volume of
intervention. The critical value for a 5%-level test for Ho: d, = d2 = 0 is 5.99.
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to be an outlier. However, the Bundesbank intervened on 57 of the 86
trading days from June 1988 through September 1988, the calculated
proportion of intervention days being 57/86=0.663. In the other cases,
the calculated probabilities underestimate the proportion of days with
nonzero interventions.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
The estimation results presented in this study indicate that both the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System conducted their official
foreign exchange operations consistently. Daily intervention data were
available. This made it possible to test whether intervention by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve was guided by their commitment to
promote a stable exchange rate system and, thus, whether they tried to
counter 'disorderly market conditions' from day to day. A 'leaning
against the wind' policy appears to have prevailed across four post-
Louvre subsamples of at least three months. In one of the subsamples , a
significant 'leaning with the wind' coefficient was found initially.
However, it turned insignificant when Tobit analysis, the appropriate
estimation technique given the large proportion of zero-observations for
the volume of intervention, was implemented.
The 'leaning against the wind' coefficient relates the volume of
intervention on day t to the difference between the opening rate of the
US dollar in Deutsche Marks at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market
and a seven-days moving average of the opening, fixing and closing rate.
It should be noticed that the moving average refers to realized values of
the exchange rate. An attempt has been made to reveal a glimpse of the
forward-looking nature of foreign exchange market operations by
including a conditional variance term in the intervention reaction
function. In fact, this study investigates whether the central banks take
into account the well-established empirical regularity that daily returns on
foreign exchange markets show clusters of outliers, i.e. that exchange
rate volatility is predictable to some extent. Estimation results presented
in this chapter confirm recent evidence that the GARCH model gives a
good description of the statistical properties of daily exchange rate
returns on the US dollar=-Deutsche Mark market. With the conditional
variance modelled as a weighted average of the variance in past days
with geometrically declining weights, the GARCH model can capture the
stylized fact of clusters of large DM/dollar returns. The time series for
the conditional variance is derived from the estimated GARCH model.
The estimated coefficient for the conditional variance term in the
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intervention reaction functions has the expected sign in all cases. It is
found that an increase in the conditional variance led the central banks to
increase the volume of intervention, in the case of both dollar sales and
purchases on account of their 'leaning against the wind' policy. In other
words, both central banks take full account of exchange market
uncertainty with respect to their intervention policy.
There seem to be some good reasons for this accentuation of the
central banks' presence on the foreign exchange market. An increased
conditional variance of daily exchange rate returns is apt to cause
'disorderly conditions' on the foreign exchange market and, if persistent,
has adverse effects on the volume of international trade as well (Bini
Smaghi (1991».
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APPENDIX A4.1 GARCH MODELS AND
EXCHANGE RATE POLICyl4
A4.1.1 Introduction
The aim of this appendix is to explain some of the statistical properties
derived from the behaviour of the daily exchange rate of the US doUar in
terms of Deutsche Marks for the period March 1985 to September 1988.
Furthermore, an attempt will be made to identify changes in the
statistical properties corresponding to shifts in the exchange rate policy
regime.
The Plaza Agreement of September 22, 1985 and the Louvre
Agreement of February 22, 1987 entailed major changes in the
coordination of exchange rate policies and the frequency and volume of
official exchange market operations among the main industrialized
countries. The Telephone Agreement of December 22, 1987 is seen by
most observers as a confirmation of the Louvre Agreement. The effect of
these shifts in G-7 exchange rate policy regimes on the stochastic process
that generated the DM/$ rate will be examined. In particular, it will be
investigated whether the monetary authorities' determination to bring the
level of the DM/$ rate in line with fundamentals was accompanied by a
decline in the (un)conditional variance of this exchange rate.
This appendix is organized into three remaining sections. Estimation
results for a random-walk model with drift and a GARCH error term for
the DM/$ exchange rate are reported in Section A4.1.2. Furthermore,
some tests are carried out to determine whether this model provides a
good description of the data. Section A4.1.3 introduces dummy variables
to account for the different exchange rate policy regimes. Section A4.1.4
provides a summary of the empirical fmdings and concluding remarks.
A4.1.2 Random-walk model with drift and a GARCH error term
The exchange rate under consideration is the midpoint between closing
bid and ask prices at 16.30 hours in Frankfurt time of the Deutsche Mark
vis-a-vis the US dollar. In the main text of this chapter it is denoted by
SFR/630 Y The sample period chosen is from March 1, 1985 up to
September ·30, 1988. During this sample period, which totals 895
observations, the DM/$ rate initially showed a steady decline brought
about, inter alia, by the establishment of the Plaza Agreement of Septem-
ber 22, 1985. The Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987 marked the
beginning of a period of relative stability in the nominal DM/$ exchange
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rate, lasting until the end of the sample.
To be able to analyse the (un)conditional variance of the time series
for SFR/6.30, an adequate representation for the conditional mean has to
be found. In line with what is commonly found in the literature on short-
run exchange rate movements, the hypothesis that the autoregression of
log SIU has a unit root could not be rejected in an 'augmented
Dickey-Fuller test' (see, e.g. Meese and Singleton, 1982). A stationary
random variable is obtained by taking the first difference of the time
series. As is well known by now, the simple random-walk model with
drift and Gaussian errors is not able to account for the stylized facts of
heteroskedasticity in, and fat-tailedness of, the distribution of exchange
rate returns (see, e.g. Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) and the literature
cited there). Several recent studies have applied Engle's (1982) auto-
regressive conditionally heteroskedastic (ARCH) model and Bollerslev's
(1986) extension to a generalized ARCH (GARCH) model to describe
time-varying variances in exchange rates.




h, = 7r + La fl_j
j=i J
(A4.1c)
In the GARCH (p,q) model the expression for the conditional variance in
(A4.1c) can be written:
q 2 P
hI = 7r + La. EI_j + L {3. b.. (A4.1c)'
j=l J j=l J 1
where fl is the residual of the mean equation (A4.1a). In essence, the
conditional variance equation is set up as an ARMA process. Adding E/
to both sides of (A4.1c)' and some rearranging gives:
2 m 2 p
ft = 7r + L (a. + (3) ft-j - L {3. 7t_· + 7t (A4.2)
j=i J J j=i J 1
with 7t = E: - ht' m = max (p.q) and 7t is serially uncorrelated. The
orders of p and m in equation (A4.2) can be determined using standard
time-series techniques. A test based on the portmanteau statistic and the
results of overfitting the specified model indicated that the GARCH
model with q =P = 1 represents the data-generating process adequately.





h, = 7f + a E,_I + {3 h'_1 (A4.3c)
The conditional variance equation in (A4.3c) can be rewritten into
00
h, = if + a ~ {3i (E;-i-l - cr)
i=O
(A4.4)
with cr = 7f/(l-a-{3). An outstanding feature of equation (A4.4) is that
the. conditional variance (h,) is higher than the unconditional variance (cr)
when large forecasting errors occurred recently. Therefore, it is not
surprising that this specification of the variance equation is generally
found to be able to account for the clustering of outliers in exchange rate
returns seen in practice.
Table A4.1 Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in (A4.3)
bo 7f a (3 10gL LR(2)
-0.041 0.019 0.106 0.868 -993.15 96.66
(-1.82) (2.89) (6.48) (39.45)
m; = -0.09 m, = 4.76 Q(l2) = 15.71 Q2(12) = 18.79
Notes: See Table 4.2
The estimated coefficients for the GARCH model in (A4.3), shown in
Table A4.1, are highly significant with one exception. The US
dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange rate did not decline uniformly across
the sample. As a result, the coefficient in the mean (bo) is significant at a
10 per cent level only. The value of the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic
in the last column of Table A4.1 indicates that the null hypothesis
Ho : a = (3 = 0 can be soundly rejected. This indicates that the
random-walk model with a GARCH error term fits the data better than
the Gaussian random walk. Under the assumptions of normality, the
measure of kurtosis has the asymptotic distribution of m4 - N(O, 24/T).
The residuals still exhibit some excess kurtosis albeit less than in the case
of the simple random-walk model with m4 = 6.40. Modelling the
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GARCH process as a conditional r-distribution as was done by Baillie
and Bollerslev (1989), probably would have accounted better for the
leptokurtosis present in the unconditional distribution of exchange rate
returns. However, the conditional normal specification in (A4.3) captures
the stylized facts of the US dollarlDM exchange rate data fairly well.
Thereby, a good starting point for the analysis of the effect of changes in
the exchange rate policy is created.
A4.1.3 Exchange rate policy and the conditional variance of the
daily DM/$ rate
In Section A4.1.2, a stationary random variable has been created by
taking the first difference of the time series of the daily DM/$ rate. The
unconditional mean and variance of such a variable are constant over
time. The variance of the daily returns in the DM/$ market can be
computed directly by taking the average of squared deviations from the
mean of the series: cl = 0.60. It can also be calculated from the
estimation results for the GARCH model in Table A4.1 as explained
above: (i2 = 0.72. The unconditional variance of the DM/$ returns thus
calculated is in fact the average variance for the three-and-a-half-year
sample period. This section investigates whether a pattern in the
unconditional variance can be identified consistent with the increased
efforts by the monetary authorities of the G-7 countries to coordinate
their exchange rate policies following the establishment of the Plaza
Agreement in the first instance and the Louvre Agreement later on. This
issue is of interest because the higher the variance of daily exchange rate
changes, the harder it is to predict future values of the rate, i.e. the
higher is the uncertainty facing people involved in international trade and
investment.
To detect the effect of exchange rate policy regime shifts dummy
variables will be included in the random-walk model with GARCH errors
estimated in Section A4.2. As will become clear, the relationship
between the conditional and the unconditional variance in equation (A4.4)
forms the basis for interpreting the estimation results. Therefore,
allowance has to be made that the effect of the inclusion of dummy
variables in the model can be put back into this crucial relationship. A
dummy variable DI, with value 1 on the days in the first half of the
sample and 0 thereafter, is included as follows:
h, = cl + 01 DI + a ~ {3i (E;-i-l - cl - 01 D)
i=O
(A4.5)
which, after some rearranging, can be written as
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2
+ ex E,-1 (A4.6)
or, more comprehensively
(A4.7)
The unconditional variance of daily DM/$ returns during the second half
of the sample period, with D, = D'_1 = 0, is a; = 7ro / (1 - ex - (3 ).
The unconditional variance during the first half of the sample, a~, can
only be calculated from (A4.7) when it is assumed that D, = D'_1 = 1
which seems to be only a minor restriction. In that case the formula runs
as follows: a~ = (7ro + 7r1 + 7r2) / (1 - ex - (3 ).
While the one-period lagging of a dummy variable does seem to make
much economic sense, estimation results not shown here indicate that the
inclusion of the lagged dummy variable does not alter the conclusions.
To get a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the unconditional
variance across exchange rate policy regimes three dummy variables are
included in the model. They are defmed as follows:
DPL = on the days between the Plaza Agreement of September
22, 1985 and the Louvre Agreement of February 22,
1987.
o otherwise.
DAL1 on the days between the Louvre Agreement of February
22, 1987 and the Telephone Agreement of December 22,
1987.
o otherwise.
DAL2 on the days between the Telephone Agreement and Sep-
tember 30, 1988 (the end of the sample period).
o otherwise.
After incorporating these dummy variables, the model looks as follows:
100 (log SFR,I630 - log SFR'_11630) = bo + b, DAL1 + b2 DAL2 + E,
(A4.8)
The variable DPL is omitted from the mean equation in (A4.8) because it
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lacks significance. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 'drift' in the
random walk is fairly constant from the beginning of the sample through
to the establishment of the Louvre Agreement.
Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in (A4.8) are
depicted in Table A4.2. The unconditional variances of the returns in the
DM/$ market during different subperiods, which together constitute the
entire sample, calculated from these estimation results are given in the
first column of Table A4.3. An indication of the goodness-of-fit of the
model can be obtained by comparing them to the values in the second
column which give the average actual variance of the returns during each
period. Both series in Table A4.3 show a tendency of a declining
unconditional variance over the sample consistent with the enhanced
international coordination of exchange rate policies from 1985 onwards.
The question arises whether this insight is confirmed in statistical tests.
The value of the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic in Table A4.2 gives
rise to the rejection of the null hypothesis Ho: 7r}=7r2=7r)=0, i.e. the
hypothesis that the unconditional variance of daily returns in the DM/$
market is constant across the sample. The value of the LR test statistic,
14.3, is even larger than the critical value at a significance level of 0.5
per cent (X2(O.OO5.) = 12.8). Given this result and given the inability to
reject the hypothesis that 7r2equals 7r), the null hypothesis Ho: 7r}= 7rz= 7r)
can be read as the hypothesis that only the Plaza Agreement had a
Table A4.2 Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in (A4.8)
-0.127 0.102 0.201
(-3.68) (1.99)(4.04)
0.106 -0.066 -0.079 -0.081 0.089 0.836 -977.624
(3.61) (-3.08) (-3.32) (-3.44) (4.78)(27.42)
m3 = -0.08 m4 = 4.68 Q(12) = 12.69
LR(I) for Ho: 71'2=71'3 0.30
LR(2) for tt; 71'1=71'2=71'3 2.95
LR(3) for Ho: 71'1=71'2=71'3=0 14.30
LR(5) for Ho: b, =b2=7I'1=7I'2=7I'3=0 31.05
Notes: See Table 4.2.
LR(J) gives the value of the test statistic for the likelihood ratio test of the null
hypothesis indicated, where J indicates the degrees of freedom. The critical values for
a 5%-level test with J=I, J=2, J=3 and J=5 are 3.84,5.99,7.81 and 11.07,
respectively.
120 ForeignExchange Intervention
Table A4.3 Unconditional variance of daily DM/$ returns during
different periods
From the model From the data
Before Plaza
Between Plaza and Louvre
Between Louvre and Telephone
Agreement









significant impact on the stochastic process that generated the DM/$ rate.
It can be rejected at a 25 per cent significance level only (since 2.95 >
X\025.2) = 2.77). •
With the establishment of the Plaza Agreement exchange market
participants found themselves confronted with a new 'economic reality'
of closely cooperating monetary authorities (Funabashi 1988). The
empirical evidence suggests that the clear guide for exchange rate
expectations embodied in the agreement led to a decline in the volatility
of the daily DM/$ rate. At their meeting in the Louvre in Paris on
February 22, 1987 central bank presidents and ministers of finance of the
G-7 countries agreed to coordinate their economic policy more closely.
In the financial press there was talk of the monetary authorities agreeing
on certain target zones for the major exchange rates. Obviously, this may
have calmed market participants still further and thereby stabilized
exchange rate expectations. In the second half of 1987, however, it
seemed that the G-3 countries were no longer willing to direct monetary
policy towards stabilizing exchange rates. Furthermore, doubt arose
about whether financial adjustment was sufficiently backed by internal
policy changes aimed at cutting the US 'twin deficit' and current account
surpluses in Germany and Japan. The results of some tentative
estimations not shown here point to an upturn in volatility after October
1987. The October 1987 stock market crash is likely to have caught
exchange market participants off balance. This may, be a reason for the
not too overwhelming empirical evidence in favour of the stabilizing
impact of the Louvre Agreement. In late December 1987 'G-7 officials
reached a new set of understandings about fluctuations in exchange rates
and cooperation in exchange market operations' (pauls 1990, p. 907).
This has become known as the Telephone Agreement, reflecting the fact
that it was not established at a central meeting. The estimation results
reported above do not point to a significant difference between the
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average volatility before and after the Telephone Agreement. The null
hypothesis Ho: 7f2=7f3 can not be rejected in a likelihood ratio test. It is
possible that market participants viewed the Telephone Agreement of
December 22, 1987 as a credible confirmation of policy coordination
fitting well in the framework of the Louvre Agreement. They may as
well have neglected it because of the meagre announcement effect.
A4.1.4 Conclusions
The results presented in this appendix are in line with recent evidence
that the random-walk model with a GARCH error term gives a good
description of the statistical properties of daily exchange rate returns in
the US dollar-Deutsche Mark market. Modelling the GARCH (1,1)
process as a conditional normal distribution takes account of the condi-
tional heteroskedasticity present in daily DM/$ returns. The model can
capture the stylized fact of clusters of large values while the conditional
variance is modelled as a weighted average of the variance in past
periods with geometrically declining weights. Some excess kurtosis is left
unexplained by the model. This, however, does not make it impossible to
detect some interesting effects of exchange rate policy regime shifts on
the unconditional variance of the DM/$ rate. Both the Plaza Agreement
and the Louvre Agreement, the latter perhaps not too convincingly in a
statistical sense, appear to have acted upon the price formation on the
market for foreign exchange.
The estimation results presented above indicate that policy coordination
stabilized market participants' expectations leading to a drop in the
unconditional variance of daily exchange rate returns. This result,
combined with empirical evidence by Bini Smaghi (1991) pointing to a
negative effect of short-term exchange rate risk on the volume of interna-
tional trade, suggests that the world economy is better off since the US
monetary authorities abandoned their hands-off policy in February 1985.
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APPENDIX A4.2 TECHNICAL DETAILS OF
TOBIT ANALYSIS
In Tobit analysis, the likelihood of each subsample has a component for
the observations that are positive (or negative, depending on whether the
central banks bought or sold US dollars) and a component for the
observations that are zero.
For the observations with I~ = 0 it is known that
do + d. (SFR,8.30 - SFR,MA) + d2 h, + /-L,. ~ 0,
so
p, [1Nv,=O] = p, [": "
- d (SFR8.30 - SFRMA) - d h ]l' I 2 I
= 1 - F,
where Pr denotes the expected probability and F, is the standard normal
cumulative density function evaluated at
do + d1 (SFR,
8.3o - S,MA) + d2 h,
a
For the T observations for which INV, is nonzero an ordinary probability
density function applies. The log-likelihood function is given by
L = Eo In (1 - F,) - ({) In 271"- ({) In a2 -
[
INV - d - d (SFRs.30 - SMA) - d h ]_ E I 0 1 I I 2 I
1 2a2
where Eo and E1 denote the sum over the zero observations and the sum
over the positive (first subsample for both central banks) or negative
(other subsamples) observations, respectively. Amemiya (1973) proves
that, if the log-likelihood is maximized, the ML estimators for this model
are consistent and asymptotically normal.
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NOTES
1. This chapter is based on Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994a).
2. Goodhart and Hesse (1993) reveal some interesting aspects of the timing of foreign
exchange intervention.
3. Goodhart and Hesse (1993) assess central bank foreign exchange market intervention
virtually in continuous time. However, their investigations are based on reponed
intervention observations which appeared on Reuters screen information. This gives a far
from exact representation of actual intervention operations. Moreover, reported interven-
tion observations do not contain information on the actual amount of intervention.
4. Data for the opening, fixing and closing dollar-DM rate are taken from: Statistische
Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank, Reihe 5: Die Wiihrungen
der Welt, Februar 1985-November 1990, Tabelle 6: Kassa-Kurse des US dollar in
Tagesverlauf.
5. Data on the official interventions of the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve, to the extent
that they affected the net foreign position of the Bundesbank, were kindly provided by
the Deutsche Bundesbank, Hauptabteilung Ausland on a confidential basis. Therefore,
this study comprises no exact data, nor any figures of these interventions.
6. Empirical evidence on the relation between trade balance announcements and exchange
rate movements is presented in, e.g., Hogan et aI. (1991), Klein et al. (1991) and
Eijffinger and Gruijters (1992).
7. Eijffmger and Gruijters (1991) compare a three-days, five-days and seven-days moving
average, respectively. However, the present study concentrates on a seven-days moving
average only, because this generally turned out to give the best empirical results.
8. The constant is a consequence of the low frequency of the data on 'fundamentals'
(inflation, money growth, balance of payments accounts, etc.). The inclusion of monthly
or quarterly data for these variables does not seem to be appropriate in a daily model of
exchange market intervention.
9. However, if the smoothing or 'leaning against the wind' coefficient unexpectedly has a
positive sign, then the central bank concerned actually reacts by a policy of 'leaning with
the wind' and thus amplifies the exchange rate volatility in the short run. Such a policy
is expected to be an exception.
10. J would argue that exchange rate risk associated with intraday exchange rate
developments is of major importance when studying noise-trading behaviour and the
interaction between central banks and exchange market participants which behave as
'chartists' (see e.g. Allen and Taylor (1990) and Hung (1991a,b) for a more extensive
treatment of this subject). An empirical investigation of this interaction would require the
use of intradaily data of interventions, exchange rates and even trading volumes.
11. An increase in exchange rate volatility does not necessarily have to lead to a decline in
the volume of trade. An income and a substitution effect are at work. The substitution
effect of resources shifted away from the traded-goods sector when volatility increases
may be dominated by an income effect working in the opposite direction. De Grauwe
(1988) shows that this is the case if producers are sufficiently risk averse and increase
resources in the export sector to offset the drop in expected utility of export revenue
caused by the rise in exchange rate volatility.
12. See Appendix A4.1 for the derivation of this expression for the unconditional variance.
13. Periods of prolonged interventions in one direction were selected to rule out the
possibility that 'negative' interventions are simply observed opposite interventions (i.e.
selling instead of buying and vice-versa).
14. This appendix is based on A1mekinders(l994a).
15. See note 4 for the data source.
5. Objectives of Daily Bundesbank
and Federal 'Reserve Intervention in
the DM/$ Market - Part II
5.1 INTRODUCTION 1
The previous chapter discussed the results of an empirical investigation
into the objectives of daily foreign exchange market intervention by the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the US
dollar-Deutsche Mark market. This chapter reports on the results of
further empirical research into the objectives of interventions conducted
by both central banks. This study makes two contributions. Firstly, the
central bank intervention reaction function is derived formally rather than
postulated ad hoc. Secondly, to capture the observed discontinuity in the
intervention behaviour of the central banks a friction model is employed.
It will become clear that this involves a generalization of Tobit analysis
implemented in the previous chapter.
The majority of previous empirical investigations into the objectives of
central bank intervention formulate the reaction function rather ad hoc
(see, e.g. Chapter 4 and the papers surveyed in Chapter 3). This study
takes a novel approach. In Section 5.2 the intervention reaction function
is derived formally. First, the popular GARCH model for the exchange
rate is amended to allow interventions to have an effect on both the mean
and the variance of exchange rate returns. Then, a policy loss function
for the central bank is combined with this exchange rate model to derive
the intervention reaction function. Official purchases (sales) of foreign
currency by the domestic central bank appear to depend on two
variables. The model implies that they are positively related to the
expected fall (rise) of the exchange rate below (above) the target level
pursued by central banks and to the volatility of the exchange rate
conditional on no intervention.
Section 5.3 describes the daily data on exchange rates and intervention
used in this study to investigate the objectives of Bundesbank and Federal
Reserve intervention. The sample period considered is the post-Louvre
period February 23, 1987 to October 31, 1989. Section 5.3 also
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introduces the explanatory variables used in the empirical implementation
of the model in Section 5.4.
In practice, central banks are rather reluctant to intervene in the
foreign exchange market. By abstaining from intervention in the face of
small changes in the exchange rate and normal levels of conditional
volatility the central banks can be viewed as 'investing' in the potential
effectiveness of interventions to be undertaken at times when the foreign
exchange market experiences some serious turbulence. This feature of
intervention behaviour makes the standard linear regression model an
inappropriate tool for estimating the derived reaction function.
To capture adequately this aspect of central banks' behaviour, we
employ a friction model devised by Rosett (1959) in which the dependent
variable is zero as long as the independent variables remain 'close' to
their desired levels. The central banks' tolerance threshold for deviations
of the explanatory variables from their desired levels is one of the
parameters in the model.
The estimation results reproduce the familiar 'leaning against the wind'
policy by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. Further-
more, an increase in the conditional variance of daily DM/$ returns is
found to have led both central banks to increase the volume of interven-
tion. Finally, the estimation results point to some interesting asymmetries
in the intervention behaviour of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve.
5.2 THE MODEL
Neumann (1984) implements a flow market model for the determination
of the exchange rate. He derives an intervention reaction function
according to which the central bank of the home country supplies
amounts of home currency to the foreign exchange market when the
exchange rate of the foreign currency in terms of the home currency is
lower than the target rate (Sf < S/) and when an increase in the expected
risk premium on assets denominated in the home currency raises
speculative demand for that currency. It should be noticed that the
serious measurement problems surrounding 'risk premiums' are well
established. More importantly, the flow market model and other
structural models for exchange rate determination are rejected in
empirical tests. This has led many economists to adopt new research
strategies in exploring the field of exchange rate economics.
By now, it is well established that a GARCH model offers a parsi-
monious description of the stochastic process of daily spot exchange rate
returns (see, e.g. Baillie and Bollerslev 1989).2 This chapter focuses on
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the motives for central bank intervention. Accordingly, it is assumed that
interventions can alter both the mean and the conditional variance of
daily exchange rate returns. Furthermore, the postulated stochastic




DUM, = 1(-1) (5.ld)
Throughout this chapter the exchange rate, S" is defined as the domestic
currency price of one unit of foreign exchange. Subscript t denotes time
and lower-case letters refer to natural logarithms of variables. Greek
letters denote positive constants. All GARCH models in this chapter are
expressed in closing exchange rates (SU). It follows that the dependent
variable in (5.la) is the exchange rate return over the 24-hour period
from the closing of the foreign exchange market on day t-l until day t's
closing. Equation (5.1a) characterizes the mean of the stochastic process
which generates the exchange rate return series. 00 denotes a constant
rate of appreciation of foreign currency. I~ is the volume of
intervention defmed as purchases of foreign currency by the domestic
central bank. Interventions are effective if 01 > 0 implying that
purchases (sales) of foreign currency by the domestic central bank lead to
a higher (lower) exchange value of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency. Et is the residual of the mean equation. Equation (5.1 b)
indicates that it has a conditional normal distribution with mean zero and
variance h.. The symbol 0'_1 denotes the information available to
exchange market participants at the beginning of the relevant interval for
which the exchange rate return is calculated: the closing of the foreign
exchange market on day (-1. When measured over a sufficiently long
period, the constant rate of appreciation of domestic currency 00 may be
approximately zero. Then, large drops in the exchange rate correspond
with large negative realizations of E,_I' E,_2' etc. In the case of
bandwagon expectations among private exchange market participants,
these may lead to a further decline of the exchange rate: the GARCH-in-
Mean effect. When the exchange rate was falling (rising) in the previous
period(s), a high conditional variance is likely to lead to a larger fall
(rise) in the current period. Hence DUM, = 1 (DUM, = -1) in case of a
falling (rising) exchange rate. Equation (5.lc) defmes the variance
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equation (hI). Due to the inclusion of the volume of intervention
premultiplied by a dummy variable, this equation can capture the effect
of both official sales and purchases of foreign currency. At first glance,
less exchange rate volatility and uncertainty seem to be preferable for
society as a whole.' Hence, interventions are effective if O2 > O. With
the dummy variable defined as in equation (5.ld), this indicates that both
purchases and sales of foreign currency lower the volatility of returns on
the foreign exchange market. Presumably, the interventions work through
the expectations channel. They may curb bandwagon expectations and
lead to a lowering of the conditional variance. In turn, the dampening
effect of interventions on the conditional variance may lead to smaller
daily returns on the foreign exchange market, if 'Y is significantly larger
than zero.
Of course, the conduct of exchange rate policy is not the only issue of
concern for a central bank. Neumann (1984) proposes a central bank
policy loss function which accounts for a trade-off between controlling
the monetary base on the one hand and the exchange rate on the other
hand. However, in most large industrialized countries the monetary
authorities give priority to domestic policy objectives and use instruments
of monetary policy to attain these objectives. By definition, sterilized
interventions lack a money-market effect (cf. Pilbeam 1991, p. 106).
Therefore, it may be an appropriate simplification to focus on the
motives for sterilized interventions in the spot market for foreign
exchange. Suppose the central bank wishes to limit deviations of the
exchange rate from a target level (S/). Its expected policy loss increases
more than proportionally with both positive and negative deviations from
the target level:
(5.2)
To capture intervention carried out on account of a 'leaning against the
wind' policy, the target level for the exchange rate can be thought of as
representing past levels of the exchange rate. This follows immediately
from the definition of smoothing exchange rate fluctuations: whether or
not the exchange rate was considered to be at a desirable (or target) level
in the previous period(s), deviations from this level will be countered.
Minimizing the loss function (5.2) by choosing l.NVr subject to the
constraints implied by the stochastic process of the exchange rate
described by (5.la)-(5 .ld) leads to the following intervention reaction
function for the central bank':'
1M',
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DUM, = 1(-1) if A log S,~ < 0 (;::: 0).
According to equation (5.3) the volume of intervention depends on a
constant term which is positive (negative) when the exchange rate was
falling (rising) in the previous period. Furthermore, official purchases
(sales) of foreign currency by the domestic central bank depend
positively on the fall (rise) of the exchange rate below (above) the target
level, which is expected to occur during period t conditional on no
intervention. Finally, an increase in the conditional variance of the
exchange rate (again, conditional on no intervention) leads the domestic
central bank ceteris paribus either to buy or sell more foreign currency
depending on whether the course of the level of the exchange rate calls
for purchases or sales of foreign currency.
The intervention reaction function derived in this section will be
estimated in Section 5.4 for daily interventions by the Deutsche
Bundesbank in the spot Deutsche Mark-US dollar exchange market and
by the Federal Reserve System in the spot Deutsche Mark-US dollar
exchange market and the spot Japanese yen-US dollar exchange
market." Section 5.3 describes the data that is used for the empirical
study.
5.3 THE DATA
An empirical study of a reaction function for daily interventions must
take account of the development of the respective exchange rates between
successive days (interday), as well as in the course of these days
(intraday).? The objectives of Bundesbank interventions are investigated
by linking the direction and volume of Bundesbank interventions to the
interday and intraday development in the DM/$ exchange rate. The study
makes use of daily observations for interventions by the Deutsche
Bundesbank expressed in millions of US dollars." For Bundesbank inter-
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vention, the relevant intraday development in the DM/$ exchange rate is
approximated by three observations per day in the Frankfurt market:
1. the opening rate (primo) at 8.30 hours (Frankfurt time), SFR(830;
2. the fixing rate (official middle rate) at 13.00 hours, SFR/3OO;
3. the closing rate (ultimo) at 16.30 hours (Frankfurt time), SFR/630.
Analogously, the objectives of Federal Reserve interventions are
investigated by linking the direction and volume of Federal Reserve
interventions to the interday and intraday development in the DM/$
exchange rate. The study makes use of daily observations for Federal
Reserve interventions in the DM/$ and yen/$ exchange market expressed
in millions of US dollars. For Federal Reserve intervention, the intraday
development in the DM/$ market and the yen/$ market are approximated
by four observations per day in the New York market:
1. the opening rate at 9.00 hours (New York time), S~9;
2. the first middle rate at 12.00 hours (New York time), S~12;
3. the second middle rate at 14.00 hours (New York time), S~14;
4. the closing rate at 16.00 hours (New York time), S~16.
In the model presented above a time subscript was attached to the
symbol denoting the target exchange rate. This indicates that it is allowed
to vary over time. Obviously, when the domestic central bank continues
to direct intervention at a fixed target level for the exchange rate while
the actual exchange rate is being driven up (i.e. , the value of the
domestic currency is being driven down) by a strong underlying market
sentiment this intervention will in the end lead to a run on the
(remaining) foreign exchange reserves of the domestic central bank. At
the other extreme, when the central bank stubbornly tries to resist a
persistent appreciation of the domestic currency (persistent decline of the
exchange rate), it will encounter problems with sterilizing the money-
market effect of its increased foreign exchange reserves. Eventually, the
central bank will have to tolerate an inflationary effect of the
interventions. Thus, while it is assumed that the central bank wishes to
limit deviations from a target level, a flexible formulation of the target
level (S(T) is chosen which seems to be in accordance with the limited
manageability of exchange rates in practice:
for Bundesbank interventions
SFR(MA = ~ t (SFR830 + SFR13·OO + SFRI6.30t~/$
21 n=1
for Federal Reserve interventions
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The target level for the exchange rate is thought of as representing past
levels of the exchange rate. This is not to say that the exchange rate was
considered to be at a desirable level in previous days. It merely provides
a base for testing whether the central banks systematically 'leaned against
the wind' and tried to smooth (further) deviations from the seven-days
moving average of the exchange rate.
The reaction function in equation (5.3) proposes a second variable to
explain the volume of intervention: the conditional variance of the
respective exchange rate returns conditional on no intervention. Time
series for the conditional variance of daily DM/$ returns (in the
Frankfurt and New York market) and yenl$ returns (in New York) are
generated using the estimated parameter values of a standard GARCH
model depicted in Table 5.1. For the time series h,FR. DM/$, h,NY. DM/$ and
h,NY· =. the unconditional or average variance of the return series for the
sample considered in Table 5. 1, rr, is used as a starting value. It is
calculated as follows rr = 7r/(l-a-{3).
The establishment of the February 22, 1987 Louvre Accord marks the
beginning of a new exchange rate policy regime. Estimation results
presented in Appendix A4.1 point to a marked change in the stochastic
process which generates the daily DM/$ return series as of that date.
Table 5.1 Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the
standard GARCH model
u u100 ( log S, - log S'_I) = ao + f,
< I 0'_1 - N(O, h,)
(3 log L Q(12) Q'(12) m3 m. LR(2)
DM/$ in 0.015 0.021 0.073 0.874 -649.3 10.29 20.63 0.04 4.29 35.68
Frankfurt (0.65) (2.77) (4.47) (31.51)
DM/$ in 0.013 0.020 0.064 0.890 -648.8 7.47 6.88 -.09 4.65 25.94
New York (0.54) (2.83) (4.13) (34.83)
YenJ$in -0.006 0.043 0.083 0.834 -730.3 5.72 8.07 -.13 5.21 42.41
New York (-.23) (3.12) (4.21) (20.23)
Notes: See Table 4.2.
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Furthermore, it appeared that the process remained relatively stable
through to October 1989. Therefore, the sample period chosen is from
February 23, 1987 through to October 31, 1989. This period comprises
677 observations for the Frankfurt market and 680 observations for the
New York market. The estimated coefficients for the GARCH models
shown in Table 5.1 are highly significant with the exception of the
coefficient in the mean equation (ao). The DM/$ rate and the yenl$ rate
did not rise or decline uniformly across the sample. The value of the
likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic in the last column of Table 5.1
indicates that the null hypothesis Ho : ex = {3 = 0 can be soundly rejec-
ted. This indicates that the random-walk model with a GARCH error
term fits the data better than the Gaussian random walk.
The variance of a variable is positive by definition. However, central
banks will react differently to rises in the conditional variance of
exchange rate returns depending on the level of the exchange rate. For
instance, when the exchange rate is 'too high' ('too low') central banks
are likely to respond to a rise in the conditional variance by selling
(buying) foreign exchange. In order to facilitate a straightforward
interpretation of the estimated coefficient for the conditional variance in
the intervention reaction function the conditional variance h, is
premultiplied with a dummy variable which takes on a value 1 (-1) if
the exchange rate is above (below) the Louvre-equilibrium level. The
latter is approximated by the opening exchange rates in New York on
February 23, 1987: $1 = DM 1.8255 and $1 = ¥ 153.4, respectively.
5.4 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The intervention reaction functions for the Bundesbank (DBB) and the
Federal Reserve System (FED) implied by the model in Section 5.2 and
the description of the data in Section 5.3 can be written:
INYcDBB = bo DUM, + b, (100 * (log(SFR,8.3~ - log(SFR,MA))) + b2 DL, h,FR + 11,
(5.4)
INYcFFJJ = Co DUM, + ci (100 * (log(SNY;9) - log(SNY;MA))) + c2 DL, h,NY + 11,
(5.5)
where DUM, = 1 (-1) if D. S'~I < 0 (~ 0), Il, is a random disturbance
term and the dummy variable DL, is defined as follows:
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if SDM/$ > S DM/$ or syen/$ > S yen/$r - LOUVRE t - LOUVRE
-1 if SDM/$ < S DM/$ or sr« < S yen/$r LOUVRE r LOUVRE
In practice, central banks are rather reluctant to intervene in the
foreign exchange market. This may stem from the fact that typical
intervention efforts, which are of the order of $100 or $200 million, are
very tiny compared to the average daily turnover on foreign exchange
markets. As a consequence of the relative negligibility of interventions,
their impact on the course of exchange rate movements depends crucially
on the strength of their announcement effect on the expectations of
private exchange market participants. Hence, it seems reasonable to
assume that the more frequently a central bank intervenes, the less
attention will be paid to the message contained in the official foreign
currency operations. It follows that the central bank is faced with a trade-
off. It can choose to intervene more frequently in the present with a
(small) chance of driving the current spot rate closer to the target rate
and/or limiting the conditional volatility of the spot exchange rate. This
will go at the cost of lowering the 'news' -content and thus the potential
effectiveness of future interventions. Thus, by abstaining from interven-
tion in the face of small changes in the exchange rate and normal levels
of conditional volatility, the central banks can be viewed as 'investing' in
the potential effectiveness of interventions to be undertaken at times
when the foreign exchange market experiences some serious turbulence.
The large proportion of zero observations for the dependent variable in
the intervention reaction functions despite nonzero values of the
explanatory variables is inconsistent with the continuous density
specification of (5.4) and (5.5). Therefore, the use of ordinary least
squares as an estimation technique yields biased and inconsistent
estimates. Rosen (1959) developed a friction model to suitably account
for relationships in which the dependent variable is insensitive to small
realizations of the explanatory variables. 9 In matrix notation:
[NY = (XU + /l) - e +
[NY = 0




(XU + /l) > e +
e - ~ (XU + /l) ~ e +
(XU + /l) < e-
where [NY is the dependent variable, X is the matrix of explanatory
variables, U is a vector of coefficients, /l is a vector of normal, i.i.d.
errors and e+(>O) and e-( <0) are the thresholds which must be
exceeded before the central bank acts to buy or sell foreign currency,
respectively. In the actual estimation of the friction model the thresholds
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replace the positive and negative constant terms in equations (5.4)-(5.5).
Maximizing the likelihood function of the friction model provides
estimates of the tolerance thresholds, the standard deviation of the
disturbance term, aI" and the coefficient vector on the explanatory
variables, Q. The likelihood function of the friction model consists of
three components. For the observations for which INV is positive (first
component) and the observations for which INV is negative (third
component) an ordinary probability density function applies. For the
observations with INV = 0 we know that e - ~ (XQ + J-t) ~ e +.
Consequently,
Pr [INV, = 0] Pr W s; XO + J-t S; 0+]
~ (0+ - XO) _ ~ (0- - XO)
a a
where Pr denotes the expected probability and ct> is the standard normal




INV <0 a J(27r)
-(INV + e" - X!l)'
20' * II {~(o+ - XO) _ ~ (0- - XO)}INV=O a a
-(INV + e--X!l)'
2~
The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the friction
model for central bank intervention are reported in Table 5.2. The
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are clearly found to have conducted
a 'leaning against the wind' policy during the post-Louvre sample period
from February 23, 1987 to October 31, 1989. The coefficients for the
explanatory variable which captures deviations of day ['S opening
exchange rate from the seven-days moving average have the expected
negative sign both for Bundesbank intervention in the DM/$ market and
for Federal Reserve intervention in the DM/$ and yen/$ market and are
statistically significant in all cases. A one percentage point appreciation
(depreciation) of the US dollar vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark above
(below) its moving average on average led the Bundesbank to sell (buy)
$79.77 million in the DM/$ market and the Federal Reserve to sell (buy)
$106.91 million. The equivalent figure for Federal Reserve intervention
in response to changes in the yen/$ rate is $99.25 million.
The estimation results indicate that both central banks actively
responded to increases in the anticipated volatility of the exchange
market. In effect, the Federal Reserve's reaction to exchange rate
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Table 5.2 Maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the
friction model for central bank intervention
Explanatory variables Bundesbank Federal Reserve intervention
intervention in
DM/$ market in DM/$ market in yenl$ market
deviations from -79.77 -106.91 -99.25
moving average (-9.27) (-8.76) (-9.15)
positive deviations -55.07 -121.55 -138.80
(-3.44) (-6.07) (-5.09)
negative deviations -103.65 -92.75 -69.87
(-6.56) (-4.74) (-4.80)
conditional variance -221.07 -224.96 -383.92 -381.99 -393.00 -383.17
(-8.30) (-8.27) (-8.46) (-8.37) (-8.00) (-8.16)
positive threshold (8+) 381.79 406.91 509.97 493.70 516.02 472.51
(12.31) (10.94) (10.61) (9.56) (10.82) (10.09)
negative threshold (8-) -226.79 -205.32 -315.47 -327.10 -361.80 -394.28
(-11.65) (-8.99) (-9.58) (-9.00) (-8.66) (-8.47)
a 196.32 195.69 218.51 217.77





logL -1300.2 -1298.7 -1168.4 -1168.0 -1037.7 -1034.9
LR(I) for equality 2.96 0.74 5.62
Notes:
r-statistics in parentheses.
LR(I) gives the value of the test statistic for the likelihood ratio test under the nullhypothe-
sis that the coefficients for positive and negative deviations from the moving average are
equal. The LR(I)-statistic has a :x: 1-distribution with one degree of freedom. The tabulated
critical value for a 5% (lO%)-level test is 3.84 (2.71).
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uncertainty was considerably stronger than that of the Bundesbank. For
example, given that the DM/$ rate was above the longer-term target rate
implied by the Louvre Agreement, an increase in the conditional variance
of one point, say from 0.40 to 0.41, caused by a larger than average
percentage change in the DM/$ rate during the previous days on average
induced the Bundesbank to sell $2.21 million, while it led the Federal
Reserve to sell $3.84 million in the DM/$ market, ceteris paribus.
The estimation results confirm the seeming reluctance of central banks
to intervene despite deviations of current exchange rates from their
moving average and changes in the conditional variance of exchange rate
returns. The tolerance thresholds for intervention (8+ and 8-, for
purchases and sales of US dollars, respectively) of the Bundesbank and
the Federal Reserve reported in Table 5.2 are all statistically significant.
The thresholds for Bundesbank intervention are smaller than those for
interventions by the Federal Reserve. This is due to the fact that on some
trading days in the sample the German central bank intervened at the
fixing of the Frankfurt market for foreign exchange in small amounts (of
the order of DM 5 to 10 million). These interventions have a technical
character and are not always policy motivated. However, they do
artificially lower the thresholds for Bundesbank intervention. The Fed's
higher threshold, in absolute value, for purchases of US dollars could be
interpreted as evidence of its concern with the competitiveness of US
exporting firms. In addition, given the already high US trade deficit, the
Federal Reserve may have been relatively more opposed to an
appreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis both the DM and the yen.
An asymmetry in both Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention
policy becomes apparent when a distinction is made between positive and
negative deviations from the seven-days moving average. From Table 5.2
it is obvious that both central banks tried to counteract appreciations of
their own currency more strongly than depreciations. Given that the
investigations in this chapter focus on a post-Louvre episode it is useful
to keep in mind that the Louvre Agreement embodied a commitment to
stabilize the value of the dollar at its then prevailing level and contain the
steep decline induced by the Plaza Agreement of September 22, 1985.
The Federal Reserve did indeed counteract depreciations of the US dollar
vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark and the Japanese yen ('negative deviations
from moving average '). However, the estimation results indicate that its
intervention efforts in response to appreciations of the US dollar in the
DM/$ and ¥/$ market exceeded those in response to depreciations by 30
and 50 per cent, respectively. It should be noted that in the case of
Federal Reserve intervention in the DM/$ market the intervention efforts
are not significantly different at usual levels of significance. For the
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Bundesbank it was relatively easy to hang on to its Louvre commitment.
By supporting the value of the dollar it simultaneously prevented a
deterioration in the international competitiveness of German industries.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter derives a central bank intervention reaction function by
combining an amended GARCH model for the exchange rate with a loss
function for the central bank. Consistent estimation results are obtained
by implementing a friction model. Tills made it possible to cope with the
fact that the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve refrain from engaging
in any transaction in the foreign exchange market on the majority of
trading days in the post-Louvre sample considered. Using daily exchange
rate and intervention data it is found that the German and US central
bank 'leaned against the wind' in the DM/$ market and the DM/$ and
yen/$ markets, respectively. In addition, it is found that the central banks
took into account the well-established empirical finding that exchange
rate volatility is predictable to some extent. The estimation results
suggest that both the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve have taken
action to lower exchange market uncertainty.
NOTES
I. This chapter is based on Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994b).
2. GARCH stands for Generalized Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic. The
purport of the meanwhile extensive GARCH literature, surveyed in Bollerslev et al.
(1992), is that volatility in daily returns is predictable in most financial markets. In
several applications it has been shown that there is a considerable persistence in the
effects of shocks in period c onto the conditional variance of exchange rates in
consecutive periods.
3. Of course, one can easily think of situations in which central banks prefer a higher
degree of uncertainty regarding the future course of currency movements. According to
Blundell-Wignall and Masson (1985, p. 156) 'it may be a deliberate part of an
intervention strategy to change the degree of uncertainty concerning exchange rate
fluctuations: either by limiting transitory fluctuations and hence providing a more stable
planning environment, or by adding an erratic element to exchange rate movements, to
discourage speculation'.
4. The variance of a random variable X can be expressed as Var (X) = E (,Xl) - (EX)2.
Consequently, equation (S.2) can be rewritten as follows
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5. The second-order conditions for a minimum are met. Given the quadratic form of the
loss function, the minimum is global.
6. The Japanese monetary authorities stick to a policy of strict confidentiality regarding
intervention data. Therefore, it is not possible to investigate empirically the reaction
function for daily interventions by the Bank of Japan in the spot US dollar-Japanese yen
exchange market.
7. Goodhart and Hesse (1993) assess central bank foreign exchange market intervention
virtually in continuous time. However, their investigations are based on reponed
intervention observations which appeared on Reuters screen information. This gives a far
from exact representation of actual intervention operations (Klein 1993, Osterberg and
Wetmore Humes 1993). Moreover, reported intervention observations do not contain
information on the actual amount of intervention.
8. Originally, the Bundesbank intervention data are expressed in millions of Deutsche
Marks. In this study the dollar value of Bundesbank interventions is used as the
dependent variable. The dollar value is calculated by dividing the DM value of day t's
intervention by the opening rate of the US dollar in Frankfurt on day t.
9. Rosen (1959, p. 263) mentions the example of small changes in yield not leading to
changes in the holdings of a particular asset by a certain class of investors because of
transaction costs. Forbes and Mayne (1989) estimate a friction model of the prime rate.
The interest rates on bank loans under $1,000,000 to businesses are mostly tied to the
prime rate which has a tendency to remain unchanged despite movements in, for
instance, the secondary market rate on large, negotiable certificates of deposit. Feinman
(1993) estimates a friction model for the volume of daily open market operations
conducted by the Federal Reserve Open Market Desk. The Desk refrains from engaging
in any transaction on roughly one day in four.
6. Effectiveness of Daily Bundesbank
and Federal Reserve Intervention
in the DM/$ Market
6.1 INTRODUCTIONl
Chapters 4 and 5 investigated empirically the objectives of Bundesbank
and Federal Reserve interventions. Both central banks were found to
have 'leaned against the wind'. After having established that, it is natural
to ask the question whether the interventions carried out by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve were effective. A lot of effort has
been devoted to investigating the effectiveness of central bank
intervention (for surveys of the literature, see Edison 1993, Edison et al.
1994 and Chapter 3 of this book). Straightforward estimation of the
effect of interventions on contemporaneous exchange rate movements
only obtains consistent estimation results if the interventions cause
contemporaneous exchange rate movements and not the other way
around. Obviously, however, it can not be ruled out a priori that
contemporaneous exchange rate movements are one of the factors which
trigger interventions. Some studies disregard this (see, e.g. Dominguez
and Frankel 1993a, p. 115 and p. 127). As a result, the estimation
results reported in these studies are subject to simultaneity bias. The
empirical investigations which do provide consistent estimates basically
measure the perceived spot rate effects of interventions indirectly through
a risk premium (see, e.g. Dominguez and Frankel 1993b). However, the
measurement problems for risk premia are well established.
This chapter reports on the results of an empirical investigation into
the effectiveness of official intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank and
the US Federal Reserve System in the Deutsche Mark-US dollar spot
exchange market. This study makes two contributions to understanding
and testing the effectiveness of central bank interventions. Firstly, the
simultaneity problem between exchange rates and interventions is
addressed explicitly by implementing a test procedure proposed by Vella
(1993). Secondly, the direct effect of intervention on the level of the
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exchange rate is estimated. Daily observations for the official
interventions and the exchange rate are used. The period under
consideration runs from the Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987 to
October 1989.
This chapter is organized into five remaining sections. Section 6.2
develops the framework within which the effectiveness of central bank
intervention is analysed. Section 6.3 discusses the simultaneity problem.
Section 6.4 sets out and implements an estimation procedure proposed by
Vella (1993) to test for simultaneity in a model with a censored
endogenous regressor. Section 6.5 reports on the results of an empirical
investigation into the immediate impact of interventions by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve on the level of the DM/$ rate by
altering market expectations. Section 6.6 concludes the discussion.
6.2 MODELLING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION
Under the assumption of highly efficient markets, effective interventions
will influence exchange rate movements immediately (that is, within the
same day) by altering the expectations of market participants. Thus, the
intraday change of the DM/$ exchange rate in Frankfurt can be written
as a function of, inter alia, the volume of intervention carried out by the
Deutsche Bundesbank on day t (l~DBB):
(6.1)
where x is a set of unspecified exogenous variables. 2 SFR/30 and
SFR/630 are the opening spot rate and the closing spot rate of one US
dollar expressed in DM at the Frankfurt exchange, collected at 8.30
hours and 16.30 hours (Frankfurt time), respectively. The exchange
market interventions by the Bundesbank are expressed in millions of
DMs. The interventions are positive if the central bank buys dollars in
return for DMs. The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve will often
coordinate their intervention efforts. Yet, it seems reasonable to assume
that the Federal Reserve only intervenes when the New York market is
opened. Therefore, the effect of Federal Reserve intervention has to be
measured by its impact on the exchange fate on the New York market.
Based on the foregoing, the effectiveness of Bundesbank intervention
can be tested by estimating the following equation:
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where 0, is a residual and ao and a, are coefficients. Equation (6.2) is a
restricted form of equation (6.1). It focuses on interventions which
reverse unwanted exchange rate movements. This reflects the fact that a
narrow definition of effectiveness of intervention is adopted in this
chapter. Consequently, official exchange market operations which only
slow down unwanted exchange rate movements are not identified as
successful interventions. However, by solving the definitional problem
we can not get away with the familiar methodological problem that the
fluctuations in the exchange rate that would have occurred in the absence
of intervention can not be observed. If the Bundesbank is able to
influence the market sentiment, the exchange rate will rise after the news
of official dollar purchases. Therefore, in that case the intervention
coefficient a, will be positive. The coefficient ~ will be significantly
larger than zero for periods in which the exchange rate experienced a
trend-like appreciation or depreciation.
Analogously, the equation for the effectiveness of Federal Reserve
intervention can be written:
(SNY.16.oo _SNY.9.oo) = b b INVFED, DMI$ b (SF'R 16.00 S'F'R9.00) ~( I DMI$ 0 + I ( + 2 ,-I - (-I DMI$ + U(
(6.3)
where SNy/6oo and SNYr9.00are the opening spot rate and the closing spot
rate of one US dollar expressed in Deutsche Marks at the New York
exchange, collected at 9.00 hours and 16.00 hours (New York time),
respectively. The exchange market interventions by the Federal Reserve
are expressed in millions of US dollars. The interventions are positive if
the Federal Reserve buys dollars in return for Deutsche Marks. Again,
the intervention coefficient b, will be positive when interventions are
effective. A positive value of b2 indicates trends in the exchange rate.
The Federal Reserve also regularly intervenes in the Japanese yen/US
dollar market. The effectiveness of these interventions can be inferred
from the estimation results of the following equation:
(SNY.16.oo _SNY.9.oo) = + INVFED.yen'$ + (SFR 16.00-SFR 9.(0) + 0I (yenl$ Co CI I C2 I-I I-I yenlS (
(6.4)
where SNYrI600 and SNYr9.oo are the opening spot rate and the closing spot
rate of one US dollar expressed in Japanese yens at the New York
exchange, collected at 9.00 hours and 16.00 hours (New York time),
respectively. The exchange market interventions by the Federal Reserve
are expressed in millions of US dollars. The interventions are positive if
the Federal Reserve buys dollars in return for Japanese yens. The
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interpretation of the coefficients in equation (6.4) is the same as in
equation (6.3)
The daily data on interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve in the DM/$ exchange market over the period February 1987 to
October 1989 show that interventions were concentrated in specific
months and thus that periods of intervention were alternated by
(sometimes longer) periods of non-intervention. Moreover, the inter-
ventions in these relatively short periods were one-sided (either purchases
or sales). Thus it may be concluded that neither the Bundesbank
(although intervening more frequently and in larger amounts), nor the
Federal Reserve intervened only to smooth exchange rate movements,
but also tried to influence the exchange rate (or market sentiment) in a
specific direction towards an equilibrium value (which eventually was
implied by the February 1987 Louvre Agreement of the G-7 countries).
The portfolio balance channel of intervention derives its effect from
creating an imbalance in wealth-holders' portfolios. Accordingly, inter-
ventions will have a proportionate effect on the exchange rate which is
constant over time. By contrast, in the case of the expectations channel
much depends on the strength of the market sentiment. Consequently, the
effect of intervention working via this channel will vary over time. To
allow for a time-varying effect of intervention, four periods of at least
three months with prolonged interventions in one direction by either of
the central banks have been selected as relevant subsamples.
6.3 THE SIMULTANEITY PROBLEM
In general, when one wants to make inferences about the effectiveness of
foreign exchange market intervention one explicitly has to address the
simultaneity problem. Equations (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4) can be estimated
consistently with ordinary least squares (OLS) only if interventions cause
contemporaneous exchange rate movements and not the other way
around." Obviously, however, it can not be ruled out a priori that
contemporaneous exchange rate movements are one of the factors which
drive interventions. At the same time, it should be stressed that the
specific form of the reduced-form equations (6.2)-(6.4) for the
effectiveness of intervention reduces the potential simultaneity problem
compared to that in other studies.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) try to infer the effectiveness of
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention. They estimate with OLS
an equation in which the dependent variable is the 24-hour DM/$ return
(see Chapter 3, equation (3.18». Baillie and Humpage (1992) estimate a
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GARCH model in which the dependent variable also is the 24-hour
DM/$ return. Their model can be written:
(6.5a)
10, I 01-1 - N(O, hi) (6.5b)
h = IpTTRDBB + FED lS'ALDBB + FED 2, 11" + Q2 v" + Q3 , + a 10,-1 + {3 n.; (6.5c)
with 11", a, {3 >0, a+(3 < 1. SNy/6.oo denotes the closing rate of the US
dollar in Deutsche Marks in New York on day t. Equation (6.5a)
represents the mean equation of the model. The dependent variable is the
DM/$ return during a global, 24-hour trading day; from the closing of
the New York foreign exchange market on day /-1 until the closing on
day t. INV,DBB+FED is the sum of the volume of US dollar interventions
carried out by the Deutsche Bundesbank and by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the Federal Reserve System,
respectively. The interventions are positive if the central bank buys
dollars in return for Deutsche Marks. Thus, interventions are effective if
Q1 > 0 implying that purchases (sales) of US dollars by the central
bank(s) led to a higher (lower) exchange value of the US dollar in terms
of Deutsche Marks. 10, is the residual of the mean equation. Equation
(6.5b) states that this residual has a conditional normal distribution with
mean zero and variance h; Or_I indicates the information available to
exchange market participants as of the beginning of the relevant interval
for which the DM/$ return is calculated, i.e. the closing of the New
York foreign exchange on day t-1. Equation (6.5c) defmes the variance
equation (ht). According to Baillie and Humpage, official purchases of
US dollars (IPUR, > 0) are effective if they lower the volatility of daily
DM/$ returns. Hence, az should be negative. Analogously, official sales
of US dollars (ISALt < 0) are effective if Q3 is positive.
It was noted in Chapters 4 and 5 that the GARCH model can take
account of the persistence in the effects of shocks in period t onto the
conditional variance in later periods. Baillie and Humpage (1992) find
the GARCH parameters (11", a, (3) to be statistically significant. They
implement appropriate econometric techniques to obtain unbiased and
consistent estimation results in spite of the fact that interventions and
exchange rates are jointly determined. There is one serious problem that
remains. The exchange rate return, which is the dependent variable in
their model, is calculated from the closing of the New York exchange on
day t-l onwards. However, day t's interventions (those carried out by
the Federal Reserve in particular) are mostly carried out in the United
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States segment of the global foreign exchange market, after the opening
of the New York exchange market, i.e. during the last 8 hours of the 24-
hour period for which the exchange rate return is calculated.
Consequently, the period for which the DM/$ return is calculated does
not exactly match the period during which the central banks carry out
their interventions. Therefore, it is not strange that Baillie and Humpage
find statistically significant but systematically wrongly signed coeffients
for the intervention variables in both the conditional mean equations and
the conditional variance equations. Perhaps a reasonable interpretation of
Baillie and Humpage's estimation results is that central bank interven-
tions have reacted to earlier exchange rate developments rather than
caused them. This suggests that the exchange rate equation embodied in
the GARCH model is a degenerated intervention reaction function.
Indeed, when the estimated coefficients are viewed as coming from an
intervention reaction function they are almost all statistically significant
with the correct sign.
Dominguez (1993) tries to infer the effectiveness of Bundesbank,
Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan interventions from a similar GARCH
model. She does not use matching exchange rate and intervention data
either. Therefore, she also finds wrongly signed coefficients for the
effect of intervention on the level of the exchange rate.
Using the intervention reaction function developed in the previous
chapters, the relevant simultaneous equation model is given by
s" - s" = INV (Su SP)t , IXO + IXI , + IX2 ,-I - ,-I + E, (6.6)
* {3 P MA UP.INV, = {3o + 1 (S, - s, ) + {32 (SI - S,) + i-tl (6.7)
where EI and i-tl' are identically and independently distributed random
variables with mean zero and constant variance a/ and a,},
respectively." SIP and StU are day t's opening (primo) and closing
(ultimo) rate, respectively, on the Frankfurt or the New York foreign
exchange market depending on whether the regression is concerned with
the effectiveness of Bundesbank or Federal Reserve intervention.
Equation (6.7) is an intervention reaction function. Accordingly, the
central bank 'leans against the wind' and acts upon increases in the
conditional variance of the exchange rate. SIMA is a moving average of
exchange rate quotations during the trading hours of the relevant foreign
exchange market on previous days. When day t's opening spot exchange
rate is above (below) the moving average of the exchange rate on
previous trading days the central bank is expected to carry out sales
(purchases) of domestic currency. Consequently, the coefficient {31 is
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expected to be negative. The term (st - S,MA) is derived from values of
the relevant exchange rate which were known (by the central bank) at the
time day t's interventions were carried out. This is not the case with the
term (S,u - S/) in equation (6.7).5 It follows that in this equation
allowance is made for contemporaneous exchange rate movements
causing current interventions.
INV, and INV,* are observed and 'desired' intervention, respectively.
On the majority of trading days in the sample (677 in the Frankfurt
market and 673 in the New York market, respectively) the volume of
intervention by either of the central banks is equal to zero. A possible
explanation for the large number of zero interventions is that the central
bank does not carry out foreign exchange market operations intended to
alter the course of the exchange rate until the perceived necessity to step
into the market exceeds a certain threshold level. This necessity can not
be observed, however. This is also the· case with 'negative' interventions
which correspond to various levels of necessity below the threshold
level. 6 The relationship between observed and necessary intervention
applying to both buying and selling of foreign exchange is
INV, = INV,* if INV,' > 0
= 0 if INV,* :::;0
(6.8)
Interventions are effective if purchases (sales) of US dollars by the
Bundesbank or the Federal Reserve lead to a rise in the value of the US
dollar expressed in Deutsche Marks or Japanese yen, i.e. if the estimated
value of the coefficient (Xl in equation (6.6) is significantly larger than
zero. However, if i32 .,e. 0, INV,' is endogenous and thus INV, can not be
treated as an exogenous variable in (6.6). Estimation of (6.6) with
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will not be consistent. One solution to this
problem is full Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation of the model made
up of equations (6.6) and (6.7).7 This is computationally not very
attractive, particularly while only a test for endogeneity is required. In
the next section a test procedure is implemented to address the
simultaneity problem between exchange rates and intervention. The test
procedure is rather technical. For the reader who wishes to skip this
section the results of the test can be summarized as follows. The results
of implementing the test procedure do not give rise to rejection of the
null hypothesis Ho: i32 = 0, i.e. the hypothesis of no endogeneity in the
volume of daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention.
Therefore, Section 6.5 proceeds by assuming that equation (6.6) and
hence equations (6.2)-(6.4) can be estimated consistently with OLS.
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6.4 TESTING FOR SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN
EXCHANGE RATES AND INTERVENTION
In this section the test procedure proposed by Vella (1993) is
implemented to address the simultaneity problem between exchange rates
and intervention. The test procedure involves taking conditional
expectations in (6.6); conditioning on both predetermined variables
«S: - S,MA), (S'~I - S'~l» and INVr. This gives
E (S,u - S/) I (S: - S,MA), c: - S'~l)' [NV,) = ao + al INV, +
u P (I P MA up) (6 9)+ a2 (S'_I - S'_I) + E f, (S, - S, ), (S'_I - S'_I), INV, .
On the assumption that Et exhibits no autocorrelation (which holds in
general for short-term exchange rate returns, see Hsieh 1989) and that
(S/ - S,MA) is correctly excluded from (6.6), the conditional expectation
on the right-hand side of (6.9) is nonzero only if INV, is endogenous.
To test this, it is convenient to have a reduced form for (6.7) in which
[NY, ([NV,') is explained by (S,p - S,MA) and (S'~J - S'~J) only.
Substitution of (6.6) in (6.7) obtains
(6.10)
or
INY,' = z,''Y + "12 [NY, + lit (6.10)'
where z,' = [1 (S,p - S,MA) (S'~J - S'~I)], "12 = [,82 aJ and lI, = ,82 f, +
p-,. Starting from the assumption that E, and p-, are independent, the error
term lI, in (6.10)' will be correlated with the error term E, in (6.6) only if
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Coherency is guaranteed if 1 - '}'2 > 0 or '}'2 < 1. For computational
ease, we define a new latent variable INV,** such that
INY" = INY' = INYI I I if INV/ > 0
INV," = INV,* / (1 - 'Y:u
We then have
where INV, = INV,** if INV,** > 0 (6.11)
= 0 otherwise
with ')'* = '}'/(1 - '}'2) and VI v/(l - 'Y:u. Equation (6.11) can be
estimated with standard Tobit ML procedures. The results are reported in
Table 6.1. This provides the reduced-form estimates for '}'* and a~..
Now, we return to (6.9). Assuming joint normality of fl and v/ (or VI)'
with covariance a, y" it holds that
E (EI I (st - SIMA), (SI~l - SI~l)' INVI) = a,y. E (v/ I INV" ZI)
where a = 0 ~ {J2 = O. Apart from a this term can be estimated
consiste~tiy after replacing the unknown p~~ameters in E (Er' I INV" Zl)
by their estimates from (6.11). The resulting estimate is known as the
generalized residual in (6.11).8 It can be shown that
if INV,'* > 0
if INV/* :::;0
where <p(.) and <1>0 are the standard normal density function and
cumulative density function (distribution function), respectively. Finally,
we rewrite (6.9) as
U sP U P(SI - t) = ao + al INV, + a2 (SI_I - SI_I) +
+ a,y' E (v/ i INV, , Z) + E; (6.12)
where, by construction, ft* is orthogonal with each of the explanatory
variables. After replacing the unknown parameters in E (VI' ilNV" zr) by
their estimates, (6.12) can be estimated by OLS providing a consistent
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Table 6.1 ML estimation resuLtsfor an auxiliary Tobit modeL
IN"Vr* * * * (S: - S,MA) * U p= 1'1 + 1'2 + '1'3 (Sr-I - Sr-J
Period 'Y1 'Y2 'Yl Log L Obs.
Bundesbank intervention in the DM/$ market
87(2)-88(4) -525.45 -234.21 -76.17 -295.53 297
(-5.85) (-5.36) (-0.82)
88(5)-89(10) 204.34 -86.19 -50.18 -984.49 380
(-6.59) (-3.88) (-0.90)
Federal Reserve intervention in DM/$ market
87(2)-88(4) -337.59 -137.11 -76.20 -262.22 300
(-5.82) (-4.89) (-1.31)
88(5)-89(10) 154.75 -57.33 -25.71 -829.07 373
(6.46) (-3.89) (-0.80)
Federal Reserve intervention in yen/$ market
87(2)-88(1) -302.42 -126.79 -85.10 -364.37 236
(-6.09) (-5.45) (-1.57)
89(1)-89(10) 130.02 -43.20 22.55 -510.87 207
(4.41) (-2.90) (0.60)
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
estimator for (J .' An asymptotically valid test for Ho: a . = 0 ({32 =
0) is the usual i-test. ' v
The results of estimating equation (6.12) are depicted in Table 6.2.
The null hypothesis Ho: a . = 0, which is equivalent to the null
hypothesis of no endogeneitY
v
in the volume of daily Bundesbank. and
Federal Reserve intervention, {32 = 0, is not rejected in any of the eleven
regressions. Therefore, this study proceeds by assuming that equation
(6.6) and hence equations (6.2)-(6.4) can be estimated consistently with
OLS.
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Table 6.2 Testing for endogeneity of Bundesbank and Federal Reserve
interventions; OLS estimation results.
o p + al lNY,
u p
+ a,v. E (v/ JlNV;, z,)s, - Sl = ao + a2 (SI_I - SI-l)
Period 0'0 0'1 0'2 a * R? OW Obs.EN
Bundesbank intervention in the OM/$ market
87(2)- 0.045 -64.0 0.031 0.00016 0.017 1.99 297
88(4) (1.87) (-2.50) (0.49) (1.13)
88(5)- 0.039 14.0 0.030 7.53 -.003 2.00 380
89(10) (1.63) (1.04) (0.56) (0.89)
Federal Reserve intervention in the OM/$ market
87(2)- 0.013 -120.0 -0.090 0.00040 0.026 1.91 300
88(4) (0.58) (-2.97) (-1.52) (0.75)
88(5)- -0.026 -5.4 -0.058 -37.0 0.005 1.98 373
89(10) (-0.60) (-0.08) (-1.09) (-0.72)
Federal Reserve intervention in the yenl$ market
87(2)- 0.0025 -48.0 -0.107 -0.015 0.004 2.00 236
88(1) (0.08) (-1.38) (-1.53) (-0.87)
89(1)- 0.020 116.0 0.031 -4.04 0.007 2.03 207
89(10) (0.29) (1.33) (0.43) (-0.53)
Notes: See Table 4.1. The coefficient on INV, (0'1) and its corresponding standard
error are multiplied by 100,000 for readability.
6.5 ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF INTERVENTION
ON THE LEVEL OF THE DM/$ RATE
The results of the test procedure implemented in the previous section
indicate that the volume of intervention can be regarded as an exogenous
variable in equation (6.6). Therefore, equations (6.2)-(6.4) can be
estimated consistently with OLS. This provides us with a direct test of
the effect of intervention on the level of the exchange rate. Estimation
results are shown in Table 6.3. The first four regression results refer to
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the effectiveness of Bundesbank interventions in the Deutsche Mark/US
dollar exchange market. 9 The dependent variable in the first four
regressions is the intradaily percentage change in the DM/$ rate in the
Frankfurt market. During the first regression period the Bundesbank
carried out purchases of US dollars. The three other periods were
characterized by sales of US dollars. The constant (ao) is positive in all
four subsamples, though not significant. This reflects an appreciation of
the US dollar vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark in the Frankfurt market.
However, during the first subsample, the US dollar lost ground overall.
Probably, the major part of the overall dollar depreciation in the months
after the stockmarket crash of October 1987 took place during the non-
European segment of the DM/$ exchange market (that is, while the
Frankfurt exchange was closed). The negative value of the constant in
the first regression for Federal Reserve intervention lends some support
to this. The dependent variable in the first four regressions for Federal
Reserve intervention is the intradaily percentage change in the DM/$ rate
in the New York market. Now compare the values of the constant in the
regressions for the three periods which were characterized by sales of US
dollars. It appears that the waves of dollar appreciation these periods
have in common were mainly concentrated in the European segment of
the foreign exchange market. This is the segment during which most
German 'news' is released (e.g. monetary policy announcements made
after the bi-weekly meetings of the Central Bank Council of the
Bundesbank). The estimation results suggest that the rise in the DM/$
rate during these periods is a result of weakness of the Deutsche Mark
rather than strength of the US dollar. More importantly, the estimation
results in Table 6.3 indicate that the interventions conducted by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve on the whole did not systematically
affect the level of the DM/$ rate across the four subsamples. The
coefficient for Bundesbank intervention (a,) in the fourth sample is
correctly signed and significant at a mere 20 per cent level in a two-sided
test. It suggests that during the period August 1989-0ctober 1989 a sale
of US dollars worth DMlOO million on average led to a lowering of the
DM/$ rate by 0.096 per cent.
The three regressions at the bottom of Table 6.3 refer to the
effectiveness of Federal Reserve interventions in the Japanese yen/US
dollar exchange market. The dependent variable in these regressions is
the intradaily percentage change in the yenl$ rate in the New York
market. During the first and second regression period the Federal
Reserve carried out purchases of US dollars. The third period is
characterized by sales of US dollars. The estimation results suggest that
sales of US dollars carried out by the Federal Reserve during the period
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Table 6.3 The effect of Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions on
the level of the DMI$ rate and the fl$ rate; OLS estimation
results
u p u p100 (s, - sr) = (\(0 + (\(1 INVr + (\(2 (100 (Sr-I - Sf-I»
Period 0'0 0'1 0'2 R2 DW Obs.
Bundesbank intervention in the DM/$ market
87(9)-88(1) 0.073 -73.0 0.038 0.018 1.98 105
(1.38) (-1.86) (0.38)
88(6)-88(9) 0.102 10.9 -0.055 -0.016 1.97 86
(1.72) (0.56) (-0.50)
88(12)-89(3) 0.060 33.0 0.043 -0.017 1.99 84
(l.40) (0.79) (0.37)
89(8)-89(10) 0.073 96.0 -0.104 0.008 2.05 66
(1.13) (1.30) (-0.84)
Federal Reserve intervention in the DM/$ market
87(10)-88(1) -0.041 -15.0 -0.086 -0.018 2.00 81
(-0.70) (-0.20) (-0.75)
88(6)-88(9) 0.015 -80.0 -0.103 0.013 1.96 86
(0.27) (-1.73) (-0.89)
89(1)-89(6) 0.00075 -24.0 -0.158 0.011 1.96 125
(0.01) (-0.54) (-1.77)
89(8)-89(10) 0.0024 -62.0 0.095 -0.016 1.97 62
(0.03) (-0.54) (0.72)
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(Fable 6.3 continued)
Period ao al a2 R2 DW Obs.
Federal Reserve intervention in the Yen/$ market
87(3)-87(5) -0.0043 -45.7 -0.1619 0.005 1.97 64
(-0.06) (-1.05) (-1.27)
87(10)-88(1) 0.0034 -54.4 -0.098 -0.009 1.98 102
(0.07) (-0.51) (-0.98)
89(4)-89(10) 0.034 66.3 0.048 0.005 2.03 146
(0.59) (1.56) (0.58)
Notes: See Table 6.2.
April 1989-0ctober 1989 on average led to a fall in the value of the US
dollar vis-a-vis the Japanese yen. The coefficient for Federal Reserve
intervention in the bottom row is correctly signed and significant at a 12
per cent level in a two-sided test. It implies that during the period April
1989-0ctober 1989 a sale of US$100 million against Japanese yen on
average led to a lowering of the yen/$ rate by 0.066 per cent.
We also carried out an event study of the effectiveness of daily
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions. Under the assumption
that the relevant opening spot rate (S/) incorporates all information
available at the time of collection and that interventions are
unpredictable, the event study takes the form of estimating equations
(6.2)-(6.4) with the zero-intervention observations left out of the
samples. The following result was found for Bundesbank intervention
during the fourth period, from August 1989 to October 1989:
100 (log SFR/630 - log SFR(830) = 0.422 + 0.00235 INVrDBB
(2.42) (2.41)
R 2 = 0.2430 DW = 1.556 Obs.= 16
As before, t-statistics are in parentheses. During the period considered,
sales of US dollars conducted by the Bundesbank were accompanied by,
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and perhaps even caused, a major shift of the market sentiment in favour
of a stronger Deutsche Mark. A similar regression on all nonzero-
intervention observations over the whole sample period, from September
1987 to October 1989, does not obtain a correctly signed and significant
intervention coefficient for either of the central banks. This confirms that
there is no time-invariant one-to-one relationship with interventions
causing exchange rate movements; much seems to depend on the strength
of the market sentiment and the ability of central bankers to 'read' it.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
It is a fact of observation that central banks enter the foreign exchange
market when there are prolonged exchange rate movements in one
direction. Estimates of intervention reaction functions presented in
Chapters 4 and 5 confirm this. This chapter makes two contributions to
understanding and testing the effectiveness of central bank interventions.
Firstly, this study contains an in-depth analysis of the simultaneity
problem between intradaily exchange rates and daily interventions. A test
procedure proposed by Vella (1993) is implemented to determine that in
the reduced forms estimated in this chapter daily interventions can be
treated as an exogenous variable. Secondly, the direct effect of
intervention on the level of the exchange rate is estimated.
The estimation results presented in this chapter cover the post-Louvre
period February 23, 1987 to October 31, 1989. They indicate that, in
general, interventions conducted by the Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve System were not successful at systematically reversing unwanted
movements in the DM/$ and the ¥/$ exchange rates. This contradicts the
findings of Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b). However, the estimation
results in the latter studies are subject to simultaneity bias and/or involve
testing the effectiveness of interventions indirectly through a risk
premium.
Of course, the conclusion regarding the general ineffectiveness of
intervention does not rule out the possibility that private exchange market
participants may sometimes be caught off balance by the news of central
banks entering the market. What it does imply is that there is no time-
invariant one-to-one relationship with interventions causing exchange rate
movements. This confirms the intuition of many private exchange market
participants and central bankers who manage the Foreign Exchange
Trading Desk. 10
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NOTES
1. This chapter is based on Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994c).
2. It is commonly assumed that intraday exchange rate movements are caused primarily by
short-term capital flows. In an efficient market investors balance their portfolios at every
moment. A change in the interest rate differential will lead to imbalances. This
immediately induces an adjustment process in the highly efficient money and foreign
exchange markets. A relative rise in the DM interest rate will bring about a demand
surplus for financial assets denominated in DM. Given the supply of DM assets in the
short run, portfolio equilibrium will be restored by a fall in the exchange value of one
U.S. dollar in terms of DM. Unfortunately, intradaily interest rate data matching the
opening and closing of the Frankfurt and New York exchanges were not available.
Goodhart (1988) interviewed numerous interbank foreign exchange traders. He found
that an 'open position is seen generally as a pure currency play with little attention
normally being given to interest rates' (Goodhart 1988, p. 457). Estimation results on
daily data in Goodhart (1988) indicate that omitting from equation (6. I) the variable
capturing the change in the short-term interest differential will not detract from its
relevance. Goodhart concludes that interest rate changes, which he assumes to be mainly
unanticipated, 'explain effectively none of the exchange rate fluctuations' (Goodhart
1988, p. 441). The same result emerges from empirical investigations in Eijffinger and
Gruijters (1992).
3. Loopesko (1984) found a high degree of contemporaneous correlation between daily
exchange rates and daily interventions.
4. The intervention reaction functions estimated in Chapters 4 and 5 contain the conditional
variance of day t's return in the DMf$ market as an additional explanatory variable.
Estimation results for GARCH models of daily exchange rate returns were used to
generate time series for the conditional variance. In the present chapter, such a two-step
procedure can lead to incorrect results. Such two-step estimators sometimes lead to
inconsistent point estimates in the second-step equation, and often to incorrect standard
errors. More importantly, this may invalidate the test procedure implemented in the next
section of this chapter, which is based on normally and independently distributed errors.
5. Note that in Chapters 4 and 5 the term (3, (S,u - S/) was omitted from the intervention
reaction function to rule out a possible simultaneity bias in the estimation results.
6. Periods of prolonged interventions in one direction are selected to rule out the possibility
that 'negative' desired interventions are simply observed interventions in the opposite
direction (i.e. selling instead of buying and vice versa).
7. However, the ML estimation will only provide meaningful results when equations (6.5)
and (6.6) are coherent, i.e. when they can be solved uniquely for [NV, and (S,u - S,'),
given (S/ - S,MA), t, and fl.,.
8. If equation (6.10) is a linear regression model, it corresponds to the usual residual.
9. A description of the main factors determining the course of the DMf$ rate in each of the
four regression periods was given in Chapter 4.
10. GIeske, a former executive director of the Deutsche Bundesbank responsible for
intervention operations states that 'under certain circumstances, only small interventions
may suffice to curb or even reverse an unwanted movement in the exchange rate. In
other cases even large interventions may result in the opposite effect; when market
participants are convinced of the strength of an underlying trend' (Gieske 1982, p. 265,
my translation).
7. A Positive Theory of Intervention
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 analysed the channels of influence of intervention. It was
established that, at least in the framework of structural exchange rate
models, the scope fOJ;sterilized intervention is rather limited. Yet, it is a
fact of observation that central banks do enter the market for foreign
exchange in case of strains. Empirical evidence provided in Chapters 4
and 5 indicates that both the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System
conduct their foreign exchange operations consistently. However,
estimation results provided in Chapter 6 do not suggest that interventions
conducted by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve were successful at
systematically reversing unwanted movements in the DM/$ rate. This
seeming contradiction raises the question: why do central banks continue
to intervene? The aim of this chapter is to provide a positive theory of
central bank intervention. This involves investigating the motives and
constraints facing central banks when they decide to engage in foreign
exchange intervention.
There is a large literature on optimal exchange rate management (e. g. ,
Boyer 1978, Roper and Turnovsky 1980 and Glick and Hutchison 1989).
The analysis in these studies is cast in terms of deriving the exchange
rate regime which minimizes the variance of output around its mean
leveL In other words, these studies are concerned with computing the
optimal degree of unsterilized intervention in response to various shocks
impinging on the domestic economy. However, it is well known that the
central banks in the major industrialized countries routinely neutralize the
money-market effect of interventions. The limited effectiveness of pure
interventions imposes a serious constraint on the intervention behaviour
of the central bank. Moreover, it seems to have important implications
for the objectives of central bank intervention. Stabilizing output is out of
the question. Even stabilizing the exchange rate may turn out to be a
'mission impossible' .
Central bank intervention has mostly been investigated as a game
against nature. This implies that private exchange market participants are
assumed to regard the central bank as 'just another exchange market
participant'. Consequently, private market participants do not engage in
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'central bank watching'. Furthermore, and what is more important, they
do not base foreign exchange trading on the anticipation of central bank
intervention. Section 7.2 highlights the conventional approach to
modelling central bank intervention. In a flow model of the exchange rate
three categories of currency flows are distinguished: currency flows
originating from current account transactions, currency flows associated
with capital account transactions and currency flows brought about
directly by the central bank. These three categories are put in one
comprehensive analytical framework to investigate whether and how the
central bank is able to attain its objectives in the field of exchange rate
policy. The objectives of the central bank are embodied in a simple loss
function. It reflects the hypothesis that the domestic central bank wishes
to limit deviations of the current exchange rate from a target level.
Section 7.3 recognizes the bad performance of structural models of
exchange rate determination in empirical tests. It implements the 'finance
approach' to the exchange rate. The random-walk model of the exchange
rate is amended to include the effect of sterilized central bank
intervention. Intervention reaction functions are derived for various
specifications of the central bank loss function and for various schemes
of expectations-formation among private exchange market participants. It
was noted before that the limited effectiveness of sterilized intervention
imposes a severe constraint on intervention behaviour. Obviously, there
may be other constraints as well. Costs of intervention are introduced in
the loss function of the central bank to make it somewhat more realistic
in the sense that it better reflects the actual motives and constraints facing
central banks. There may be bureacratic or decision costs involved in
conducting intervention. Furthermore, the central bank incurs losses
when purchases (sales) of foreign currency turn out to be unsuccessful at
preventing the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating).
To influence exchange rate movements interventions basically have to
alter the balance of supply and demand for foreign exchange. However,
average central bank transactions in foreign exchange are very small
compared to the daily turnover on the global foreign exchange market.
Furthermore, due to the sterilization of the money-market effect, the
interventions, in essence, involve nothing but a shift in the currency
composition of private investment portfolios. In Section 2.3.4 it was
shown how sterilized interventions may exert an effect on the exchange
rate through the portfolio balance channel by causing an imbalance in
investors' portfolios. Bhattacharya and Weller (1992, p. 4) note that 'it is
implausible to suppose that the impact of such tiny changes in the
worldwide asset mix would have a significant effect on exchange rates'.
Empirical studies into the effectiveness of central bank intervention
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surveyed in Chapter 3 and the estimation results reported in Chapter 6
lend support to this. According to Bhattacharya and Weller, the
introduction of strategic behaviour by central banks can alter the scope
for intervention dramatically. Section 7.4 investigates the motives and
constraints facing central banks when there is strategic interaction
between the central bank on the one hand and private exchange market
participants on the other hand. It is a fact of observation that private
exchange market participants are eager to detect any information related
to official operations in foreign currency. Central bankers, in turn, know
that their actions are monitored very carefully. Therefore, it seems to
make sense to abandon the implicit assumption of Sections 7.2 and 7.3
that the central bank is regarded by private exchange market participants
as 'just another exchange market participant'.
The order of events in the resulting exchange rate policy game is as
follows. Each time period, individual private exchange market
participants interpret the 'news' and rumours in the foreign exchange
market and react to it. The interplay among the diverse group of private
exchange market participants leads to a shock to the exchange rate. This
shock is observed both by private currency traders and the central bank.
The central bank wants to counteract the shock to the exchange rate.
However, it is aware of the relative negligibility of typical intervention
efforts compared to the average daily turnover in the foreign exchange
market. In order to maximize the effect of interventions carried out to
counteract speculative shocks to the demand for foreign exchange, the
central bank will try to catch private speculators off balance by means of
surprise interventions. Under symmetric information private exchange
market participants know that the central bank will be tempted to offset
the initial shock to the exchange rate by carrying out a larger-than-
expected intervention, so they purposely set the expected volume of
intervention high. At the same time, the central bank weighs the benefits
and the costs of intervention, and only finds it optimal to carry out the
volume of intervention expected by the private sector. The non-
cooperative equilibrium of the exchange rate policy game has an
inefficient 'intervention bias'. It is inefficient to carry out a nonzero
equilibrium amount of intervention because the costs involved are not
offset by any benefits. The nonzero amount of intervention is fully
anticipated by the private sector. Therefore, it is not successful at
limiting the impact of the initial shock to the exchange rate. This is the
case if the central bank systematically tries to counteract realized shocks
to the exchange rate and if the private sector has full information about
the shape of the policy loss function which underlies the intervention
behaviour of the central bank. Section 7.4.8 investigates the sensitivity of
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the equilibrium volume of intervention to changes in the central bank's
aversion to non-fundamental exchange rate changes. Furthermore, two
propositions are derived with regard to the link between central bank
independence and the magnitude and the variability of the volume of
intervention. Section 7.4.9 investigates whether these propositions are
supported by cross-country evidence. Section 7.5 analyses three
extensions of the basic exchange rate policy game against rational
speculators. First, attention is paid to a dynamic extension of the game.
Second, returning to the static game, the implications of unequal status of
the players are studied. Third, allowance is made for the central bank to
have asymmetric information about shifts in its own preferences. Section
7.6 concludes the discussion.
7.2 CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION AS A
DETERMINISTIC GAME AGAINST NATURE
7.2.1 Introduction
Central bank foreign exchange market intervention has mostly been
investigated as a game against nature. Accordingly, as a first step the
central bank lets private exchange market participants engage in position-
taking in foreign currency. Foreign exchange market intervention comes
to the fore only when the resulting movements in the exchange rate are
out of line with what the central bank regards as acceptable. For
instance, suppose private speculators expect an immediate depreciation of
the .domestic currency. Unless the interest rate differential in favour of
investments denominated in domestic currency is sufficiently high to
compensate investors for the expected depreciation, this will induce them
to sell domestic currency in return for foreign currency. The central bank
may try to counteract the downward pressure on the value of the
domestic currency and do exactly the opposite of what the private sector
does with respect to position-taking in foreign exchange.
Modellng central bank intervention as a game against nature implies
that exchange market participants are assumed to regard the central bank
as 'just another exchange market participant'. Consequently, there is no
strategic interaction among private and official market participants.
7.2.2 The exchange rate in a flow model
The determination of the exchange rate can be modelled by implementing
a simplified flow market interpretation as in Neumann (1984) and Black
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(1985).1 Equation (7.1) gives the market-clearing condition of the
foreign exchange market in a two-country model:
INY, = CAr + M, (7.1)
where the left-hand side describes the net supply of domestic currency,
the right-hand side the net demand for domestic currency. INY, denotes
the volume of central bank purchases of foreign currency (= sales of
domestic currency) in period t. For simplicity it is assumed that only the
domestic central bank engages in operations in foreign currency. The
first part of the net flow demand for domestic currency in the foreign
exchange market results from current account transactions between the
two countries. The current account surplus of the domestic economy
(CA) can for instance be thought of as depending on lagged values of
the real exchange rate. In the present context it needs no further
specification. The second part of the net flow demand for domestic
currency in the foreign exchange market results from capital account
transactions. It is assumed that current account deficits of the domestic
country are financed by 'exporting' domestic currency-denominated
financial assets only. An expression for the net flow demand for domestic
currency through the capital account of the balance of payments (ilK,)
can be derived from the postulated behaviour of a representative foreign
investor. Suppose the representative foreign investor trades off the
expected rate of return in foreign currency on assets denominated in
domestic currency (i - (E,s'+I- Sf» against the expected rate of return
on assets denominated in foreign currency (i,") , where, as before, s, is
defined as the (log of the) domestic currency price of one unit of foreign
exchange, i, and i,' are the one-period interest rates on assets
denominated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively. The ex post
profit in foreign currency, net of opportunity costs, of holding K, assets
denominated in domestic currency is2
(7.2)
In speculative dynamics models (Stein (1987), De Long et al. (1990» the
representative speculator is commonly assumed to have a constant
absolute risk-aversion utility function,
(7.3)
where 'Y is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and IT denotes the
representative investor's profits. According to De Long et al. (1990, p.
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708), when the returns to holding assets denominated in foreign currency
are normally distributed, maximizing the expected value of (7.3) is
equivalent to maximizing
E(U) = ElI'+1 - 1varlI,+1
where En 1 and Var Il 1 are the conditional expected profit in foreign
t 1+ I t+
currency of holding assets denominated in domestic currency and its
variance given information available at time t. Therefore, we have
(7.4)
ElI'+1 = K, (i, - it * - (EI'+I - s,» (7.5)
(7.6)
where VarrSl+1 is the conditional variance of the exchange rate in the next
period. Substituting the expressions in (7.5) and (7.6) into equation (7.4)
and differentiating with respect to K, yields the following solution for the
representative investor's optimum position in assets denominated in
domestic currency
K' = (i, - i,*) - (E,s'+1 - S,)
, 'Y Var 1'+1
Accordingly, the representative investor, ceteris paribus, invests more in
assets denominated in domestic currency when the expected rate of return
in foreign currency on assets denominated in domestic currency (i -
(ErS,+1 - s,» becomes larger than the expected rate of return on assets
denominated in foreign currency «: when he becomes less averse to
risk, i.e. when 'Y declines, and when the conditional variance of the
next-period exchange rate, Var, Sl+I, is smaller.
Expectations regarding the mean and variance of the exchange rate are
determined outside the simple model presented here. As a consequence,
both E, S,+I and Vart St+1 do not depend on the volume of intervention
conducted by the central bank. The implications of this will be discussed
below. For simplicity it will be assumed that the conditional variance of
the exchange rate is time-independent, i.e. Vart St+1 = Vart_1 s, = Var St.
The crucial characteristic of the flow model is that the exchange rate
adjusts instantaneously so as to equilibrate demand and supply for
domestic currency at any point in time. The mechanics of this can be
seen after substituting equation (7.7) into the market-clearing condition in
equation (7.1). Under freely floating exchange rates, i.e. when the
(7.7)
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central bank abstains from intervention (l~ = 0), the resulting equation
can be written:
~ [(i - i·) - (E s - s,)]o = CA + " , 1+1
, 'Y Var s,
(7.8)
Suppose the domestic economy ran a current account deficit in previous
periods and that, at the end of period t-1, it is a net debtor to the
foreign country. In period t the current account of the domestic country
turns into surplus due to recent rises in the real exchange rate. This
causes an incipient excess flow demand for domestic currency. As a
result, the nominal exchange rate s, falls. The appreciation of domestic
currency detracts, ceteris paribus, from the attractiveness of investments
denominated in domestic currency. For, given next-period' s expected
exchange rate (E, S,+I)' the actual fall in the exchange rate enlarges the
expected depreciation of the domestic currency. As this is not
compensated by a larger interest differential in favour of investments
denominated in domestic currency, foreign investors will on net dispose
of some of their investments denominated in domestic currency. At the
new exchange rate s, the resulting excess flow supply of domestic
currency flowing through the capital account of the balance of payments
is equal to the excess flow demand for domestic currency caused by the
current account surplus.
7.2.3 The behaviour of the central bank
Net flows of domestic currency through the current account depend on
price differentials between foreign and domestic goods and services. Net
flows of domestic currency through the capital account depend on return
differentials on assets denominated in different currencies. It should be
clear from the market-clearing condition in equation (7.1) that there may
be a third category of nonzero net flows of domestic currency through
the balance of payments. This third category is at the discretion of the
central bank. In practice, all central banks have a common short-term
objective of 'countering disorderly exchange market conditions'. It is part
of their commitment to promote a stable exchange rate system in
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF as amended in
1992. Therefore, it is rather straightforward to make a behavioural
assumption for the central bank.
Assume a single-period loss function of the central bank which is
quadratic in the deviation of the current exchange rate (sJ from an
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exogenous target level (S,T). It thus reflects the hypothesis that the
domestic central bank wishes to limit deviations from this target level
irrespective of sign, and that the loss increases more than proportional
with increases in the deviation:
L CB = (s - S T)2, " (7.9)
To capture intervention carried out on account of a 'leaning against the
wind' policy, the target level for the exchange rate can be thought of as
representing past levels of the exchange rate. This follows immediately
from the definition of smoothing exchange rate fluctuations: whether or
not the exchange rate was considered to be at a desirable level in the
previous period(s), deviations from this target level will be countered.
In accordance with the essentials of the flow model of the exchange
rate the volume of purchases of foreign currency (INV,) is the only
instrument the central bank can dispose of freely to limit deviations of
the actual exchange rate from the target level. Moreover, in line with the
assumption that the central bank is playing a game against nature the
volume of intervention only has a bearing on the excess supply or
demand in the foreign exchange market. The private sector regards the
central bank as 'just another exchange market participant'. Consequently,
an indirect effect of interventions on the current exchange rate through an
effect of INVI on next-period's expected exchange rate (E, Sl+l) or the
conditional variance of the exchange rate (Var, S,+l) is ruled out.
An intervention reaction function can be obtained by minimizing the
loss function (7.9) with respect to the volume of intervention [NY,.
Solving for INV, after taking account of the constraints implied by the
exchange rate equation in (7.1) and the expression for the optimal
position in assets denominated in domestic currency in (7.7) gives'
l~ = CAl + 1 (~ RP, - (s, - s/») (7.10)
'Y Var s,
The reaction function in equation (7.10) implies that there are three
potential reasons for intervention: one direct reason and two indirect
ones. The domestic central bank supplies amounts of domestic currency
to the foreign exchange market (lNV, > 0) when the current exchange
rate is below the target value (s, < s/). While it concerns monitoring of
the actual exchange rate I would refer to this as a direct reason for
intervention. The central bank detects the two other reasons for
intervention by monitoring exchange market pressure which will
eventually result in revisions of the actual exchange rate away from the
target level. Therefore, these could be referred to as indirect reasons for
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intervention. Firstly, the domestic central bank sells domestic currency
(l~ > 0) in proportion to the current account surplus of the domestic
economy (CA( > 0). Obviously, the current account surplus induces an
excess demand for domestic currency which is bound to drive the actual
exchange rate below the target exchange rate. Secondly, equation (7.10)
implies that the domestic central bank sells domestic currency to counter-
act the effect on the exchange rate of an increased demand for assets
denominated in domestic currency. Official sales of domestic currency
(I~ > 0) are carried out when the expected risk premium on assets
denominated in domestic currency becomes larger than the minimum risk
premium private investors require for investing in domestic currency.
7.2.4 Evaluation
Following Neumann (1984) a simplified flow market interpretation of
exchange rate determination is used to track the determinants of exchange
rate movements. The model is deterministic. This implies that there are
no unexpected events impinging on the foreign exchange market. It is
assumed that the central bank wishes to keep movements in the exchange
rate perfectly under control. Additionally, and perhaps more contro-
versially, it is also assumed that the central bank is able to keep
movements in the exchange rate perfectly under control, i.e. it is
assumed that the central bank has sufficient resources to counter
movements in exchange rates brought about by private currency flows.
Given these assumptions it is hardly surprising that the central bank turns
out to be able to attain its objective of keeping the exchange rate on the
target level. The value of the central bank's loss function in the present
deterministic game against nature is equal to zero, L(CB = (s, - s/Y = O.
This follows directly from solving (7.1) and (7.10) for the exchange rate
and substituting the resulting relationship into the loss function (7.9).
7.3 CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION AS A
STOCHASTIC GAME AGAINST NATURE
7.3.1 Introduction
The merit of the flow approach to the foreign exchange market is that it
discerns some fundamental driving forces behind movements in the
external value of a currency. The model in the previous section
distinguished three categories of currency flows: currency flows
originating from current account transactions, currency flows associated
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with capital account transactions and currency flows brought about
directly by the central bank. These three categories were put in one
comprehensive analytical framework. However, in practice the lion's
share of the daily turnover on the foreign exchange market is made up of
speculative capital flows. In Section 1.2 it was established that the
proportion of international currency flows which are directly associated
with international trade in goods and services is very tiny. The
proportion of international currency flows which are directly brought
about by the central bank is fairly negligible. Moreover, periods with
(sometimes prolonged) interventions are alternated by longer periods with
no intervention. Putting the three categories of foreign currency flows in
one comprehensive analytical framework is bound to lead to 'insights'
which are way out of line with what one observes in reality. For
instance, the reaction function in (7.10) implies that the domestic central
bank buys foreign currency aimed at withstanding downward pressure on
the exchange rate caused by an expected return differential in favour of
investments denominated in domestic currency. This is not what one sees
in practice. Rather, central bank interventions are of an order of
magnitude smaller than private capital flows. In any case, it is well
known that the flow model, like other structural models of the exchange
rate, performs poorly in empirical tests.
The failure of structural exchange rate models in empirical tests has
led many economists to adopt new research strategies in exploring the
field of exchange rate economics. Within a short time an extensive
literature has developed which aims to describe the mere statistical
properties of the time series of exchange rates (for a survey see De Vries
1994). In this literature short-term exchange rate returns are thought of
as resulting from the interaction among the various sorts of exchange
market participants and their interpretation of, and reaction to the 'news'
which hits the market almost continuously. However, the behaviour of
the different groups of exchange market participants and the interaction
among them is mostly left unspecified ('black box').
In this section the popular random-walk model of the exchange rate is
amended to allow for an effect of intervention. To influence currency
movements, interventions basically have to alter the balance of supply
and demand for foreign exchange. However, typical intervention efforts
are very tiny compared to the daily turnover on foreign exchange
markets. Furthermore, in practice their money-market effect is routinely
neutralized. In Section 2.3.4 it was shown how sterilized interventions
may eventually exert an effect on the exchange rate through the portfolio
balance channel by causing an imbalance in investors' portfolios.
In the course of this section it will be seen that the unrealistic features
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of the reaction function derived in the previous section do not disappear
by postulating a different exchange rate model. The reaction functions
still imply that the central bank, when faced with shocks to the exchange
rate, unconditionally engages in intervention to mitigate the effect of
these shocks. In Section 7.3.6 it is assumed that there are costs involved
in intervening. This forces the central bank to weigh the benefits and
costs of intervention when confronted with speculative shocks to the
exchange rate.
7.3.2 The random-walk model of the exchange rate amended
to include the effect of intervention
Consider the following stochastic process for the exchange rate, SI
E, I Ur-1 - N (0, O"~) (7.11)
where a and 00 are a constant term and a coefficient, respectively; EI is a
stochastic disturbance term. Conditional on information available at time
[-1, denoted by U,_l' the disturbance term is normally distributed with
mean zero and constant variance 0";.4 One of the early insights of what I
would call the 'finance approach' to the exchange rate is that short-term
exchange rates contain a unit root. 5 This means that the null hypothesis
that the coefficient 00 is equal to one can not be rejected in a r-test (see,
e.g. Meese and Singleton 1982 and Baillie and Bollerslev 1989).
After taking account of the unit root in the time series of the exchange
rate and after amending the model in (7. 11) to include the effect of
central bank interventions it can be written:
(7.12)
where a is a 'drift' -term which denotes a constant rate of depreciation of
the domestic currency vis-a-vis foreign currencies. This constant and
therefore perfectly predictable change in the value of domestic currency
may be due to the underlying weakness of the domestic economy
measured by, for instance, the macroeconomic fundamentals. It may also
be caused by self-fulfilling depreciation expectations among currency
speculators which are detached from economic fundamentals. As distinct
from the flow model discussed in Section 7.2.2 the present random-walk
model of the exchange rate does not distinguish between these two
possibilities. [NVI denotes the volume of sterilized central bank
intervention. Positive (negative) values represent purchases (sales) of
foreign currency by the domestic central bank. The coefficient OV
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measures the effect of sterilized interventions. Purchases (sales) of
foreign currency should lead to an increase (decrease) in the value of
foreign exchange. Therefore, effective interventions are associated with a
positive value of bV.
7.3.3 Derivation of the intervention reaction function and the loss of
the central bank
The random-walk model of the exchange rate can again be combined
with a central bank policy loss function. Regarding the exact specifica-
tion of the loss function it is important to note that the stochastic term in
(7.12) introduces uncertainty into the model. One approach would be to
assume that the central bank can easily cope with this kind of
uncertainty. For instance, it can be asserted that central bank intervention
is a highly flexible policy instrument which can be implemented at any
point in time. Therefore, the central bank can be thought of as
monitoring the exchange rate carefully with interventions being
conducted after the realization of the shock E,' When, in addition, one
believes in the manageability of the exchange rate in the short run it may
make sense to think of the central bank as pursuing a target level of the
exchange rate. Under these circumstances the loss function in equation
(7.9) above, repeated here as equation (7.13), still applies:
L CB = (s _ S T)2
I t
(7.13)
As before, the intervention reaction function can be obtained by
minimizing the loss function (7.13) with respect to the volume of
intervention INV, and after substitution of equation (7.12):
1 TINV, = - b
V
(a + S'_I - S, + E,) (7.14)
A staightforward implication of the random-walk model in (7.12) is that
the best prediction of the exchange rate at time t conditional on no
intervention is a + S,_I' This is also reflected in the reaction function
(7. 14) which states that the central bank buys amounts of domestic
currency (INV, < 0) when its best guess of the current exchange rate (a
+ S'_I) is higher than the current exogenous target rate (s/). Equation
(7.14) implies that the central bank will buy additional domestic currency
in the event of a positive shock to the exchange rate, i.e. a positive
realization of the disturbance term E. 6 The volume of intervention is,
higher, ceteris paribus, the lower the value of the effectivity coefficient
bV• Clearly, the more effective the interventions are, the smaller the
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volume of intervention that is required to stabilize the exchange rate
around s/ in spite of permanent (a) and transitory (to,) shocks impinging
on it.
After substituting the intervention reaction function (7.14) into the
exchange rate equation (7.12) and the resulting equation into the loss
function (7.13), it turns out that the value of the central bank loss
function in the present stochastic game against nature is equal to zero,
i.e. LlcB = (s, - st? = O. Below it will become clear that this result
depends crucially on the assumption that the central bank carries out
interventions only after the transitory shock EI is realized. Given the
assumed unlimited availability of foreign exchange reserves the central
bank can attain the objective embodied in a different loss function as
well. It may for example want to limit exchange rate changes per se.
This can be captured by a loss function which is quadratic in the
percentage change of the exchange rate:
(7.15)
This implies that the central bank is equally averse to appreciations and
depreciations of the domestic currency. The reaction function obtained by
substituting (7.12) into (7.15) and differentiating the resulting relation
with respect to the volume of intervention, can be written:
INV = -~ (a + E) (7.16)
I OV I
By making use of equations (7.12), (7.16) and (7.15) it can easily be
derived that the value of the central bank loss function is again equal to
zero, i.e. LlcB = (Sl - SI_Y = o.
7.3.4 Bandwagon effects in exchange rate dynamics and intervention
If the central bank carries out interventions only after the transitory
shock E is realized and when there is no physical limit to the foreign
I
exchange reserves, the central bank can attain the objective embodied in
the loss function irrespective of the exact stochastic exchange rate
process. For instance, assume that there are bandwagon effects in
exchange rate dynamics (Takagi 1991, Lai and Pauly 1992). Suppose,
specifically, the exchange rate follows a process as
(7.17)
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where 1> > o. This occurs when a rise (fall) in the exchange rate
generates anticipations of a further rise (fall). The central bank may want
to resist the effect of bandwagon expectations among speculators. With
the loss function given by (7.15) the resulting intervention reaction
function can be written:
1INV, = - BV (1)(S'_1 - s,_) + lO) (7.18)
When the central bank intervenes according to (7.18) its loss can again
be shown to be equal to zero.
7.3.5 Countering transitory shocks in real time
The foreign exchange market is a global market on which trading takes
place 24 hours a day. Moreover, the market is hit by 'news' almost
continuously. As a consequence of this, in practice, the exact realization
of the shock lO, is known only at the very end of day t. It does not seem
to be realistic to assume that the central bank waits for this to compute
and carry out the optimal volume of intervention. However, in line with
that, it can also be argued that the central bank will not react to
unexpected events which occur during the first half of the trading day:
unexpected events announced during the second half of the trading day
may have an opposite effect on the exchange rate making lOt = o. In
view of this it seems reasonable to assume that the central bank only
wants to minimize the expected divergence between the actual exchange
rate and the target value. In that case the loss function can be written:
(7.19)
The intervention reaction function obtained by minimizing the loss
function (7.19) with respect to the volume of intervention INVr and after
substitution of equation (7.12) is given by
1 TINV, = -y (a + St_1 - S, ) (7.20)s
What stands out from the comparison of the reaction functions in (7.14)
and (7.20) is that in the latter case the central bank does not react to the
realization of the transitory shock lO/. As a consequence of the fact that
the central bank tries to compress the expected rather than the actual gap
between the actual exchange rate and the target value conditional on no
intervention, the expected loss is positive and proportional to the variance
of the transitory shock lO/:
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2= II, (7.21)
In practice, the central bank can not counteract all transitory shocks in
real time. However, from an analytical point of view this poses no
problem.' Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter it will be assumed
that the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market at the end
of period t and that it reacts to shocks which materialized between the
end of period t-l and the end of period t.
7.3.6 Introducing costs of intervention
To arrive at an expected loss of zero it is not only crucial to assume that
the central bank carries out interventions after the transitory shock is
realized. In addition to that, the effectivity coefficient (lv has to be
sufficiently high or foreign exchange reserves have to be unlimited.
Neither of the latter two conditions holds in practice. In fact,
interventions seem to have a fairly negligible effect on the balance of
supply and demand in the foreign exchange market. Consequently, the
chance that interventions are able to drive the exchange rate into the
direction favoured by the central bank and against the current market
sentiment is small. To take account of that I assume that there are costs
involved in conducting official operations in foreign exchange. There
may be bureaucratic costs involved in deciding on the volume of
intervention. Furthermore, the costs of intervention may take the form of
losses on the net foreign currency position of the central bank caused by
purchases (sales) of foreign currency which turn out to be unsuccessful at
preventing the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating). To
proxy the costs of intervention the value of the central bank loss function
increases more than proportionally with the volume of intervention:
L,eB = ~ (c INVy + ex (Ll s, - a)22 2
(7.22)
where c is a factor of proportionality for the costs of intervention and the
coefficient ex measures the weight assigned to limiting exchange rate
changes. The first term on the right-hand side of (7.22) reflects that the
higher the volume of intervention the higher the potential fmancial losses
on the net foreign currency position of the central bank caused by
purchases (sales) of foreign currency which turn out to be unsuccessful at
preventing the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating). Of
course, potential fmancial gains from interventions which turn out to be
effective also increase with the volume of intervention. However, if
central banks are risk averse and if they are aware of the relative
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negligibility of interventions on the balance of supply and demand in the
foreign exchange market, they will limit the chance of losing money by
intervening too heavily. 8
In principle, exchange rate stability is a public good. The second term
on the right-hand side of (7.22) reflects that central bank losses increase
more than proportionally with changes in the exchange rate which are not
caused by the relative state of the 'fundamentals' of the domestic
economy. For instance, in the next section it is argued that the exchange
rate may experience a predictable a per cent rise due to the domestic
inflation rate being persistently higher than the foreign one. This
depreciation may be at odds with the monetary authorities' attempts to
stabilize the exchange rate and to maintain the external equilibrium of the
domestic economy. By assumption, however, priority is given to
domestic monetary policy. Therefore, interventions are not directed at
countering the a per cent change which is a direct result of the outcome
of monetary policy.
The intervention reaction function is obtained by substituting the
stochastic process for the exchange rate in equation (7.12) into the loss
function (7.22) and differentiating the resulting relation with respect to
the volume of intervention. It can be written:
ex OV
INV, = - E, (7.23)
c2 +·ex Wy
The introduction of costs of intervention alters the behaviour of the
central bank. It can easily be seen by comparing the intervention reaction
functions in (7.16) and (7.23) that positive costs of intervention lower the
intervention coefficient in absolute value." When interventions are
costless, the central bank fully counteracts all shocks to the exchange
rate. Moreover, it was noted before that a higher effectivity coefficient
(higher value of the positive coefficient o~ simply means that smaller
amounts of intervention are required to stabilize the exchange rate.
Compare this with the case of positive costs of intervention. An increase
in the effectiveness of intervention allows the central bank to make a
more favourable trade-off between the costs and the benefits of
intervention. It turns out that a higher effectivity leads ceteris paribus to
a higher volume of intervention as long as OV < c Ira, i.e. as long as
the initial effectivity is below a certain threshold level." This threshold
level is increasing in the costs of intervention and decreasing in the
central bank's weight to exchange rate stability. It can easily be seen
from equation (7.23) that a high value of c and a low value of ex both
contribute to a low equilibrium volume of intervention. 11 When the
initial equilibrium volume of intervention is low the costs of intervention
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do not weigh too heavily and the central bank increases the volume of
intervention in response to a rise in 5v
The value of the central bank: loss function can be computed by
substituting (7.12) and (7.23) into (7.22). It is given by
(7.24)
Clearly, the loss is increasing in Q! and c but decreasing in av. Thus,
although an increase in the effectivity of intervention does not necessarily
lead to an increase in the volume of intervention (see note 10) it
unambiguously leads to a lower loss of the central bank. This is due to
the fact that a rise in aV allows the central bank to make a less unfavoura-
ble trade-off between the costs and benefits of intervention.
7.3.7 Intervention as a stochastic game against nature: evaluation
In this section a random-walk model for the exchange rate was used to
analyse a stochastic exchange rate policy game against nature. The
central bank: intervenes in the foreign exchange market at the end of
period t, after the transitory shock to the exchange rate is realized. It was
found that the exchange rate can be stabilized if the interventions are
sufficiently effective or foreign exchange reserves are unlimited. Neither
of these conditions holds in practice. In fact, the exact channel through
which central bank intervention affects the exchange rate was not made
explicit in the random-walk model. Presumably, sterilized interventions
exert an effect on the exchange rate through the portfolio balance
channel. However, it appeared from Chapter 3 that there is only a small
chance that sterilized interventions are able to influence the course of the
exchange rate. To take account of that it was assumed that there are costs
involved in conducting interventions. Depending on the exact shape of its
loss function the central bank makes a trade-off between the costs and the
benefits of intervention. Positive costs of intervention lower the
intervention coefficient but increase the loss of the central bank.
Bhattacharya and Weller (1992) argue that one should not build on the
portfolio balance channel of intervention. According to them, the
introduction of strategic behaviour by central banks can alter the scope
for intervention dramatically. In the next section I will explore the
strategic interaction between the central bank: on the one hand and private
speculators on the other hand.
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7.4 INTERVENTION AS A GAME AGAINST
RATIONAL MARKET PARTICIPANTSI2
7.4.1 Introduction
It is a fact of observation that private exchange market participants are
eager to detect any information related to official operations in foreign
currency. Therefore, it seems sensible to abandon the implicit assumption
of Sections 7.2 and 7.3 that the central bank is regarded by private
exchange market participants as 'just another exchange market
participant'. On the other hand, central bankers know that their actions
are monitored very carefully. Consequently, to make reasonable
inferences on the impact of foreign exchange interventions it seems that
strategic considerations surrounding the actions of central bankers in the
market for foreign exchange have to be taken into account. Section 2.4
briefly explored the implications of non-fundamentalist trading strategies
by currency traders for the actions to be taken by central banks to render
interventions effective. The remainder of this chapter retains the
assumption of rational expectations among foreign exchange market
participants. First, I will present a basic model with symmetric
information and analyse the exchange rate policy game it embodies. Then
I will discuss the approach taken by Bhattacharya and Weller (1992).
They stress that central banks may have more information about their
own targets than private speculators (asymmetric information). In that
case 'the exchange rate communicates information' to the private sector,
ensuring that 'large scale intervention is not required to affect exchange
rates' (Bhattacharya and Weller 1992, p. 4).
7.4.2 Monetary policy and exchange rate policy
An extensive body of literature now exists which analyses monetary
policy games (for surveys, see e.g. Blackburn and Christensen 1989,
Argy 1992, Cukierman 1992, Ch. 2-7 and Sijben 1992). A game-
theoretic analysis of the incentives facing monetary authorities when they
manage the external rather than the internal value of the domestic
currency has only recently attracted attention. Horn and Persson (1988),
Holden (1991), Rasmussen (1993) and Alogoskoufis (1994) go beyond
refining the familiar inflation-unemployment trade-off. Holden (1991, p.
1543) recognizes that 'a government may feel tempted to exploit the
short run rigidity of wages, and devalue in order to obtain a short run
gain in terms of improved competitiveness'. 13 However, for countries
which committed themselves to the Articles of Agreement of the
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) competitive devaluations do not seem
to be a feasible policy option. 14
In general, the monetary authorities of large industrialized countries
give priority to domestic policy objectives. The instruments of monetary
policy are basically used to attain these objectives. Appendix A7.1 sets
out a static monetary policy game between wage-setters and the central
bank. When setting the money supply the monetary authorities make a
trade-off between the benefits and the costs of an actual higher-than-
expected increase in the domestic money supply. In the symmetric
information case considered in Appendix A7.1 the private. sector
anticipates the central bank's temptation to engage in surprise inflation. It
follows that the economy is caught up in a Nash equilibrium which is
characterized by an inefficiently high level of inflation but with output
unchanged at its natural level." Appendix A7.1 derives the optimal
time-consistent domestic inflation rate i, set by the domestic monetary
authorities. Analogously, the inflation rate set in a foreign country i;
will be the outcome of a similar monetary policy game. However,
similar monetary policy games at home and abroad may lead to different
optimal time-consistent inflation rates for the domestic and foreign
economy.
Suppose private exchange market participants recognize that the
underlying trend in the exchange rate is determined by PPP consider-
ations. On the assumption that they have at least the same information as
trade unions at home and abroad, they can compute the expected inflation
rate for the domestic and the foreign economy and, hence, the expected
PPP-implied change in the exchange rate
E A PPP E • E ••,_\ L.l S, = ,-I 7r, - ,-I 7r, == a (7.25)
The inflation differential is measured on a yearly basis. Under normal
circumstances the PPP component of daily exchange rate changes will be
negligible. Moreover, for short-term exchange rate determination the
whims of speculators and institutional investors can be much more
important than inflation differentials between countries. Still, equation
(7.25) underlies the exchange rate equation in the exchange rate policy
game against rational speculators.
7.4.3 The determination of the exchange rate
Consider the following stochastic exchange rate equation:
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where s, is the log of the foreign exchange rate (units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency). l~ and l~e denote the actual
volume of intervention (purchases of foreign currency by the domestic
central bank) and private exchange market participants' expected volume
of intervention, respectively. It is important to note that speculators
determine l~e upon observation of E" the stochastic shock to the
exchange rate." When the actual and expected volume of intervention
are both zero (i.e., when INV, = l~e = 0) and when the stochastic
shock to the exchange rate E, takes on a value of zero, the domestic
currency experiences a constant a per cent depreciation (a > 0) or
appreciation (a < 0) vis-a-vis the foreign currency per time period. In
fact, in the latter case the exchange rate equation reduces to the PPP
relation in (7.25). Obviously, if a is positive (negative) the domestic
inflationary bias is higher (lower) than the foreign one.
Compared to individual private currency dealers, the central bank may
be viewed as a relatively big player in the market. However, intervention
volumes are very tiny compared to the total daily turnover on the foreign
exchange market. 17 Consequently, the course of the exchange rate is not
likely to be affected by the very volume of intervention. In spite of that,
equation (7.26) does allow sterilized interventions to affect the exchange
rate through the portfolio balance channel." This effect is measured by
the coefficient ov. If OV is positive the volume of intervention itself
matters with purchases (sales) of foreign currency affecting the exchange
rate positively (negatively). The negligibility of intervention volumes
compared to the average daily turnover on the foreign exchange market
implies that OV = O. Equation (7.26) also leaves open the possibility that
central bank intervention works through the expectations channel. Actual
higher-than-expected interventions may catch private speculators off
balance and, hence, lead to a correction in the exchange rate. The
expectations channel is operative if OE > O. Tbis implies that actual
larger-than-expected purchases (sales) of foreign currency affect the
exchange rate positively (negatively)."
7.4.4 Central bank behaviour
The loss function of the central bank is identical to equation (7.22) in the
previous section. It is repeated here for convenience as equation (7.27)
L,CB = ~(c INV,)2 + O'(LlS, - a)2 (7.27)2 2
The central bank is assumed to make a trade-off between the costs of
interventions in the spot market for foreign exchange and the losses from
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fluctuations in the exchange rate. The first term on the right-hand side of
(7.27) proxies the costs of intervention. The value of the central bank
loss function increases more than proportionally with the volume of
intervention. The second term on the right-hand side of (7.27) reflects
the fact that central bank losses increase more than proportionally with
changes in the exchange rate which are not caused by the differential
inflationary biases at home and abroad. Above it was argued that the
different outcomes of the monetary policy games between the central
bank and workers in the domestic and the foreign economy initially
resulted in an a per cent per period depreciation of the domestic currency
(of course, when a is negative the domestic currency appreciates). This
depreciation may be at odds with, for instance, the monetary authorities'
attempts to stabilize the exchange rate and to maintain the external
equilibrium of the domestic economy. However, it is assumed that the
central bank gives priority to domestic monetary policy and that it will
not direct exchange rate policy at counteracting exchange rate movements
which are a direct result of the outcome of the monetary policy game.
7.4.5 The behaviour of rational speculators
The foreign exchange market is hit by 'news' almost continuously. This
frequent arrival of new information causes currency traders' positions to
be in a permanent state of flux. Each exchange market participant bases
position-taking on his prediction of the market's interpretation of, and
reaction to news and rumours (Almekinders and Rovers 1994). This
translates into a stochastic shock to the exchange rate E,. Obviously, this
stochastic shock is the outcome of a kind of information game among
well-informed private exchange market participants (Lyons 1991).
By assumption, strategic interaction between the central bank on the
one hand and private exchange market participants on the other hand
comes into play only after the shock E, has materialized." Therefore,
for the exchange rate policy game analysed here, issues of intra-private
sector behaviour are of no concern. 21 The diverse group of foreign
currency traders will be treated as one representative agent. The loss
function of the representative speculator can be written:
L PS = .!. (IWe - INV)2 (7.28), 2 ' ,
where INV/ denotes the speculator's expectation regarding the volume of
intervention to be carried out by the central bank in period t. To make
sure, the realization of the shock E, is contained in the information set of
the speculator when he computes this expectation. The loss function in
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(7.28) reflects speculators' aversion to being fooled by the central bank.
7.4.6 The Nash equilibrium of the exchange rate policy game
The strategic interaction between the central bank and the representative
speculators takes place after the shock to the exchange rate has occurred.
Hence, although there is a stochastic element in the exchange rate model,
the exchange rate policy game is essentially deterministic. The timing of
events is illustrated in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Timing of events in the exchange rate policy game
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Interaction among the Shock to the The central bank and
various sorts of exchange rate (;1 is the private sector
private exchange observed by both the simultaneously set
market participants central bank and the INVr and INV/,
leads to a shock to private sector respectively
the exchange rate EI
Upon observing the speculative shock to the exchange rate, the monetary
authorities attempt to minimize period t's policy loss, taking the
expectations or' private exchange market participants, INVre, as given (the
Nash assumption). The central bank's reaction function to the expectation
of the representative private exchange market participants is obtained
from the first-order condition for a minimum of (7.27), i.e. aLICB I aINVI
= 0, after substituting equation (7.26) into it:
I~ (7.29)
According to equation (7.29) the domestic central bank partly
accommodates private exchange market participants' expectations
regarding the volume of intervention. 22 Clearly, private exchange
market participants minimize period t's losses by setting
INVre = INVI (7.30)
An expression for equilibrium intervention is obtained by substituting this
reaction function in (7.29):
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where B = (7.31)
c2 +aoV(oV +(1)
Figure 7.1 shows the central bank's reaction function for the case of a
negative shock to the domestic currency value of foreign currency, i.e.
fl <0.23 Thus, it depicts the volume of intervention as a function of the
expected volume of intervention in a situation in which purchases of
foreign currency are called for. The only point at which expectations are
rational is at point N, tbe intersection of the central bank's reaction
function and the 45°-line through the origin. This represents the Nash
equilibrium. This equilibrium, which is also called the 'discretionary
equilibrium' or the 'time consistent solution' in the 'rules versus
discretion' literature, is unique in this one-shot game. If private exchange
market participants expected a lower volume of intervention, in absolute
terms, than what is implied by (7.31), the central bank would have an
incentive to carry out surprise interventions. Thus, expectations would
not turn out to be rational. 24 Intervention expectations rise to the point





Figure 7.1 Actual and expected intervention in the presence of a
positive shock to the demand for domestic currency which
the domestic central bank wants to counteract
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surprise interventions. Analogous to the well-known 'inflationary bias' of
discretionary monetary policy analysed by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b)
and Alogoskoufis (1994) this is the 'intervention bias' of discretionary
exchange rate policy. The volume of intervention at point N is given by
equation (7.31). However, what stands out from equation (7.30) and
Figure 7.1 is that in equilibrium intervention is fully anticipated.
Substituting (7.30) in the exchange rate equation (7.26) gives
~ s = a + OV INV + E
f f f
(7.32)
Equations (7.31) and (7.32) highlight the time inconsistency of optimal
intervention policy. The intervention policy of the central bank described
by equation (7.29) is time-consistent in the sense that at each point in
time the volume of intervention selected is best, given the current
situation. However, as can be seen from equations (7.31) and (7.32), the
resulting non-cooperative equilibrium of the exchange rate policy game
has an inefficient 'intervention bias'. It is inefficient to carry out the non-
zero equilibrium amount of intervention associated with the Nash
equilibrium in point N because the costs involved are not offset by any
benefits. The nonzero amount of intervention is fully anticipated by the
private sector. Therefore, it is not successful at limiting the impact of the
initial shock to the exchange rate through the expectations channel. Gains
in the form of systematically smaller exchange rate changes are only to
be expected if the portfolio balance channel is operative (ov> 0).
The value of the central bank loss function can be computed by
substituting (7.26) and (7.31) into (7.27). It is given by
(7.33)
7.4.7 Intervention as a game against rational speculators: evaluation
In Section 7.3.7 doubts were raised about the significance of the effect of
interventions working through the portfolio balance channel; the
presumed low value of OV was the main reason to investigate the
expectations channel of intervention and to explore the concomitant
strategic interaction among official and private exchange market
participants. The implications of the strategic interaction can be inferred
by comparing the expressions for the optimal volume of intervention and
the loss of the central bank in the game against nature and the game
against rational speculators, respectively.
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The intervention reaction coefficient in (7.23) is smaller in absolute
value than the one in (7.31).25 Strategic interaction creates some new
room for discretionary exchange rate policy. It allows the central bank: to
affect the exchange rate through the expectations channel of intervention.
However, it is assumed that the central bank: and private speculators have
an equal status and full information regarding each other's objective
functions. In the end, the central bank fmds itself forced to fully use up
its room for discretion and engage in more voluminous intervention than
what is optimal from its individual point of view. Yet, the exchange rate
equation (7.32) which applies in the Nash equilibrium of the game
against rational speculators is the same as the exchange rate equation
(7.12) which was used to analyse the game against nature. Therefore, it
can easily be seen that society as a whole, which is presumably interested
only in smaller exchange rate changes, on average only benefits from the
higher volume of intervention to the extent that the volume effect of
intervention (51) is larger than zero. In any case, the central bank can be
shown to be unambiguously worse off.26
7.4.8 The sensitivity of intervention policy to changes in the
preferences of the central bank
This section investigates the effect of changes in a, the weight assigned
by the central bank to limiting fluctuations in the exchange rate around
the PPP-implied fundamental trendline. It was noted before that there are
many similarities between the present exchange rate policy game and
standard monetary policy games. A basic assumption in monetary policy
games is that due to existing distortions the market-clearing level of
output is lower than the monetary authorities' target level. The parameter
which denotes the relative weight the central bank places on output
compared to inflation is of crucial importance in the monetary policy
game. A well-known result in the literature on monetary policy games is
that the higher the central bank's weight on output, the greater the
incentive to create surprise inflation. In many studies the parameter for
the central bank's weight on output is interpreted as the inverse of the
degree of central bank independence (Rogoff 1985, Bijffmger and
Schaling 1993b, Debelle 1993). The idea behind this is that a central
bank: knows that in the long run it can not systematically stimulate output
by means of surprise inflation. Consequently, a central bank will only
engage in larger-than-expected monetary expansions if it is forced to do
so by politicians and if it is not protected from their influence by law.
In the previous section it was established that the central bank is not
able to limit systematically the impact of realized shocks to the exchange
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rate by means of interventions which work through the expectations
channel. Consequently, a central bank which is independent from
political incumbents will in general not stubbornly resist these shocks to
the exchange rate. As shown, for instance, by Cukierman (1992) and
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a), in most countries central banks are
highly dependent on the government in general and the minister of
fmance in particular. As a result, the policies implemented by central
banks are not independent from the general political process. For
instance, a persistent appreciation of the domestic currency will lead
domestic exporters to complain to the minister of fmance about their
declining competitiveness on the world market. A central bank which
lacks autonomy in the field of exchange rate policy may be forced by the
ministry of fmance to engage in highly visible foreign exchange
intervention; political incumbents will want to show that they are really
concerned with the competitiveness of domestic exporters. The converse
of this argument is as follows. The greater the independence given to the
central bank by law, the smaller the political influence on exchange rate
policy and the smaller the pressure on the central bank to systematically
counteract speculative shocks to the exchange rate. Analogous to the
monetary policy game, the notion of central bank independence can be
incorporated in the present exchange rate policy game by taking the
weight a in the central bank loss function in (7.27) to measure the
inverse of the independence of the central bank.
Regarding the intervention reaction coefficient in (7.31) it can be
shown that a B /a a > 0 and a2 B / a ~ < 0 . Consequently, the
higher the weight given by the central bank to reducing changes in the
exchange rate which are larger in absolute value than those implied by
PPP, i.e. the higher the value of a, the larger the intervention bias.
From this Proposition 7.1 can be derived.
Proposition 7.1: The more independent the central bank, the smaller
the average volume of intervention.
From
lim B = lim (7.34)
Of _ co 0'_00
it follows that when the central bank is averse to non-fundamental
exchange rate changes the intervention reaction coefficient in (7.31)
converges to the inverse of the coefficient which measures the 'volume
effect' of intervention. This happens to be the same intervention reaction
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coefficient as in the game against nature analysed in Section 7.3.3 in
which fJE = O. Figure 7.2 shows how the intervention reaction coefficient
in (7.31) changes with an increasing aversion of the central bank to
speculative shocks to the exchange rate. When ex goes to infmity the
central bank (or the politicians which determine its policy) is not
bothered by the costs of intervention. In a full information exchange rate
policy game private speculators know the value of ex. Consequently,
when ex is very high they know that the central bank is going to
counteract realized shocks to the exchange rate (e.) as fiercely as
possible. As a result, the expectations channel of influence of
interventions does not work at all. The mere 'volume effect' of
intervention has to do the job. This implies that the central bank will
have to try to affect the exchange rate through the portfolio balance
channel of intervention. Clearly, when bV is very small the average





Figure 7.2 The central bank's aversion to shocks to the exchange rate
and the intervention reaction coefficient
The variability of the volume of intervention is also sensitive to
changes in the central bank's aversion to non-fundamental changes in the
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it follows that, if the central bank gives an infinite weight to stabilizing
the exchange rate around PPP levels, the variance of the volume of
intervention is positively related to the variance of shocks to the
exchange rate, a,2, and inversely related to the effectiveness of
interventions via the portfolio balance channel. Obviously,
aB2 /a a > o. This implies that a higher weight to limiting changes in
the exchange rate leads to a higher variance of the volume of intervention
relative to the variance of the shock to the exchange rate. From this
Proposition 7.2 can be derived.
Proposition 7.2: The more independent the central bank, the lower the
variance of the volume of intervention.
Figure 7.3 shows how the relative variability of the intervention volume
changes with an increasing aversion of the central bank to speculative
shocks. Equating to zero the second derivative of B2 with respect to a
obtains a point of inflection at a = 2/(2 c/(bv + bE». From equation
(7.31) it follows that the higher the costs of intervention, c, the smaller
ceteris paribus the equilibrium volume of intervention. When the weight
a increases, the central bank is relatively less concerned with the costs of
intervention. This leads to a catch-up effect with the variability of
intervention (compared to a,2) initially rising fast. When a is above the
value corresponding to the point of inflection the shape of the central
bank loss function in (7.27) implies that the costs of intervention start to
weigh more heavily again. Consequently, a rise in a leads to a slower
rise in the relative variability of the volume of intervention.
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Figure 7.3 The central bank's aversion to shocks to the exchange rate
and the variability of the volume of intervention
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7.4.9 The link between intervention efforts and central bank
independence: some cross-country evidence
Sections 7.4.2 to 7.4.7 presented a simple game-theoretic model of
exchange rate policy. Section 7.4.8 established that the model implies a
negative correlation between the degree of central bank independence and
the magnitude and variability of the volume of intervention. In this
section it will be investigated whether these negative correlations are
supported by cross-country evidence. The Eijffinger=-Schaling (ES)
index of policy independence developed in Eijffinger and Schaling
(1993a) will be used as a measure of central bank independence." This
index is available for twelve major industrialized countries. For each of
the twelve central banks the magnitude of the intervention efforts is
proxied by the average absolute monthly percentage change in the foreign
exchange reserves of the respective central bank. The variability of the
volume of intervention is proxied by the variance of the absolute monthly
percentage change in the central bank's foreign exchange reserves. The
data on central bank independence and intervention efforts are depicted in
Table 7.2.
The relationship between the degree of central bank independence and
the magnitude and variability of the volume of intervention is analysed
for the post-Bretton Woods period from February 1973 through to
January 1993. Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
all countries were fully committed to maintaining a fixed price of the US
dollar in terms of their own currency. In the model in Section 7.4.2 it
was assumed that central banks are free to choose the actual volume of
intervention, i.e. they are not bound by international exchange rate
arrangements. Therefore, the propositions derived from this model can
not be tested with data covering a period during which central banks
were obliged to conduct unsterilized interventions in the event of strains
on the foreign exchange market.
Figure 7.4 shows a negative relation between the average absolute
monthly percentage change in foreign exchange reserves and the ES
index of central bank independence. Switzerland is a clear outlier in the
figure. There are two obvious explanations for that. Firstly, Switzerland
plays a central role in international banking and international investors
often regard it as a safe haven. Consequently, foreign currency flows
into the Swiss economy can at times be very large. The Swiss National
Bank, like many other central banks, sometimes tries to limit the upward
pressure on the external value of the Swiss franc by absorbing some of
the foreign currency coming in from abroad. Secondly, it is an
idiosyncrasy of Swiss commercial banks that they wish to exhibit higher
A Positive Theory of Intervention 183

















OL- L- L- L- __~L_ __ ~ ~
o
Figure 7.4
1 2 3 5 64
Central Bank Independence
Central bank independence and the average volume of
intervention in twelve industrial countries
end-of-quarter liquidity in terms of Swiss francs than they wish to
maintain over the entire period. In order to smooth out the resulting daily
money-market rate peaks, the Swiss National Bank offers end-of-quarter
swaps to commercial banks (Gartner 1987, p. 443). These swaps are
completely unrelated to developments in the foreign exchanges. Yet, they
are included in the monthly reserves data used in this section.
With Switzerland excluded from the sample, the negative correlation
between the volume of intervention and the degree of central bank
independence is supported by the results of a simple OLS regression
depicted in the top row of Table 7.3.
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The negative relation between the variability of the volume of
intervention and the degree of central bank: independence can be seen
from Figure 7.5. The results of an OLS regression shown in the bottom
row of Table 7.3 confirm this (again Switzerland is left out of the
sample).
Table 7.2 Central bank independence and intervention efforts:
February 1973-January 1993
Country ES-index; DResi VarRes;
Australia 1 6.80 63.27
Canada 1 11.69 194.91
France 2 4.53 27.31
Italy 2 9.37 133.16
Sweden 2 6.65 49.25
United Kingdom 2 4.75 44.96
Belgium 3 5.56 38.99
Japan 3 2.77 13.13
United States 3 5.77 42.76
The Netherlands 4 4.74 26.42
Germany 5 3.39 20.13
Switzerland 5 8.54 62.67
Notes:
Es-index, denotes the index of central bank independence developed in Eijffinger and
Schaling (l993a). The higher the index number, the more independent is the central
bank from tbe political process.
The foreign exchange reserves data are taken from the International Financial Statistics
of the IMF, Foreign exchange reserves in millions of us dollars, line 1 D.D. Upon
denoting this monthly variable by R" Dices, the average monthly absolute percentage
change in the foreign exchange reserves of country i is given by
Yarlies.; the variance of the monthly absolute percentage change in foreign exchange
reserves of country i is given by
Yarkes, = [Yare IR{ - R{_I II Rt-I) 1
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Table 7. 3 Central bank independence and the magnitude and variability
of intervention: OLS estimation results Feb. J973-Jan. 1993
Dependent variable Constant ES-index; R2
DRes; 9.59 -1.41 0.37
(6.37) (-2.62)
Yarkes, 129.82 -27.63 0.30
(3.84) (-2.29)
Notes: The number of observation is eleven. r-statistics are in parentheses. R2 is the
squared multiple correlation coefficient adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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7.5 EXTENSIONS OF THE GAME AGAINST
RATIONAL SPECULATORS
7.5.1 A dynamic extension
In Section 7.4.6 it was concluded that strategic interaction among official
and private exchange market participants introduces an intervention bias.
This result hinges on the presumed equal status of the central bank and
the representative speculator and their having full information about each
other's objective function. The central bank is forced to engage in more
voluminous intervention than is optimal from its individual point of view.
Moreover, interventions working through the expectations channel were
found to be unable to lessen the impact of shocks to the exchange rate. A
dynamic extension of the model does not lead to a more favourable
picture regarding the central bank's ability to limit exchange rate
fluctuations. In principle, in the full information environment
characteristic of the non-cooperative Nash game there is nothing that
links different time periods (Barro and Gordon 1983b). Consequently, the
interaction between the players leads to an inefficient intervention bias in
every period. The dynamic extension of the model involves generalizing
the central bank policy loss function in equation (7.27):
where {3 is the discount factor applied to future losses of the central
bank. Clearly, the term in brackets is period t's policy loss. As before,
the central bank chooses INY, to minimize the loss function in equation
(7.36), taking INV,e as given. Since different time periods are not
connected, minimization of equation (7.36) is equivalent to minimizing
the loss function in (7.27) for each period separately. Hence, the Nash
equilibrium discussed above results in each period. The equilibrium
volume of intervention differs from period to period only to the extent
that the shock E( takes on different values.
Game theorists have shown that in a repeated game non-cooperative
players may settle upon more efficient outcomes than a repeated play of
one-shot Nash outcomes. Intertemporal Friedman (1971) type trigger
strategies on the part of the private sector can enforce 'good behaviour'
of the monetary authorities. In the standard Barro-Gordon monetary
policy game a low-inflation outcome can be enforced if the private sector
adopts a trigger strategy, which takes the form of a reversion to the high
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discretionary wage inflation (the Nash equilibrium of the single-period
game) if the central bank engages in surprise inflation. 28
In the present exchange rate policy game an obvious trigger strategy
for private exchange market participants is to (1) start by setting INV/
equal to zero; (2) continue setting INV/ = 0 in later periods unless the
central bank has carried out a nonzero volume of intervention, and if the
central bank has deviated from setting l~ = 0, revert to the non-
cooperative strategy for the rest of the game. However, the exchange
rate policy game under consideration in this chapter contains a stochastic
element. A new shock to the exchange rate E, is drawn each period.
Canzoneri and Henderson (1991, pp. 95-9) show that in stochastic
repeated games there are limits to the efficiency that can be achieved
through tbe use of trigger strategies. For instance, in a period in which a
large positive (negative) sbock to the exchange rate E, is drawn, it will be
beneficial for the central bank to set I~ < 0 (INV, > 0) and try to
surprise private exchange market participants ratber than to continue to
set l~ = INV/ = O. Consequently, the trigger mechanism does not
produce the right incentives.
7.5.2 Unequal status of the players
In Section 7.4.8 the notion of central bank independence was
incorporated in the exchange rate policy game. The central bank's weight
to exchange rate stability, 0', was taken to measure the inverse of the
political independence of the central bank. It was argued that the greater
the independence given to the central bank by law, the smaller the
pressure on the central bank to systematically counteract speculative
shocks to the exchange rate. This interpretation of the value of 0' is not
without flaws. It could, for .instance, be read as implying that
independent central banks do not care about exchange rate fluctuations.
But what if a central bank is independent and yet has a high aversion to
non-fundamental exchange rate changes? The policy loss function (7.27)
with a high value of 0' -may still apply.
Here a crucial difference between exchange rate policy and monetary
policy comes to the fore. A primary responsibility of the central bank in
the field of monetary policy is the continuous provision of base money to
the domestic economy. The only discretion lies in the choice of the
planned rate of growth of the money supply. By contrast, in the field of
exchange rate policy tbe very involvement of tbe central bank in the
determination of the exchange rate is at its own discretion. An
independent central bank can choose to abstain from any intervention in
the foreign exchange market. Put differently, the choice of the volume of
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intervention can imply an outright hands-off policy. This additional
degree of freedom improves on the status of the central bank. In fact, it
can be argued that the exchange rate policy game between an indepen-
dent central bank and a representative speculator is a Stackelberg game.
In a Stackelberg game the players have no equal status. One of the
players, the leader, acts before the other player, the follower. Therefore,
there is an asymmetry in the availability of information to both players.
The information set of the follower includes the action of the leader.
Although the leader can not observe the follower's action, he can take
advantage of the fact that the follower reacts on his action. On the
assumption that the leader knows the exact shape of the follower's
reaction function, the leader can choose the point on the follower's
reaction function which minimizes his own loss function. Thus, the
follower's reaction is endogenized in the leader's optimization problem.
Given the point made earlier, an independent central bank acts as a
leader in the Stackelberg game. As a Stackelberg leader the central bank
by definition acts before private speculators. Table 7.4 depicts the timing
of events in the exchange rate policy game when the central bank is a
Stackelberg leader. The relevant Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained, as
before, by minimizing the central bank's loss function in (7.27) but only
after substituting into it the speculator's reaction function.
Upon substitution of INV,e = INY" the loss function of the central
bank reduces to
2
L CB = .£.- (INV)2 + ~ U/ INV + bE . 0 + E)2 (7.37)
I 2 '2 I I
Differentiating with respect to INV, and equating to zero yields an
expression for the equilibrium volume of intervention for the case of
Stackelberg leadership of the central bank:
1~ (7.38)
A striking implication of this expression is the absence of an intervention
bias. Apparently, a central bank which acts as a leader does not intervene
at all when the portfolio balance channel of intervention does not work,
i.e. when bV=O.
Stackelberg leadership of the central bank is one extreme. One can
also think of a central bank which completely lacks independence from
the government. In that case the central bank may be forced by the
minister of finance to smooth fluctuations in the exchange rate by means
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Table 7.4 Timing of events in the exchange rate policy game when the
central bank is Stackelberg leader
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
A shock to the c, is observed The central bank sets INV,.
exchange rate e, is by both parties Thereby, INV,e is determined
drawn endogenously
of sterilized interventions. Under symmetric information the private
sector is aware of the low status of the central bank and its obligation to
repair any damage to the exchange rate. Private speculators will act as a
Stackelberg leader in the exchange rate policy game. This changes the
third stage of the game. Upon observing the shock to the exchange rate
c" private speculators set INV/. Thereby, INV, is determined
endogenously.
An expression for the expected volume of intervention in the case of
Stackelberg leadership of private speculators is obtained by minimizing
their loss function in (7.28) with respect to I~e after substituting into it
the central bank's reaction function in (7.29). Upon substituting the
resulting expression into the reaction function of the central bank it
appears that
(7.39)
Thus, for the exchange rate policy game described by equations
(7.26)-(7.28) there is no difference between Stackelberg leadership of
the private sector and equal status of the players which leads to the Nash
equilibrium as described in Section 7.4.6. This result depends crucially
on the shape of the loss function of private speculators. Table 7.5
summarizes the impact of strategic interaction both for the loss of the
central bank and the loss of the private sector.
7.5.3 Asymmetric information
In practice, for individual central banks one observes that periods of
prolonged interventions in one direction are alternated by mostly much
longer periods with no official operations in foreign exchange at all. This
discontinuity in the interaction between the central bank and private
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speculators may be a deliberate part of the intervention strategy. In order
to keep away from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium the central bank may
try to prevent speculators from learning the exact shape of its objective
function.
The loss function in equation (7.36) reflects the central bank's aversion
to non-fundamental exchange rate changes. However, it does not take
account of the fact that in some instances the central bank may perceive
large exchange rate changes to be less harmful than in other instances.
For example, when the level of the exchange rate is broadly in line with
the economic fundamentals of the domestic and foreign economy the
central bank's weight to exchange rate stability may be low. An
additional complicating factor is that the fundamentals themselves may
change over time. Furthermore, the weight to exchange rate stability may
depend on the central bank's perception of the strength of the underlying
trend in the exchange rate. When the vast majority of private exchange
market participants has a firm belief about the future course of the
exchange rate the central bank is not likely to engage in intervention even
if this exchange rate pattern is out of line with what it regards as
desirable. Under these circumstances, the chance of turning around the
market sentiment is small. At the same time, the chance of losing money
with official operations in foreign exchange is large. Finally, as put
forward by Cukierman (1992, pp. 161-2) the central bank's preferences
may change to accommodate changes in the social and political pressures
it feels. Apparently, Cukierman assumes that the central bank is unable
to withstand these pressures because of lacking political independence.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) analyse the consequences of shifting
objectives of the monetary authorities in a monetary policy game.
Analogous to their approach, changing objectives in the exchange rate
policy game can be captured by specifying a as a stochastic variable with
the following characteristics:
A>O
o s p s (7.40)
where A is the mean, publicly known, value of at. The term P, is the
stochastic component of policymaker preferences.
Clearly, shifting objectives of the central bank per se do not imply a
deviation from the symmetric information Nash equilibrium. In the
present exchange rate policy game, when private speculators know the
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realizations of a, at the beginning of period t, they still can calculate the
volume of intervention the central bank will carry out in response to their
setting of INV,'. What results is the suboptimal Nash equilibrium as
derived in equation (7.31) whereby different realizations of at lead to
different values for the optimal amount of intervention.
Things become different if the policymaker has private information
about his own preferences. For instance, this is the case if in period t the
realization of a, (or p,) is known by the central bank but not by the
public. The central bank is as ignorant as the speculators about future
innovations u to the central bank's objectives. However, based on its
knowledge of the current value of a, (or p,), the central bank can produce
a more precise forecast of future values of a, than the speculators.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) ingeniously introduce a learning process
for individuals in the monetary policy game. Their argument can be
applied straightforwardly to the exchange rate policy game.
Suppose speculators know the stochastic structure of the process which
leads to changes in a" that is, suppose that they know the values of a}
and p. Assume, in addition, that speculators obtain a precise observation
on PI-2 at the beginning of period t prior to their position taking on the
foreign exchange market in that period. At the same time, initially they
remain ignorant about PI_I' However, they know that P is serially
correlated according to equation (7.40). Moreover, the volume of
intervention in period t-l contains information about the value of PI_I'
Consequently, speculators will use INV,_I' the volume of intervention in
period t-l, to update their forecast of period t's volume intervention.
The very fact that learning becomes an important feature of the
behaviour of speculators has important consequences for exchange rate
policy. Learning, essentially introduced by the assumption that the
central bank has private information about its own preferences, causes
current decisions of the central bank on the volume of intervention to
affect the expectation of speculators regarding the next period's volume
of intervention. As was the case in the static exchange rate policy game
analysed above (see equation (7.29», the central bank will feel the need
to at least partially accommodate expected interventions. However, when
an intertemporal policy loss function like in equation (7.36) applies, the
central bank takes into consideration the adverse effect of its current
action on the next period's losses. A higher actual volume of intervention
in period t leads to a higher expected volume. of intervention in
consecutive periods. Through the accommodation of expectations the
actual volume of intervention in later periods rises too. The costs
involved in intervening prevent the central bank from choosing the same
volume of intervention as under complete information.
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Cukierman and Meltzer assume that policymakers do not have perfect
control over the rate of monetary growth. They postulate an identically
and independently distributed random monetary control error. By
assumption, the realization of this control error is not in the information
set of the central bank when it determines the planned rate of monetary
growth. However, the variance of the control error in the money supply
process is publicly known. It appears to be an important parameter.
When it is very large the latest money growth figures contain relatively
little information about the changing objectives of the central bank. As a
consequence rational individuals, who are assumed to know the variance
of the monetary control error exactly, will not pay much attention to past
inflation in forecasting the upcoming rate of inflation. It follows that the
disciplining effect of learning is reduced and the rate of inflation actually
chosen by the central bank will approximate the rate under symmetric
information.
Imperfect control of the central bank's instrument is also an issue in
the present exchange rate policy game. Foreign exchange interventions
are the sole instrument of the central bank in the exchange rate policy
game. The central bank tries to stabilize the exchange rate by means of
surprise interventions. In fact, the unexpected part of an intervention is
equal to the difference between the volume of intervention the central
bank is reported to have carried out ex post (INV,R) and the ex ante
expected volume of intervention (lNV,). However, central banks do not
have perfect control over the volume of intervention that is reported in
the fmancial press." The relation between actual (INV,) and reported
(INV,R) intervention can be represented as follows
t/;, - N(O, (5,/) (7.41)
where t/;, is a random intervention control error representing the central
bank's inability to perfectly control the information speculators obtain
about the volume of intervention.
For the monetary policy game Cukierman (1992, p. 175) shows that
the inflationary bias disappears completely when (5,/ tends to zero and if,
in addition, p = {3 = 1. There seems to be no reason why this result
would not carryover to the intervention bias in the exchange rate policy
game. Thus, the equilibrium volume of intervention is equal to zero
when three conditions are met. Firstly, the central bank has perfect
control over the volume of intervention that is reported in the fmancial
press. Secondly, the central bank cares about the future as much as it
cares about the present ({3= 1). The equal weighing of current benefits
and future losses in the intertemporal loss function (7.36) reduces the
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likelihood of the central bank engaging in unexpectedly large intervention
operations. Thirdly, the stochastic component of the central bank's
preferences exhibits hysteresis (p = 1). The second condition implies
that the central bank does not feel tempted to engage in surprise
interventions because it weighs the short-term benefits and the long-term
costs equally. The third condition implies that past volumes of
intervention are very informative for predicting the current volume. This
encourages speculators to carefully track the intervention record of the
central bank. In turn, this diminishes the room for surprise interventions.
Every central bank may wish to have some room for influencing the
course of the exchange rate. On the assumption that only unexpected
interventions are effective, central banks have an interest in maintaining a
positive value of the intervention control parameter a,/. This is because
the larger the variance of the intervention control error the harder it is
for private exchange market participants to distinguish between changes
in the volume of reported intervention brought about by persistent
changes in the objectives of the central bank (vt) and those caused by
transitory control errors (1/;t)' The public knows the average variability of
v and 1/;. However, when only or mainly Vt_1 is responsible for an
increase in INVt_1, speculators underpredict it. This underprediction
enables the central bank to alter the course of the exchange rate.
Furthermore, when cr '" is high speculators pay little attention to past
volumes of intervention. As a result the effect of the current volume of
intervention on future expectations is small. This makes the future cost to
the central bank of current intervention small too.
In order to let interventions have some leverage on speculators'
behaviour their announcement effect has to be maximized. Consequently,
central banks sometimes carry out highly visible interventions. At the
same time, to be able to reap the benefits from their information
advantage over speculators, central banks have an interest in preventing
the financial press from giving exact reports on the incidence and volume
of intervention. In other words, it is beneficial for the central bank to
maintain some degree of ambiguity regarding (shocks to) its preferences
and, hence, regarding the exact volume of intervention. The general
refusal of central banks to release detailed up-to-date intervention data
seems to be a practical implication of this.
Cukierman and Meltzer assume that individuals in the private sector
only use past observations of money growth to predict present money
growth. Balke and Haslag (1992) generalize their model. They allow
individuals to 'purchase' additional information about innovations in the
policymaker's preferences. Balke and Haslag assume that the more
resources agents spent on information acquisition (,central bank
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watching'), the more precise are their estimates of the preference
innovation (a} is lower). As a result agents place less weight on past
realizations of money growth and the central bank loses (some of) its
information advantage. Obviously, the central bank will try to safeguard
its information advantage over the private sector. One way of doing that
is to increase the variance of the money control error. However, Balke
and Haslag show that this is not very effective; it merely induces more
intense central bank watching on the part of the private sector. From
their analysis it follows that the monetary authorities should be more
secretive. That increases the private sector's marginal cost of acquiring
information about the authorities' shifting objectives and thus decreases
the intensity of central bank watching.
Information is a highly valuable resource in the foreign exchange
market. Private exchange market participants are very eager to detect
changes in the objectives of the central bank. At the same time, the
central bank requires an information advantage to render interventions
effective. Two crucial implications for the exchange rate policy game can
be derived from Balke and Haslag's generalization of the original 1986
Cukierman and Meltzer article. First, a necessary condition for
maintaining the information advantage of the central bank in the
exchange rate policy game is that the variance of the intervention control
error is larger than zero. This translates into the requirement that the
public is by no means able to acquire detailed and up-to-date actual
intervention data. Otherwise, private exchange market participants would
spend the necessary amount of resources to get access to the intervention
data. Second, the central bank has to be very careful with public
statements about the stance of exchange rate policy. Speculators are
willing to devote a lot of efforts to interpret these statements in order to
extract information about the central bank's shifting objectives. Central
bank watching is intensified up to the point where the marginal gain of
an improvement of their estimate of VI exceeds the marginal costs of
information acquisition. Public statements may thus undermine the
effectiveness of interventions.
Obviously, public statements by (monetary) authorities may also be a
deliberate part of exchange rate policy. The authorities may for instance
try to 'talk down' the value of a currency. In the latter case, the aim is to
actively use the eagerness of exchange market participants to detect
information about changing policy objectives. However, there is an
abundance of anecdotal evidence pointing at the problems with these
public statements. Often they are misinterpreted by the financial press,
leading to confusion rather than clarity.
Reasoning along the lines of the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) model,
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it turned out to be beneficial for the central bank to maintain some
degree of ambiguity regarding the exact volume of intervention.
Analogously, Bhattacharya and Weller (1992) develop a theoretical
explanation of why central banks do not make precise announcements of
their exchange rate targets. Bhattacharya and Weller assume that the
central bank 'leans against the wind' in the sense that it seeks to stabilize
the spot rate around a target. This target may be inconsistent with
exchange market fundamentals in the short run. As before, it is assumed
that the central bank seeks to balance expected losses on exchange
market transactions against its success in achieving its targeting objective.
Bhattacharya and Weller recognize that the typical size of daily
intervention is very small relative to the total volume of trade on the
foreign exchange market. However, they argue that the central bank is
not just another market participant. Rather, it should be viewed as an
'informed insider' in the foreign exchange market. Moreover, compared
to the many individual private exchange market participants, the central.
bank is a large player in the market. Therefore, it is able to use its inside
information about its own exchange rate target to limit the costs it incurs
during interventions.
Bhattacharya and Weller assume that the central bank has more
information about its own target than the private sector and that it acts
strategically. They find that only when the central bank does not reveal
its target to the market is sterilized intervention effective. This is because
if the central bank does reveal its target, speculators no longer face any
uncertainty about the next period's spot rate (Sl)' Consequently,
speculators will take unbounded positions in the forward market unless
the current one-period forward rate (Fo) is equal to Sl' This implies that
the central bank loses all ability to manipulate the exchange rate.
As long as the central bank's target exchange rate is not known
exactly, intervention reveals information to the market. Bhattacharya and
Weller show that for certain parameter values in their model relatively
small interventions have a significant impact upon the spot exchange rate.
The market-clearing condition for the forward market takes the form
(7.42)
The aggregate speculative demand function takes the form
(7.43)
where
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oe the quantity of forward foreign exchange purchased by the
central bank
QS the quantity of forward foreign exchange purchased by private
speculators
E, a random variable which denotes the fundamentals.
Bhattacharya and Weller analyse the characteristics of az as a function of
the speculators' precision on the distribution of the target exchange rate.
The features to note are as follows:
First, as the precision approaches zero, ~ approaches a positive limiting value.
Second, a2 is monotonically declining in the precision. Third, as the speculators'
precision on the distribution of the target exchange rate approaches infinity, ~
approaches a limiting value which may be positive or negative, depending upon
parameter values. (Bhattacharya and Weller 1992, p. 14)
Clearly, if az is close to zero, relatively small interventions will have a
significant impact upon the spot exchange rate. Moreover, Q2 - the
market response to central bank intervention - can have either sign.
Bhattacharya and Weller establish that speculators always revise
upwards their conditional expectation of the future spot rate in response
to an increase in the current spot rate. However, the covered interest
parity condition implies that, with the domestic and the foreign interest
rate assumed constant, an increase in the current spot rate leads to an
equal increase in the current forward rate." Referring to equation (7.7)
it can easily be seen that an increase in the conditional expectation of the
next period's spot rate only leads speculators to buy in the forward
market if this increase exceeds the impact of the change in So on the
forward rate Fo. If it does Q2 is negative. If it does not az is positive."
In Chapter 6 distinct periods were identified over which the spot
exchange rate moved in opposite directions in response to intervention.
Bhattacharya and Weller's theoretical result is consistent with these empi-
rical findings. It also gives an indication of the causal factors involved.
7.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter is a first attempt to develop a positive theory of central bank
intervention. Initially, an exchange rate policy game is analysed under
symmetric information. The central bank is assumed to systematically
resist realized shocks to the exchange rate. It is shown how the implied
intervention behaviour in combination with the strategic interaction
among the central bank and private speculators creates an 'intervention
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bias'. This bias is found to increase with the central bank's aversion to
non-fundamental exchange rate changes. In the Nash equilibrium of the
game a nonzero shock to the exchange rate induces a nonzero volume of
intervention. However, the interventions are fully anticipated.
Consequently, the interventions can not reduce the impact' of shocks to
the exchange rate through the expectations channel.
A dynamic extension of the exchange rate policy game with symmetric
information does not lead to a more favourable picture regarding the
central bank's ability to limit exchange rate changes around PPP. It is
shown in the paper that the intervention bias disappears when the central
bank, presumably by virtue of its political independence, acts as a
Stackelberg leader in the exchange rate policy game. Stackelberg leader-
ship, however, does not tum foreign exchange intervention working
through the expectations channel into an instrument which is effective in
equilibrium. It appears that a central bank can make interventions have
some leverage on the exchange rate by maintaining an information
advantage over the private sector concerning changes in its own
objectives and by conserving a certain difference between the actual
volume of intervention reported in the financial press.
A Positive Theory of Intervention 199
APPENDIX A7.1 A STANDARD STATIC
MONETARY POLICY GAME
Following Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) and
Milesi-Ferretti (1993) this appendix sets out the standard static monetary
policy game between workers who sign wage contracts and the monetary
authorities who implement monetary policy. The aim of this appendix is
to derive expressions for the optimal time-consistent monetary policy in
the domestic and foreign economy. In Section 7.4.2 it is assumed that
private exchange market participants recognize that the underlying trend
in the exchange rate is determined by PPP considerations. Clearly, based
on the assumption that they have at least the same information as trade
unions at home and abroad, they can compute the expected inflation rate
for the domestic and the foreign economy and, hence, the expected PPP-
implied change in the exchange rate. The latter is equal to the difference
between the expected value of the time-consistent rate of inflation in the
domestic and the foreign country (equation (7.25) in the main text).
An open economy with a floating exchange rate produces one
homogeneous good whose price is determined on world markets.
Domestic output y, is determined by a 'Lucas supply curve' relation:"
E - O: E 2 - a 2'-I Il, - , ,-I Il, - I' (A7.1)
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. yM is the market-
clearing level of output, p, is the domestic price level, w, is the nominal
wage, Il, is a supply shock and E,_1 is the operator of rational
expectations based on information available at time t-l. Domestic output
y, will be above its market-clearing level yM if real wages in the domestic
economy fall or if the supply shock Il, takes a positive value.
The timing of events in the monetary policy game is as follows: first,
workers sign wage contracts based on their rational expectation of period
t's inflation rate; second, the supply shock is observed; finally, the
monetary authorities choose monetary policy and production takes place.
Table A7.1 Timing of events in a monetary policy game
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Workers sign wage contracts Supply shock u, Authorities choose
based on E, I 7r, is observed rate of inflation 1r
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Workers attempt to maintain a constant level of the real wage, which
is normalized to zero for simplicity:
(A7.2)
Because of the turung assumption, the 'information set' of workers
includes the structure of production and of monetary authorities'
preferences, but does not include the realization of the supply shock.
Suppose existing distortions make the market-clearing level of output
yM lower than its socially optimal level if, as in Barro and Gordon
(1983b).33 The preferences of the monetary authorities are described by
a standard quadratic loss function:
e (y _ kyM)2"2 I k > 1 (A7.3)
where 7r1' equal to PI - PI-I' is the inflation rate. Equation (A7.3)
implies that the optimal rate of inflation is zero.
The monetary authorities are unable to commit themselves to a given
rate of inflation before wage contracts are signed. They therefore choose
the rate of inflation that minimizes the loss function (A7.3), taking wage
contracts as given. Because the market-clearing level of output is too
low, the monetary authorities have an incentive to reduce real wages by
creating surprise inflation, in order to raise output. However, in
equilibrium it cannot accomplish this in a systematic fashion. Also, the
monetary authorities have a margin for stabilization of the supply shock
before monetary policy is chosen. Minimizing (A7.3) subject to (A7.1)
yields the following optimal inflation rate:
(A7.4)
where H = (k - 1) yM and the expected rate of inflation EI_I 7r1 is equal
to EI_I PI - PI-I. The term H is the wedge between the desired level of
output and the market-clearing level: it measures the incentive of the
monetary authorities to create surprise inflation, and therefore the
intensity of the time-inconsistency problem in domestic monetary policy.
Workers are assumed to have rational expections. Since the monetary
authorities' preferences are known, they will predict inflation using
(A7.4) and they will ask for inflation compensation accordingly:
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(A7.5)
The time-consistent rate of inflation will therefore be given by:
ir, = () 'A H - (A7.6)
Clearly, apart from the term H, steady-state inflation also depends
positively on both the weight assigned by the monetary authorities to
raising domestic output to a desired level which is above the market-
clearing level (() and the responsiveness of domestic output to decreases
in the real wage ('A).
Analogously, the predicted rate of inflation for the foreign economy
will be equal to
(A7.7)
Obviously, similar monetary policy games at home and abroad may lead
to different expected rates of inflation and optimal time-consistent rates
of inflation for the domestic and foreign economy. The responsiveness of
output to changes in the real wage ('A), the difference between the
market-clearing level of output and its socially optimal level (H) and/or
monetary authorities' preferences (() may be different in any pair of
countries (see, e.g. Cukierman 1992, p. 29).
It was assumed that private exchange market participants have at least
the same information as trade unions at home and abroad. Therefore,
they can compute the expected inflation rate for the domestic and the
foreign economy and, hence, the expected PPP-implied change in the
exchange rate. The latter is equal to the difference between the expected
value of the time-consistent rate of inflation in the domestic and the
foreign country:
(A7.8)
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NOTES
1. According to Neumann (1984, p. 226) the flow model of the exchange rate analysed
here 'is certainly close to the exchange market view of most policymakers'.
2. By assumption, the financial assets are denominated in domestic currency. One unit of
domestic currency invested at the domestic interest rate it will have grown after one
period to (I +it) , which, if converted into foreign currency at the spot rate St+I' is equal
to (1+irl/St+1 units of foreign currency. The representative investor may as well opt to
exchange his initial unit of domestic currency into foreign currency at the spot rate S, at
the beginning of the period. At the end of the period his investment will be worth
(I +it)/St units of foreign currency. Clearly, it is profitable to hold fmancial assets
denominated in domestic currency as long as
I + i, I + it" 1 + i S'_I




s - S it - i,·> ,-I t If i,- is small and
--S-t-' I + i,-
i, - it" , this condition
S - S
simplifies to i, - i," > _'--I __ t, or, in logs it - it" > S'.I - St's,
3. The following 'exchange rate equation' can be derived from (7.1) and (7.7):
(N7.1)
minimizing the loss function in (7.9) with respect to INVt yields
aL,eY t. es, Bs,
'INV ~ 2 (s, - St) -- ~ 0 where ~ 'Y Vars,
o , aIN~ a/NYt
(N7.2)
Substituting equation (N7.1) into (N7.2) and solving for IW, gives
(N7.3)
By definition, RP" the expected risk premium on assets denominated in domestic
currency is equal to RPt = fr - E, St+I' where t; denotes the log of the one-period
forward rate. After making use of the interest arbitrage condition, i, - i; = t, - s.. the
first bracketed expression on the right-hand side of equation (N7 .3) can be rewritten into
(N7.4)
Substituting (N7.4) into (N7.3) yields (7.10).
4. For supporters of structural exchange rate models this may be a disappointing
specification of the exchange rate equation. However, short-term exchange rate
movements do not seem to be driven by fundamentals according to an identifiable
relationship. The many forces working on exchange rates do not show a clear pattern
and in sufficiently long samples they even out making the drift a equal to zero.
5. In economic terms this means that shocks to the exchange rate have a permanent effect.
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In other words, the exchange rate does not return to its starting value after a shock has
occurred.
6. Of course, it is possible that the factor a + S,_I - S,T on the one hand and the factor f,
on the other hand embody opposite signals as to the direction of intervention. It is even
possible that the central bank minimizes the value of its loss function by refraining from
intervention. This is the case when a + S,_I _ S,T = - €,.
7. To be sure, interventions in the DMf$ market are mostly conducted in the second half of
the European Segment of the global foreign exchange market when both the European
and US currency markets are open (Goodhart and Hesse 1993). Thus, period 1 could be
defmed as running from say 15.00 hours (Central European Time) on day t-l to 15.00
hours (CET) on the next day the foreign exchange market is open.
8. The factor of proportionality for the costs of intervention, c, is exogenous in the present
model. One can easily imagine, however, that the potential losses from intervention
increase with the predictability of the actions of the central bank.
9. Only when the central bank assigns a sufficiently high weight to limiting exchange rate
changes (high value of the coefficient a) is it not bothered by the costs of intervention
and the reaction coefficient reduces to the one in (7.16). This follows directly from
lim






c'+a(o')' 0" C' > 0 as we assumed that OV > O.
iJa (c' +a(o')')'
This section is based on Almekinders (l994b).
Some countries, like for instance Finland, Norway and Sweden, have indeed resorted to
devaluation policies in the recent past. After the widening of the ERM bands on August
2, 1993 the intra-European exchange rates are allowed to deviate 15 per cent on either
side from their central parities. Many proponents of exchange rate stability feared that
some European monetary authorities would engage in competitive devaluations of their
currencies. However, exchange rates remained remarkably stable. Apparently the
monetary authorities foresaw that private investors would respond to devaluations by
demanding a higher return on investments denominated in the weaker currencies thereby
raising (long -term) interest rates at a time when there was a perceived need to lower
them drastically.
Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF provides that 'a member shall ...
avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive
advantage over other members' (IMF 1993, p. 5).
In a Nash equilibrium neither of the players can improve on his own situation given the
action of the other player.
The shock to the exchange rate may exhibit persistence according to €, = €,_I + b + X,.
where X, is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance ax' and
b, the drift of the e-process, is the constant and predictable part of the shock. In this
section the exact specification of the shock is not important as speculators are supposed
to form expectations after its realization.
What stands out from Dominguez and Frankel (1993a, Figures 5.1 and 5.4-5.13) is that
the Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank refrain from
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efforts by these central banks are of the order of $100 to $300 million. In April 1992,
the daily average of global spot market turnover net of double-counting arising from
both local and cross-border interbank operations was estimated to be $400 billion. This
implies a 15 per cent rise from the corresponding estimate of $350 billion for April 1989
(Bank for International Settlements J 993).
18. Chapter 2 illustrates how intervention operations that, for example, increase the current
relative supply of German mark to US dollar assets which private investors are obliged
to accept into their portfolios, force a decrease in the price of German mark assets.
19. It can easily be seen from equation (7.25) that the effect of (unexpected) interventions in
support of the foreign currency may not be large enough to fully compensate for the
downward pressure on the exchange rate, i.e. when
o < OV lNV, + OE (lNV, - /NV,') < la + E,I·
20.
In that case, casual observation of the resulting exchange rate movement, ~ s" leads
one to conclude that the interventions were not effective. This touches upon the familiar
methodological problem that, in practice, the rate of appreciation a + e that would have
occurred in the absence of intervention is not known.
In Krugman's (1991) target zone model the anticipation of unlimited unsterilized
interventions by the central bank at the edges of the band induces an S-shaped exchange
rate pattern inside the band, the so-called honeymoon effect. There is no such effect in
the model here. This is because the central bank is assumed to use monetary policy
instruments only for domestic policy objectives. This assumption, which seems realistic
for most large industrialized countries, diminishes the scope for central bank intervention
rather dramatically. Private speculators know that interventions have no significant
impact on the exchange rate as long as they do not come by surprise. Hence the absence
of a honeymoon effect.
Blackburn and Christensen (1989, p. 12) address issues of intra-private sector behaviour
in a general game-theoretic context.
O"SE(OV+QE) ,< 1 as long as c- > - (> 0" (0" + 01). This holds by assumption.
c2 +"'(0" +01)2
This figure is based on a similar one in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 597).
At points to the left (right) of N, the private sector chooses INV,' and the central bank
responds by actually carrying outlNV, such that/NV, > /NV,' (INV, < [NV,').
It can be shown that the reaction coefficient in (7.23) is smaller in absolute value than
h . (7 3 ) . "'0" < (>(0" +OE) 'f' .E 0 hi h . bt e one ID . 1 , r.e, , 1 c: '" u > w IC IS true y
c2 +"'(0")2 c2 +(>0"(0" +01)
assumption.
It can be shown that the value of the loss function in (7.33) is larger than the one in
(7.24) if OE > 0 which is true by assumption.
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a) show that the Alesina (1988, 1989) synthetic indicator of
central bank independence is internally inconsistent and does not qualify as an index.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT) (1991) develop an index of political and
economic independence which is very broad. Because they use eight criteria in
determining the degree of independence, it can be argued that the essential characteristics
of central bank independence are watered down. Alesina and Summers (1993) average
the Alesina index and the GMT index of political and economic independence.
Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1994) provide a resolution of the non-uniqueness of reputational
equilibria in the Barro-Gordon model.
Klein (1993) and Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1993) show that there are systematic
and significant differences between daily volumes of intervention actually carried out by
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likelihood of intervention being reported given that it actually occurred was 72 per cent
and that the likelihood of intervention actually occurring given that it was reported was
88 per cent.
30. Sterilized intervention operations usually lead to changes in interest rates at home and
abroad. However, the authors focus on the effect of small but informative interventions.
Therefore, the assumption of constant interest rates is not very restrictive.
31. For a critical set of parameter values a, can be zero. In that case speculative positions in
the forward market are independent of the spot rate and the spot rate is indeterminate.
32. Argy (1992) sets out how equation (A7 .l) is derived.
33. After reviewing many studies Blackburn and Christensen (1989, p. 10) conclude that
'these distortions are usually alleged to arise from the existence of taxes and transfers (in
particular, income taxation and unemployment compensation), but could also reflect the
presence of trade unions or minimum wage laws that prevent voluntary decisions over
work and leisure'.
8. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In principle, exchange rate stability is a public good. However, since the
demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates the
exchange rates of the major currencies have been highly volatile. To
comply with Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund as amended in 1992 central banks are obliged to promote
a stable exchange rate system and hence to 'counter disorderly exchange
market conditions'. It is often argued that closer coordination and
cooperation among countries on monetary and fiscal policies would
reduce fluctuations in exchange rates and hence foster economic growth.
However, in general, the monetary and fiscal authorities of large
industrial countries give priority to domestic policy objectives.
Chapter 1 of this book describes the exact implications of an operation
in foreign exchange carried out by the domestic central bank to change
the exchange rate of the domestic currency vis-a-vis one or more foreign
currencies. It appears that an official purchase of foreign currency
conducted to curb an appreciation of the domestic currency eventually
leads to an increase in the domestic money stock. In Chapter 2 it turns
out that this increase in the domestic money supply in itself is very
conducive to limiting the rise in the value of the domestic currency.
However, the monetary authorities of most large countries do not want
exchange rate policy to interfere with monetary policy. Consequently,
central banks routinely neutralize the money-market effect of their
interventions in the foreign exchange market. At first sight, the resulting
sterilized interventions allow the central banks to strike a perfect balance
between trying to limit exchange rate fluctuations on the one hand and
pursuing an independent monetary policy on the other hand. However,
the crucial question which comes up is: are sterilized interventions
effective? The theoretical models surveyed in Chapter 2 imply that the
potential effectiveness of sterilized interventions depends very much on
the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. Earlier models usually
assume that the foreign exchange market is efficient in the sense that
market participants use some structural model as a yardstick when taking
positions on the foreign exchange market. Chapter 2 makes clear that in
these models sterilized intervention can only be effective when risk-
averse investors believe assets denominated in different currencies to
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have different risk characteristics. In that case, a swap of domestic bonds
for foreign bonds in the portfolio of the private sector brought about by a
sterilized purchase of foreign currency by the domestic central bank can
lead to an appreciation of foreign currency. However, the empirical
studies surveyed in Chapter 3 do not find a systematic effect of sterilized
intervention through the so-called portfolio balance channel. Moreover,
the scale of intervention relative to the magnitude of flows in the foreign
exchange market and relative to the magnitude of stocks of private
foreign assets is insignificant. Therefore, on the basis of casual
empiricism the potential for central banks to cause a significant
imbalance in investors' portfolios seems negligible.
Chapter 2 does suggest that the scope for intervention changes quite
dramatically when one is willing to drop the assumption that the foreign
exchange market is efficient in the sense that market participants base
trading in the foreign exchange market on some structural model.
However, the literature on how the inefficiency of the foreign exchange
market opens up distinct channels through which intervention can affect
the exchange rate is still in its infancy. Some of the empirical studies
surveyed in Chapter 3 suggest that official exchange market operations
which create expectations of changes in monetary policy or which
embody another sufficient 'news' -content appear to have a chance of
affecting the exchange rate significantly.
It is a fact of observation that central banks intervene in case of strains
on the foreign exchange markets. Moreover, the insights presented thus
far do not rule the possibility that out that sterilized interventions can
affect the exchange rate. Chapters 4 to 6 report on the results of original
empirical investigations into the objectives and effectiveness of
interventions conducted by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System. These investigations were made possible by the availability of
daily intervention data of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
System in the Deutsche Mark/uS dollar market and the Japanese yen/US
dollar market.
Chapters 4-6 abandon the traditional structural exchange rate models.
The failure of these models in empirical tests is well documented in the
literature. Discontent with the performance of structural exchange rate
models in explaining the actual behaviour of exchange rates has led many
economists to adopt new research strategies in exploring the field of
exchange rate economics. Within a short time an extensive literature has
developed which studies the statistical properties of short-term returns in
the foreign exchange market and other financial markets. The purport of
this so-called GARCH literature is that volatility in daily returns is
predictable in most financial markets. In several applications it has been
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shown that there isa considerable persistence in the effects of shocks in
one period onto the conditional variance of exchange rates in consecutive
periods. The material in Chapters 4 and 5 is novel because it
incorporates the insights derived from the GARCH literature into the
decision-making process of the central bank. It is well known that the
establishment of the Plaza Agreement of September 22, 1985 marked the
beginning of enhanced coordination of exchange rate policies among the
G-7 countries. Chapter 4 shows that a GARCH model for the exchange
rate can capture the stabilizing effect of the policy coordination on the
course of the Deutsche Mark US dollar exchange rate. More importantly,
the Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve System are found to have
taken account of the predictability of volatility when they intervened in
the foreign exchange market over the post-Louvre period February 23,
1987 to October 1989. The estimation results presented in Chapter 4
indicate that both the Bundesbank. and the Federal Reserve System
conducted their official foreign exchange operations consistently. Both
central banks appear to have tried to counter 'disorderly market
conditions' from day to day. A 'leaning against the wind' policy appears
to have prevailed across four post-Louvre subsamples of at least three
months. The estimation results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that both
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve tried to counteract appreciations
of their own currency more strongly than depreciations. After having
established that both central banks conducted their interventions
consistently, it is straightforward to ask the question whether these
interventions were effective. It is well known that there are a lot of
problems involved in estimating the effectiveness of interventions.
Chapter 6 makes two contributions to understanding and testing the
effectiveness of central bank interventions. Firstl y, the simultaneity
problem between exchange rates and interventions is addressed explicitly.
Secondly, the direct effect of intervention on the level of the exchange
rate is estimated. The estimation results presented in Chapter 6 indicate
that, in general, interventions conducted by the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve System were not successful at systematically reversing
unwanted movements in the DM/$ and the ¥/$ exchange rate. What it
does imply is that there is no time-invariant one-to-one relationship with
interventions causing exchange rate movements. This confirms the
intuition of many private exchange market participants and central
bankers who manage the Foreign Exchange Trading Desk. The lack of a
systematic effect of interventions does not rule out the possibility that
private exchange market participants may sometimes be caught off
balance by the news of central banks entering the market. This insight
serves as a starting point to develop a positive theory of central bank
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intervention.
Chapter 7 uses the insights derived from the recent game-theoretic
approach to monetary and fiscal policy. Account is taken of the fact that
regular central bank transactions in foreign exchange are very small
compared to the daily turnover on the global foreign exchange market. In
Chapter 7 it is argued that the introduction of strategic behaviour by
central banks can alter the .scope for intervention dramatically. This
chapter analyses a simple exchange rate policy game between a central
bank and rational speculators under symmetric information. The central
bank tries to counteract shocks to the exchange rate by means of
sterilized intervention working through the expectations channel. Private
speculators resist being fooled. They anticipate the interventions. An
'intervention bias' results with an inefficiently high equilibrium volume
of .intervention which does not reduce the impact of shocks to the
exchange rate. Cross-country evidence lends support to the propositions
derived from the model that the more independent the central bank the
smaller and the more consistent the intervention efforts. This suggests
that countries should make their intervening authority independent from
politicians. This is a new result which complements the findings of the
topical literature on the political economy of central bank independence
which has been growing out of the game-theoretic approach to monetary
policy. A second finding relates to the general refusal of central banks to
release detailed-up-to date intervention data. In the framework of a game
with asymmetric information it turns out to be beneficial for the central
bank to maintain some degree of ambiguity regarding (shocks to) its
preferences and, hence, regarding the exact volume of intervention.
Official operations in foreign exchange only have a chance of affecting
the exchange rate if they convey new information to private market
participants regarding changes in the objectives of the central bank. This
is the case if the private sector has less information about shifting
objectives of the central bank. The central bank can conserve its
information advantage by not releasing exact intervention data.
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In 1973 viel het Bretton Woods systeem van vaste wisselkoersen uit
elkaar. Sindsdien is er in principe sprake van vrij zwevende
wisselkoersen. Regelmatig valt echter waar te nemen dat een of meer
centrale banken de prijsvorming op de valutamarkten trachten je
beinvloeden door middel van aan- of verkopen van vreemde valuta's,
Dergelijke transacties worden valutamarktinterventies genoemd. Dit
proefschrift onderzoekt de doelstellingen en effectiviteit van
valutamarktinterventies en tracht een antwoord te vinden op de vraag
waarom centrale banken blijven intervenieren terwijl hun acties over het
algemeen geen effect lijken te hebben.
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een exacte definitie van een interventie en bespreekt
de effecten van een interventie. Een initiele interventie waarvan het
geldmarkt effect wordt geneutraliseerd wordt een gesteriliseerde
interventie genoemd. Hoofdstuk 2 analyseert het effect van interventies
binnen het kader van gangbare wisselkoersmodellen. Het blijkt dat in
theorie ook gesteriliseerde interventies effect kunnen hebben op de
wisselkoers. Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een overzicht van de resultaten van het
empirisch onderzoek dat sinds 1973 is uitgevoerd naar de doelstellingen
en effectiviteit van valutamarktinterventies. De meeste studies vinden dat
centrale banken consistent en systematisch intervenieren. In veel gevallen
blijken de centrale banken een 'leaning against the wind'-beleid te hebben
gevoerd. Dit houdt in dat de centrale banken tegen de koersbeweging in
handelen (vreemde valuta's verkopen (kopen) als de koers van deze
valuta's stijgt (daaltj). Het is de bedoeling om daarmee het koersverloop
te stabiliseren. Echter, bestaand empirisch onderzoek concludeert over
het algemeen dat gesteriliseerde interventies geen systematisch effect op
het wisselkoerverioop hebben. Eigen empirisch onderzoek beschreven in
de Hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 6 bevestigt deze inzichten. Dit onderzoek
maakt gebruik van dagcijfers voor valutamarktinterventies van de
Deutsche Bundesbank en het Federal Reserve System. De
beschikbaarheid van dagcijfers maakt het mogelijk de korte-termijn
doelstellingen en effectiviteit van interventies te onderzoeken. In de
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Hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 6 wordt daarbij gebruik gemaakt van recente
inzichten uit de financieringsliteratuur. Deze literatuur besteedt veel
aandacht aan het fenomeen dat dagelijkse koersschommelingen op
financiele markten een patroon te zien geven van clusters van hoge
'returns' afgewisseld door relatief rustige perioden. Dit maakt dat de
volatiliteit van financiele markten tot op zekere hoogte voorspelbaar is.
Met andere woorden, als het vandaag rustig is op de wereldvalutamarkt
is de kans groot dat er ook morgen slechts kleine
wisselkoerveranderingen vallen te noteren. Als het vandaag hectisch is
zal er naar verwachting ook morgen veeI turbulentie zijn. De resultaten
van het empirisch onderzoek in Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 geeft aan dat de
Bundesbank en de Federal Reserve gebruik maken van de
voorspelbaarheid van de variantie van wisselkoersen. Naast korte-termijn
'leaning against the wind'-gedrag blijken de centrale banken ook te
intervenieren in reactie op een stijging van de conditionele variantie van
de Duitse Mark/ Amerikaanse dollar-koers.
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt gebruik gemaakt van een adequate
econometrische techniek om de korte-terrnijn effectiviteit van interventies
vast te stellen. Voor de onderzochte steekproefperioden in het tijdvak
februari 1987-oktober 1989 blijkt dat de interventies van de Bundesbank
en de Federal Reserve geen systematisch effect hebben gehad op de
DM/$-koers.
Uiteraard doen deze resultaten de vraag rijzen waarom centrale banken
nog intervenieren. Hoofdstuk 7 tracht deze vraag te beantwoorden. Een
verklaring voor het waargenomen interventie gedrag kan worden
gevonden in het feit dat centrale banken die met volledig onafhankelijk
mogen opereren van politici in het algemeen en het Ministerie van
Financien in het bijzonder soms gedwongen worden om over te gaan tot
interventies. Onder overigens gelijkblijvende (monetaire) omstandigheden
zouden de interventies de wisselkoers moeten beinvloeden door het
publiek te verrassen.
De monetaire autoriteiten van grote landen zijn over het algemeen niet
bereid om hun monetaire beleid ondergeschikt te maken aan hun
wisselkoersbeleid. Interventies waarvan het geldmarkt effect wordt
geneutraliseerd vormen echter door de bank genomen een vrij machteloos
instrument dat niet in staat is tegenwicht te bieden aan de omvangrijke
kapitaalstromen die door private valutamarktparticipanten worden
gegenereerd. Gesteriliseerde interventies kunnen wei gebruikt worden om
de private sector uit haar evenwicht te brengen. Transacties in vreemde
valuta's zijn met veel onzekerheid omgeven. Met interventies kunnen
centrale banken een signaal geven. Dit kan private valutamarkt-
participanten aan het denken zetten over de duurzaamheid van het
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bestaande wisselkoersniveau. Dit kan hen aanzetten tot het zodanig
afdekken van open posities dat de wisselkoers in de door de centrale
bank gewenste richting gaat bewegen.
In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt gebruik gemaakt van de inzichten uit de
moderne spel-theoretische benadering van monetaire en budgettaire
politiek. Het blijkt dat ook de uitkomsten van de 'exchange rate policy
game' tussen centrale bank en rationeel publiek aanleiding geven om te
pleiten voor een zo groot mogelijke politieke en economische
onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank. Een politiek afhankelijke centrale
bank kan gedwongen worden te intervenieren. Rationele private
valutamarktparticipanten kennen de machtsverhoudingen en voorzien de
interventies. Daarmee is het verrassingseffect van interventies tot nul
gereduceerd. Wat resteert zijn de vrijwel onvermijdelijke verliezen voor
de centrale bank. Een centrale bank die zelf mag weten wat ze doet en
bovendien niet gedwongen is om volledige inzage te geven in de exacte
interventiecijfers (asymmetrische informatie) blijkt het beste in staat om
het wisselkoersverloop enigszins te stabiliseren.
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat conclusies.





